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ABSTRACT 
Competition law has become an important legal tool as it plays a significant role in 
preventing different forms of anti-competitive behaviour and ensures fair competition in 
the market. For this purpose, the United Arab Emirates has adopted its first comprehensive 
competition law, named “UAE Federal Law No. 4 of 2012 Concerning Regulating 
Competition”, to be enforced from 23rd February 2013. The law contains 33 Articles 
regulating competition in all commercial sectors. 
This research aims to investigate the UAE competition law in order to answer the 
main question, which is to what extent does the new law ensure fair competition in the 
commercial field of the country. It examines the flaws and drawbacks in the competition 
law and the enforcement mechanism. The research suggests the reforms required to 
improve the law and the way this could be accomplished. In order to answer the main 
question, the research applies two main methods, which are the black letter approach and 
the socio-legal approach. In addition, the research will employ the interview approach. 
Different issues were found in the UAE competition law in the areas of anti-
competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position, mergers and acquisitions, state aid, 
and enforcement. The findings demonstrate that evidence exists of anti-competitive 
behaviour in the market, such as monopolistic practices and abuse of dominant position. 
Furthermore, there is evidence of inadequate implementation of the law against many 
market players, such as state-owned undertakings. From the findings, the role of the 
Competition Regulation Committee seems to be weak and inadequate, and there are some 
conflicts with the role and the Ministry of Economy. Some recommendations have been 
suggested for policy reform and enhancement of the law and its upcoming regulations. 
It is hoped that the findings of this research will provide a framework for the UAE 
and the countries in the region that seek to have more competitive markets. This study is 
the first to address the competition law of the UAE, thus this study contributes to the 
understanding of the law and its application, and it is hoped it will add to knowledge in the 
field of competition law. Furthermore, based on the evidence, the research concludes by 
suggesting a number of implications and potential future research avenues. 
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Chapter One: Introduction and Methodology 
1.1 United Arab Emirates Economy - Overview 
The economy of the United Arab Emirates is the second largest in the Arab 
world (after Saudi Arabia), with gross (GDP) of $377 billion (AED1.38 trillion) in 2012. 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has successfully diversified their economy, as 71 per 
cent of the UAE's total GDP comes from non-oil sectors.  
The economy was expected to grow between 4-4.5% in 2013, compared to 2.3-3.5% 
over the past five years. Since independence in 1971, the UAE’s economy has grown by 
nearly 231 times to AED1.45 trillion in 2013. The non-oil trade has grown to AED1.2 
trillion, representing growth of around 28 times from 1981 to 2012. 
Tourism is one of the main sources of revenue in the UAE, with some of the world's 
most luxurious hotels being based in the UAE. Although the UAE is now less dependent 
on natural resources as a source of revenue, petroleum and natural gas exports still play an 
important role in the economy, especially in Abu Dhabi. A massive construction boom, an 
expanding manufacturing base, and a thriving services sector are helping the UAE 
diversify its economy. Nationwide, there is currently $350 billion worth of 
active construction projects. Chapter 3, section 3.2 goes into relevant detail of the 
economic development in the UAE. 
The UAE is a member of the World Trade Organization and OPEC. Based on the 
above statistical summary and financial figures it is imperative that UAE government 
maintain such wealth and economic growth. This can only be achieved with investment, 
worldwide economic confidence of the UWE economy that enhance, support, encourage 
and allow freedom for foreign investment and trade. For all this to happen the UAE 
government and institutions need a good, fair and balance competition law to serve all of 
these objectives. 
1.2 Introduction to Competition Law 
Competition law has become an important legal tool in the developed states and some 
of the developing economies and is considered a major instrument of market reform 
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worldwide.1 During the last few decades, competition law has gone through an important 
process of expansion. Mostly it was known in developed states, while most of the 
developing economies, including the United Arab Emirates, did not have any proper 
competition laws.2 It has been claimed that competition law is a primary legal tool which 
aims to operate market-oriented economies. Nearly a century after the first modern 
competition statute was passed in 1889 in Canada,3 it may be noticed that there has been a 
rapid increase in the number of states which have adopted competition laws. It has been 
claimed that approximately 90 states have adopted competition policies among their laws, 
whereas only a few countries had competition laws in the past.4 However, since then that 
number has increased and more than a hundred states have adopted competition laws, 
whereas some of the developing economies are in the stage of law drafting.5 
The terms competition law and competition policy are used synonymously. 
However; they have different meanings. It should be noted that the domain of competition 
policy is wider than that of competition law. Competition policy may be defined as the 
tools of public policy which establish the basis for an open market economy or “facilitate 
the creation and growth of efficient and competitive firms that can deliver goods and 
services to [the consumer] and engage in trade and competition in international markets.”6 
In addition, competition policy determines competition’s conditions that control the 
market, since it consists of the set of tools and measures practised by governments.7 The 
measures of competition policy can include actions to reduce licensing requirements for 
new investment or entry, the privatising of state-owned enterprises, deregulating activities, 
trade liberalisation,8 cutting “firm-specific subsidy programmes” and reducing “the extent 
of policies that discriminate against foreign products or producers.”9 
                     
1 Holmes, P. The World Trade Organization and Competition Policy: Implications for Developing Countries. Institute for Developing 
Studies. 2003. 34, p. 2 
2 Singh, A. Competition and Competition Policy in Emerging Markets: International and Developmental Dimensions. United Nations 
Center for International Development-Harvard University, G-24 Discussion Paper Series. [Online] 2002. Available from: 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=5&ved=0CEIQFjAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fciteseerx.ist.psu.edu%2Fview
doc%2Fdownload%3Fdoi%3D10.1.1.167.5828%26rep%3Drep1%26type%3Dpdf&rct=j&q=Competition%20and%20Competi
tion%20Policy%20in%20Emerging%20Markets%3A%20International%20and%20Developmental%20Dimensions.%20&ei=fs
t-TdPFLoWXtweO89TVCA&usg=AFQjCNG8yG1deVc1nLlysoaMbEez04Ikrg [Accessed: 12 March 2011]. 
3 Ross, T. The Evaluation of Competition Law in Canada. Review of .Industrial Organisation. 1998. 13. 1-2. p. 2. 
4 Lianos, L. Collusion in Vertical Relations Under Article 81 EC. Common Market Law Review, 2008. 45. 4, pp. 1027-1077. 
5 Emmert, F., Kronthaler, F. and Stephan, J. Analysis of Statements made in Favour of and Against the Adoption of Competition Law 
in Developing and Transition Economies. [Online]. 2005. Available from: http://www.iwh-
halle.de/projects/competition_policy/Claims_02.PDF [Accessed: 13 March 2011]. 
6 Fingelton, J., Fox, E., Neven, D. & Seabright, P. Competition Policy and the Transformation of Central Europe. London: CEPR. 
1996, pp. 2-3. 
7 Hoekman, B. & Mavroidis, P. Economic Development, Competition Policy, and the World Trade Organisation, Policy Research 
Working Paper, No. 2917, Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 2002, p. 4. 
8 Jones, A. & Sufrin, B., EC Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 3rd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2007, p. 3. 
9 Hoekman, B. & Mavroidis, P. Op. cit. 
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Consequently, competition policy comprises two parts which have a great effect on 
economic agents in the market place. The first one refers to anti-trust or competition law 
and the other refers to “micro industrial policies such as tariff and non-tariff policies, 
foreign direct investment, unnecessary government intervention in the market place and 
economic regulation designed to prevent anti-competitive business practices by firms.”10 
On the other hand, competition law has a different meaning to competition policy. 
There have been some efforts to define competition law. However, in spite of the efforts 
made by the literature on this topic, it has been claimed that defining competition law, 
comprehensively and in an uncontroversial manner, is difficult and doubtful. This is 
because competition law’s objectives and aims are “as fluid and changing as competition 
law itself.”11 
Notably, competition law has a broad and a narrow meaning. The broad meaning of 
competition law refers to the laws that seek the promotion of competition through banning 
unfair competition conduct and anti-competitive conduct. The broad definition of 
competition law and policy has only been adopted by a few countries, such as China and 
Germany. The Chinese competition law covers both unfair competition and anti-
competitive practices, while in Germany there are two kinds of legislation that cover both 
groups (anti-competitive practices and unfair competition practices). The first legal statute 
is the competition law (known as Wettbewerbsrecht) which covers anti-competitive 
conduct and unfair practices. The second is cartel law (known as Kartellrecht) which not 
only covers cartels but all types of anti-competitive practices.12 
It is worth mentioning that, although both anti-competitive conduct laws and unfair 
competition conduct laws aims to protect consumer welfare and market competition, there 
are massive differences between them. Unfair competition practices law aim to protect 
enterprises from the dishonest practices conducted by other competitors. Frequently, 
dishonest practices generally include deception, trade secrets misuse, misleading 
advertising, competitors’ defamation, and commercial bribery. The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has defined unfair competition 
                     
10 Khemani, S. & Dutz, M. A., The Instruments of Competition Policy and their Relevance for Economic Development. In: Frischtak, 
C. (ed.) Regulatory Policies and Reform in Industrializing Countries: A Comparative Analysis. Washington D. C: The World 
Bank. 1995. 
11 Dabbah, M. EC and UK Competition Law: Commentary, Cases and Materials. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2004, p. 
5. 
12 Gerber, D. Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 1998, p. 4. 
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practices as a “sort of fraudulent behaviour or misappropriation of property rights.”13 
Moreover, the OECD emphasised that in general unfair competition prohibition or unfair 
trade practices prohibition are not part of competition law.14 
On the other hand, the narrow meaning of competition law defines it as the legislation 
which bans anti-competitive conduct only. This meaning has been adopted by major 
competition regimes in many countries which have different forms of legislation for both 
anti-competitive practices and unfair competition practices, and use the term ‘competition 
law’ to refer to the anti-competitive practices. It is worth mentioning that some countries, 
such as Australia and Russia, which have a single piece of legislation that deals with both 
unfair competition conduct and anti-competitive conduct, use the term ‘competition law’ 
to refer to anti-competitive practices only. 
One of the least controversial attempts to define competition law is that it is 
“concerned with applying legal rules and standards to address market imperfections and to 
preserve, promote and sometimes restore market conditions conducive to competition. In 
other words it is law used to protect competition.”15 
In addition, competition law has been defined by some scholars as the relationship 
between undertakings that sell the same kind of goods or services “at the same time to an 
identifiable group of costumers.”16 In view of that, each firm will be in relationship with 
the other undertakings in the same market once that firm has taken a decision to operate 
the production and distribution facilities and place its service or goods on the market. 
Moreover, competition law has been defined as a set of rules, judicial decisions and 
regulations that governments apply in connection with either the agreements set out 
between firms that restrict competition or the abuse of a dominant position by a firm or 
firms through mergers.17 
While the key role of competition policy is the injection of more competition into 
the market “either through pursuing pro-competition policies like opening the whole 
economy to international competition, or deregulating certain sectors to permit the entry 
                     
13 OECD. The Role of Competition Law and Policy, Paris: OECD. 15. 2001, p. 28. For the EU unfair competition, see MacCulloch, 
A. & Rodger, B. Competition Law and Policy in the European Community and United Kingdom, 2nd ed., London: Cavendish 
Publishing Limited. 2001, pp. 26-27. 
14 Ibid. p. 29. 
15 Ibid. pp 5- 6. 
16 Albors-Llorens, A. & Goyder, J. Goyder. EC Competition Law. 4th ed. New York: Oxford University Press. 2009, pp. 8-9. 
17 For a detailed definition see Amato, G. Anti-trust and the Bounds of Power. Hart Publishing. 1997, pp. 2–3. 
5 
 
of private agents,”18 competition law aims to create and protect competition’s conditions 
in the market. A firm’s organisation and monitoring in the market is what competition law 
seeks.19 
The primary goal of the rules established under competition law is to eliminate 
hindrances that may affect competitive processes. Competition law is a subset of 
competition policy and it offers a framework that guides competitive activity with the aim 
of making markets operate more effectively. Thus, competition law emphasises 
accomplishing two things: (i) enhancing the achievement of all efficiencies associated with 
it through implementation of rules that guide competition within a market where 
competition already exists and (ii) encouraging competition where it does not exist through 
the adoption of structural remedies within a market that is unduly concentrated.20 
In addition, according to Singh, “the intensivity of competition in some developing 
countries’ markets is low: it is not easy to access the market and the number of players is 
limited, with large concentration.”21 A lot of evidence exists which demonstrates anti-
competitive conduct in developing countries’ markets.22 One of the reasons that the anti-
competitive behaviour exists is what we can see from the anti-competitive conduct 
committed by foreign firms and multinationals and international cartels, which eliminates 
the progress of competition among small and medium-sized firms. Thus, the purpose of 
competition law is to protect small and medium-sized enterprises from the dominant 
firms23 or to “force a dominant firm to give access to the resources it controls to a smaller 
firm in order to allow the latter to compete with it.”24 
In addition, one of the main goals of competition law is to “protect economic freedom 
and opportunity by promoting competition in the market place” which will result in 
benefiting consumers through reduced prices, greater choice and better quality.25 
                     
18 Shahein, H. The Development of Competition Law and Policy in Egypt: International and National Factors. (Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of The London School of Economics and Political Science). 2010, p. 13. 
19 Jones, A. & Sufrin, B. Op. cit. p. 35. 
20 This is the major philosophy behind the law, see Baquero, C. J. Between Competition and Free Movement: The Economic 
Constitutional Law of the European Community. Hart Publishing. 2002, pp. 31-33.  
21 Marcos, F. Do Developing Countries Need Competition Law and Policy?  Instituto de Empresa Business School. [Online] 2006, p. 
6. Available from: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID930562_code242325.pdf?abstractid=930562&mirid=1 
[Accessed: 20 April 2011]. 
22 Jenny, F. Cartels and Collusion in Developing Countries: Lessons from Empirical Evidence. World Competition. 2006. 29:1, pp. 
109-137. 
23 Stenborg, M. Do We Need New Competition Policy in the ‘New Economy’? The Finnish Economy and Society [Online] 2002. 49. 
Available from:  <www.etla.fi/files/921_FES_02_2_competition_policy.pdf. [Accessed:  20 January 2010]. 
24 Jones, A. & Sufrin, B. EC Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials. 3rd ed. 2008. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 3. 
25 Stenborg, M. Op. cit. p.4.  
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Competition is highly regarded since it is usually considered as an approach to 
inspire international confidence in a given economy. This is because foreign investors are 
rather cautious of freely committing their capital in a country where they are not too sure 
of its systems transparency. Thus, enacting competition laws provides an assurance to 
international investors that a country operates under a true market economy and the 
participants in that economy, including local and foreign participants, are equally directed 
by the law responsible for governing the behaviour of players in the market place.26 
Based on the above, competition law or anti-trust law could be defined as legislation 
which is enacted by the government: a) to regulate trade and commerce by many ways 
such as preventing monopolies, unlawful restraints and price-fixing; b) for competition 
promotion; and c) for the encouragement of lowest price production of quality goods and 
services, with the aim of protecting public welfare through guaranteeing “that consumer 
demands will be met by the manufacture and sale of goods at reasonable prices.”27 
Competition law in general has three main elements, which are:  
“Prohibiting agreements or practices that restrict free trading and 
competition between businesses. This includes in particular the repression of 
cartels; banning abusive behaviour by a firm dominating a market, or anti-
competitive practices that tend to lead to such a dominant position. Practices 
controlled in this way may include predatory pricing, tying, price gouging, 
refusal to deal, and many others; and supervising the mergers and acquisitions 
of large corporations, including some joint ventures. Transactions that are 
considered to threaten the competitive process can be prohibited altogether, or 
approved subject to "remedies" such as an obligation to divest part of the 
merged business or to offer licenses or access to facilities to enable other 
businesses to continue competing.”28 
1.3 Research Aims and Question 
The aim of this research is to investigate the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
competition law and its rules and regulations. This aim can be achieved through reviewing 
                     
26 For details on its relation to international trade and industrial policy, Baker, J. The Case for Anti-trust Enforcement. The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives. [Online] 2003. 17. 4. pp. 27-50. Available from http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3216930.pdf 
[Accessed: 20 February 2010] 
27 Jones, A. & Sufrin, B. Op. cit. p. 2. 
28 Kerber, W. The Theory of Regulatory Competition and Competition Law. Munich: Sellier European Law Publishers. 2008. 
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a selected jurisdiction which has been developed in the competition field. This research is 
going to examine the legal regimes of the EU and then indicate the difficulties, anomalies 
and gaps that exist in the laws of the UAE concerning the commercial competition field. 
The reason that the researcher is going to look at the legal systems in the EU is that the EU 
system is foremost in adopting competition laws just like the US. However, the researcher 
selected the EU competition law due to the similarities between the EU and UAE 
competition laws. The EU competition law and its scope are very similar to the UAE 
competition law, even though the objectives are different. The EU competition law has 
proven great implementation within the EU member states through the years; thus, the 
comparative method aims to find solutions to overcome any difficulty that might face the 
government when implementing the law within the different Emirates. Then the UAE 
competition law and other laws regarding the competition area will be studied, and 
measured and evaluated in the light of the EU regimes. The strengths and weaknesses of 
these different regimes will be scrutinised and the lessons which the UAE can learn from 
the EU competition regimes will be indicated. 
The review looks into the following research questions: 
1. Does the UAE competition law ensure fair competition in the 
Emirates? 
2. What are the defects, if any, in the UAE competition law and the 
enforcement mechanism? 
3. What reforms are required, if any, to advance the UAE competition 
law and what are the ways to achieve such reforms? 
1.3.1 Initial Considerations 
The researcher chooses the competition laws of the UAE and the EU for comparison 
in his research. The purpose of the comparison is to determine the choice of a more 
comprehensive competition legal system that will benefit the UAE, taking into 
consideration that it is a developing economy compared to an advanced and developed 
system of the stature of the EU.  
1.3.2 Purposes of comparative law in this research 
The following points will illustrate the purpose of this comparative study research: 
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 An academic discipline and hopefully this will lead to the researcher gaining his 
PhD. 
 An aid to legislation and law reform. This is the ultimate result of this research, as 
the researcher feels strongly about the lack of competition fairness in the UAE. 
 A means of understanding legal rules. This is imperative as it was found when 
carrying out this research. It goes beyond the common public users and reaches as 
far as law enforcement authorities in UAE. 
 A contribution to the systematic unification and harmonisation of law in the UAE.  
1.3.3 Types of comparative studies. 
The types of comparative studies used in this research were: 
 Comparison of the different stages of the development of the competition law 
systems in the EU and UAE. 
 Comparing the EU and UAE competition laws to ascertain similarities and 
differences between the two systems. 
1.4 Research Significance 
It should be noted that competition law is not a new concept in the UAE only but in 
the Middle East as a whole. It was only recently that many countries in the region adopted 
their own competition law, for example, Jordan in 2004, Saudi Arabia on 2004, Qatar in 
2006 and Egypt in 2006. Prior to the enactment of the new competition law, few articles 
in the commercial law included rules with regard to competition matters. The new 
competition law was adopted in order to cover the various unfair practices in the market, 
such as mergers and acquisitions operations, abuse of dominant position and anti-
competitive agreements. 
This study is the first of its kind to address competition law in the UAE. The law has 
been recently implemented, and no in-depth study has been carried out yet. It is hoped that 
the research outcomes and findings will add to the knowledge in this field, enabling a good 
understanding and application of the law. Through the findings of the research, not only 
will practitioners (judges and lawyers) and law researchers benefit, but also consumers and 
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investors. The research aims to set up a framework for the UAE and the countries in the 
region that aim to have more competitive markets. 
The importance and the significance of this research lie in the achievement of the 
above-mentioned aims and objectives. The research is important in the sense that it 
purports to outline the weaknesses in the present UAE competition system. It aims to 
compare the current (New) competition law of the UAE with the more developed laws of 
Western countries. It will endeavour to compare and evaluate the current legal regime with 
a well-established and implemented competition law (the EU competition law) and provide 
solutions to overcome the existing weaknesses identified. It will recommend reform and 
will enumerate the steps which the government ought to take regarding competition. 
1.5 Research Methodology 
Generally, research methodology is described as undertaking research within a 
framework or set of approaches using techniques and procedures that have been examined 
for their reliability and validity and designed to achieve an unbiased objective. According 
to Polkinghorne, research methodology is a process that deals with the investigation of the 
potential strategies to be carried which leads to obtaining understanding.29 In this research, 
three approaches have been used in the process of designing which are: the black letter 
(Theory) approach, the socio-legal (Practice) and mixing both, theory and practice, 
approach. 
This section shall accordingly cover examination of the three interrelated aspects of 
legal methodology: comparative legal research, socio-legal research and the pattern of their 
synthesis in the context of the acquiring of the scientific knowledge on the interaction of 
national legal systems. Through the elucidation of mentioned methodological layers and 
their relation, the researcher will quest for the answers on the following questions: 
Whether strict distinction between comparative and socio-legal research has outlived its 
utility? Is it possible to efficiently synthesize comparative and socio-legal research in the 
joint pattern of scientific legal inquiry? If the efficient synthesis of comparative and socio-
legal research is possible, how such kind of methodology should be shaped in the context 
of the research on the interaction of national legal systems? 
What methodological pattern is the most efficient in order to reveal the interaction of 
                     
29 Polkinghorne, D. E. Methodology for the Human Sciences: Systems of Inquiry, New York: New York Press, 1983, p. 15. 
10 
 
national legal systems? Should such kind of legal research be doctrinal, socio-legal, 
comparative or should it adopt comprehensive methodological synthesis? The author will 
quest for the answers on these and related questions by analysing the interconnection 
between comparative legal research and socio-legal studies. 
The main methodology of this research consists of three interrelated sections. The 
first part is devoted to the discussion of the traditional distance between comparative legal 
research and socio-legal studies and indented to elucidate the concepts of methodological 
trends and the reasons of their demarcation. The second section is designed for the 
examination of history and current tendencies of the methodological synthesis between 
comparative legal research and socio-legal studies. Finally the possibilities of 
methodological synthesis in the research on the interaction of national legal systems are 
presented. The concept ‘comparative legal research’ is most commonly referred as 
‘comparative law’ – linguistically imprecise term (nevertheless most widespread one). 
Instead of ‘comparative law’ the researcher advocates for the usage of more coherent and 
diverse terminology – ‘comparative legal science’, ‘comparative legal research’, 
‘comparative legal method’ (taking into the consideration corresponding context, i.e. 
whether one is referring to branch of legal science / academic discipline, tool of 
construction, mean of understanding legal provisions, etc.). In order to elucidate 
comparative trend of legal research it is essential to mention its methodological scope. In 
this research this is done to achieve the followings, as conventionally as the researcher 
can distinguish five possible categories (suggested by Hug and adopted by Cruz):  
1- Comparison of foreign system(s), in this case the EU with the domestic system 
(UAE) in order to ascertain similarities and differences;  
2- Studies which analyse objectively and systematically solutions which the two above 
systems (EU and UAE) offer for the competition legal problem;  
3- Studies which investigate the causal relationship between EU and UAE 
competition law;  
4- Studies which compare the several stages of the two (EU & UAE) legal systems; 
and 
5-  Studies which attempt to discover or examine legal evolution of both systems, in 
this case only the EU will be looked at as the UAE law is in its infancy.  
In this research the presence of ‘many points of similarity and overlap’ between 
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comparative legal research and socio-legal studies is beyond any doubt which makes it 
very hard for the demarcation between these two fields of scientific legal inquiries, (in 
this basis all three methods were adopted for this research): ‘In view of its general 
aims, comparative law needs legal sociology as much as legal history and legal ethnology. 
Both legal sociology and comparative law are engaged in charting the extent to which law 
influences and determines man’s behaviour, and the role played by law in the social 
scheme of things’.
30
 Nevertheless they provide more or less sound arguments for the 
demarcation: ‘One fundamental difference between the two is that sociology covers a much 
wider field than comparative law, and, as Zweigert and Kotz explain, while sociology of 
law, through field studies and empirical observation, simply observes how the legal 
institutions operate, comparative law concerns itself with the question of ‘how the law 
ought to be’, by studying the rules and institutions of law in relation to each other.31 
Watson32 has also emphasised the autonomy of law, legal ideas and legal tradition which 
transcend purely sociological or socio-historical explanations’.33 In this research this was 
looked at in more depth for the EU law and in term of the UAE law the componential 
institutions of the law as well as mechanisms in ratifying the law were looked at. 
1.5.1 The Black Letter Law Methodology 
The black letter law methodology is an important approach for carrying out legal 
research. It refers to the basic standard elements for a specific field of law that are well 
established and not subject to reasonable dispute.34 It can also be described as a specific 
method of understanding what counts as legal research, including the relevant materials.35 
However, this approach does not focus on law in practice; its main focus is on law in 
theory.36 Thus, adopting this method allowed the researcher to establish an in-depth 
understanding of the UAE competition law rules and highlight their advantages and 
disadvantages. This approach was important for this research and considered appropriate 
to the aim of analysing the law since the law has not been tested yet. 
In this research this was used to draw a distinction, between competition law theory 
                     
30 De Cruz, P. Comparative law in a changing world. 2nd ed. London: Cavendish Publishing. 1999. p. 10. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Watson, A. Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law. Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press. 1974. p.183 
33 De Cruz, P. Op cit.  
34 Princeton University. Black letter law. Available from: 
http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Black_letter_law.html [Accessed: 20 June 2013]. 
35 Polkinghorne, D. E. Op. cit. p. 44. 
36 Ibid. p. 118. 
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and contrast black-letter law as used in the EU and the unsettled legal issues of the UAE 
competition law. In this research this was mainly carried out as desktop and library research 
to conclude the main points of this research. 
Justification for using black letter methodology: 
The Black letter approach/methodology is justifiable and appropriate for use in this 
research which investigates the UAE Competition Law enforceable from February 2013. 
The United Arab Emirates has adopted its first comprehensive competition law, which is 
named “UAE Federal Law No. 4 of 2012 Concerning Regulating Competition”, 
enforceable from 23rd February 2013. The Black letter approach is particularly suitable for 
investigating defects or inconsistencies that might arise during enforcement.37 One would 
expect looking at the enforcement mechanism in the UAE that inconsistencies in 
application of this new law are bound to arise, thereby making the black letter approach to 
be appropriate. 
The reason why the black letter is found to be a suitable methodological approach in 
this research is that it enables the researcher to use a popular technique among black letter 
lawyers to carry out deductive reasoning (sometimes referred to as syllogistic reasoning).38 
In so doing, the researcher used the black letter technique of deductive reasoning to 
examine both the internal consistency (thread of precedents in which judgements so far 
passed regarding anti-competitive behaviour fits) and external consistency (whether the 
newly enforceable competition law in the UAE is aligned with the relevant universal 
principles of fair market competition).39 The Black letter approach as used in this context 
enables the researcher to answer one of the research questions “what are the defects, if 
any, in the UAE competition law and the enforcement mechanism”? Following the 
tradition of black letter lawyers this research was carried out using desktop and library 
research. 
1.5.2 The Synthesis of Comparative and Socio-Legal Research 
Justification for using a synthesis of comparative & socio-legal research: 
A fundamental research question this thesis attempts to answer is “does the UAE 
                     
37 Morris, C. & Murphy, C. Getting a PhD in Law. Oxford and Portland Oregon: Hart Publishing. 2011. p.31. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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competition law ensure fair competition in the Emirates? In order to answer this question 
an approach based on a synthesis of comparative and socio-legal research is adopted. The 
reason and usefulness for adopting the above approach is that the main essential argument 
of this research is that competition law in the UAE appears inconsistent with the wider 
social values of fairness in the context of UAE market institutions.40 Abuse of dominant 
positions, monopolies, and anticompetitive behaviours are a manifested in the UAE market 
practices. The socio-legal aspect of the methodology is used in this context to enable 
researcher to examine the socio-cultural contexts of UAE markets in which relevant laws 
were made and operate. In so doing, it provides the researcher with an approach whose aim 
is to find lasting solutions to an endemic problem of lack of fairness subjecting a sector of 
the UAE market to disadvantage and consequently the society at large.  
In addition to above, a comparative legal analysis is undertaken by reference to the 
above particular social phenomenon of lack of fairness in the UAE market system which 
the researcher is hoping to find a solution to. The main relevance of adopting comparative 
legal analysis by reference to the social problems arising from market unfairness in the 
UAE is to draw out of the comparison knowledge that could not be obtained by examining 
UAE market system separately.41  
In so doing,   the above approach enabled the researcher, despite historical and 
cultural differences in jurisdiction and regulations of anticompetitive behaviour in the 
market places of EU on one hand and UAE on the other, to draw useful insights.42 Since 
the UAE competition law is relatively new compared to a more established EU competition 
laws, the researcher is able to draw some knowledge of how EU come up with workable 
solutions when faced with similar social and market problems. The overall goal is to find 
something of value therefrom which can be used by UAE towards enforcing the 
competition laws.43 Using this methodological synthesis the researcher was able to answer 
the following research question “What reforms are required, if any, to advance the UAE 
competition law and what are the ways to achieve such reforms. 
Through the comparative approach, the researcher compares the UAE and EU 
competition laws.  Through comparison it has been noticed that the UAE competition rules 
                     
40 Ibid 
41 Watkins. D. & Burton, M. (eds.) Research Methods in Law. London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. 2013. p. 101. 
42 Morris, C. & Murphy, C. Op cit. p. 38. 
43 Ibid. 
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are very similar to the EU competition rules. It was suggested that the UAE has adopted 
the EU competition law (specifically Article 101 and 102 of the Treaty of Functioning of 
the European Union); thus, it was very important, through this approach, to assess the 
application of the competition law of the EU. The outcomes of this approach are aimed at 
enhancing the enforcement mechanism for the application and enforcement of the UAE 
competition law.  
The methodological synthesis of comparative and social-legal research is rooted 
deep in the history of the Western thought. Early attempts to conjoin these two 
methodological trends can be found in the works of J. J. Rousseau44 and Ch. Montesquieu45, 
later – M. Weber46, K. N. Llewellyn47, L. H. Morgan48 and many others.49 A good example 
of the early attempt to build foundation for the fruitful methodological synthesis between 
comparative legal research and socio-legal studies took place at the Law School of 
Columbia University in New York in the 1920s. The whole experiment is described in 
detail by B. Currie50:  
1-The first difference consisted in the organisation of materials in terms of social and 
economic problems rather than legal doctrine.  
2- Secondly, the proposals proceeded on the assumption that certain non-legal materials 
were directly and pointedly relevant.  
3- Thirdly, courses utilised statutory materials to an extent which was unusual. Each of these 
features emphasised the role of creative reason, as opposed to deduction from a priori 
principles in the solution of social and legal problems’.51 Notwithstanding Columbian 
experiment in many aspects was a failure52, it can be evaluated as a landmark for the 
future more successfully attempts of synthesising comparative legal research and socio-
legal studies. 
The traditional distance between comparative legal research ad socio-legal studies 
                     
44 Rousseau, J. The Social Contract (orig. 1743) Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1968. pp.81-91. 
45 Montesquieu, B. & Louis De Secondat, C. The complete works of M. de Montesquieu (orig. 1777) Farmington Hills: Gale ECCO. 
2010. p.35. 
46 Weber, M. Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1966. pp.53-55. 
47 Llewellyn K. N &. Hoebel, E. A. The Cheyenne Way. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1941. p.188. 
48 Maine, H. S. International Law: A Series of Lectures Delivered Before the University of Cambridge 1887. London: John Murray. 
1888. pp.206-209. 
49 Riles, A. Comparative Law and Socio-legal Studies’ In: Reimann, M & Zimmermann, R. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2006. pp.776–777. 
50 Currie, B. The Materials of legal Education. Journal of Legal Education. 1955-56. 8. pp.1-78. 
 
51 Wilson, G. Comparative Legal Scholarship’ In ‘Research Methods for Law. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 2007. p.90  
52 Ibid. p.90. 
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began to decrease in the second half the twentieth century concerning ‘two principal 
subjects—the study of legal institutions other than those of Europe, North America and 
Latin America on the one hand, and the (often related) study of ‘legal pluralism’ on the 
other’.53 Nowadays is it obvious that ‘socio- legal studies has seen a tremendous growth of 
interest in international and transnational subjects’ and comparative legal research ‘has 
engaged more with empirical studies and with social theory’.54 According to A. Riles ‘one 
finds everywhere today signs of a new rapprochement’55 between these two methodological 
trends. Presently rapid synthesis between two mentioned methodological trends is 
proceeding in research fields under the topics of legal profession, law and development, rule 
of law, harmonisation projects national and local effects of global legal forms, renewed 
debates about Legal pluralism, and even more intensively – concerning legal transplants and 
legal culture.56 
Summarising contemporary tendencies (and before progressing to the methodological 
synthesis in the context of the research on the interaction of national legal systems), it is 
important to finally answer on the utility of strict distinction between comparative and socio-
legal research. Is it correct to delimitate socio-legal studies from comparative legal research 
on the basis of the transnational focus? Whether the autonomy of law, legal ideas and legal 
tradition transcend purely sociological or socio-historical explanations?57 Whether 
sociology of law, through field studies and empirical observation, simply observes how 
the legal institutions operate and comparative law concerns itself with the question of ‘how 
the law ought to be’?58 
Firstly, the transnational focus both in comparative legal research and socio-legal 
studies is indispensable – both fields are reconfigured around ‘the transnational character of 
even the most local of regulatory practices’.59 Secondly, the stark distinction of law and 
society has already outlived its utility60 – the autonomy of law, legal ideas and legal tradition 
from the society is under severe stress and is unable to defend itself. Finally, the distinction 
between normative and descriptive argument is no longer a fruitful way of delineating 
boundaries between comparative legal researches and socio-legal studies: ‘it is now generally 
                     
53 Riles. A. Op cit. p.785. 
54 Ibid. pp.789. 
55 Ibid. pp.777. 
56 Ibid. pp.789–799. 
57 Watson, A. Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law. Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press. 1974. p.183. 
58 Zweigert K. & Kotz, H. An introduction to comparative law. Amsterdam and New York: North-Holland Pub. Co. 1977. pp.9-10.  
59 Riles. A. Op cit. 799. 
60 Ibid. pp.800-80 
16 
 
agreed that it is needed not choose between ‘theoretical’ and ‘empirical’ work. Although 
Law and Society scholars have long shown some antipathy towards ‘theory’ and 
comparative lawyers have shown some antipathy towards empiricism, there is consensus 
now that scholarship in both fields needs to be both theoretically informed and empirically 
grounded – and that different mixes of these two elements should be encouraged and 
appreciated’.61 
In conclusion of the discussion on the synthesis of comparative and socio-legal 
research, one more important aspect is to be clarified. In legal literature often, three 
methodological approaches are distinguished:  
1. Doctrinal (black-letter),  
2. Socio-legal and  
3. Comparative.62  
However, the author of this research argues that it is methodologically incorrect to 
classify legal researches into three mentioned groups as separate trends of scientific 
inquiry, i.e. comparative approach is not independent field of legal methodology, but 
rather specific dimension of both doctrinal and socio- legal approaches as shown in table 
1, below. 
 Doctrinal (black-letter) 
approach 
Socio-legal approach 
Domestic research of ‘law 
in books’ 
Domestic research of ‘law 
in action’ 
 
Comparative approach 
Transnational research 
of ‘law in books’ 
Transnational research 
of ‘law in action’ 
Comparative 
interdisciplinary 
approach 
Transnational research of EU and UAE 
Competition Laws. 
‘law in books’ and ‘law in action’ 
Table 1 
The proposed classification, as shown in table 1, may lead some legal scholars to 
                     
61 Ibid. pp.802. 
62 Salter, M. & Mason, J. Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide to the Conduct of Legal Research. Dorchester: 
Pearson Education Ltd. 2007. pp.385-407. 
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unexpected conclusion that real dichotomy exists not between comparative legal research 
and socio-legal studies, but rather lies in comparative legal research itself, i.e. dichotomy 
between doctrinal and socio-legal approaches in comparative legal research. Yet synthesis 
of doctrinal and socio-legal approaches within comparative legal methodology is possible 
and gives birth to the comparative interdisciplinary approach, an approach which is able to 
comprehensively coincide with contemporary trends in legal methodology. 
1.5.3 Methodological Synthesis in the Context of the Research on the 
Interaction of National Legal Systems 
As it was thoroughly discussed above, the new rapprochement63 between 
comparative legal research and socio-legal studies is evident and the ongoing process of 
methodological synthesis between these two trends is clearly manifest. But how such kind 
of methodology should be shaped in the context of the research on the interaction of 
national legal systems? Can (should) the synthesis of comparative and socio-legal research 
be approached as the essential prerequisite to reveal the interaction of national legal 
systems? 
In order to answer the questions raised above, examining possible pattern of 
comparative and socio-legal methodological synthesis in this research on the interaction 
of two
64 national legal systems (EU and UAE), Table 2 below. 
(EU) (UAE) 
q 
Domestic research of 
‘law in books’ 
Example: 
Article 101, 
102 TFEU 
q 
Domestic research of 
‘law in action’ 
Example: 
Legal cases and 
historical 
development  
q 
Domestic research 
of 
‘law in 
books’ 
Example: 
UAE 
Federal 
Law No. 4 
of 2012 
Concerning 
Regulating 
Competition  
q 
Domestic research of 
‘law in action’ 
Example: 
Componential 
institutions and 
law enforcement 
structure 
                     
63 Riles, A. Op cit. p.789. 
64 The pattern discussed in this conference paper is equally applicable in case of research on the interaction between three and more 
legal systems. see: Levičev, V. The Synthesis of Comparative and Socio-Legal Research as The Essential Prerequisite to 
Reveal the Interaction of National Legal Systems. In International Conference of PhD Students and Young Researchers-
Integrating Social Sciences into Legal Research. Vilnius University, Lithuania, 24-25 April 2013. Vilnius: Vilnius University. 
2013. pp.163–170. 
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q 
Domestic research of both 
‘law in books’ and ‘law in action’ 
q 
Domestic research of both 
‘law in books’ and ‘law in action’ 
q 
Transnational comparative research of both ‘law in books’ and ‘law in action’ 
q 
INTERACTION OF NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 
 
Table 2 
 
By presenting the pattern of comparative and socio-legal methodological synthesis, 
the researcher strives to reveal three methodologically significant points. Firstly, both the 
doctrinal (‘law in books’) and socio-legal (‘law in action’) dimensions of law must be 
present in the comprehensive research of the interaction of legal systems. Absence of either 
will unavoidably prevent approaching actual interaction of selected legal systems – without 
social context researcher risks to leave behind deeper layers of legal actuality, while 
depending only on ‘law in action’ one stands the hazard of losing the nature of law itself. 
Secondly, in order to reveal the interaction of legal systems it is absolutely insufficient 
merely to define and collate domestic law of selected legal systems. If one is interested in 
discovery of the actual interaction – the comprehensive interdisciplinary comparative 
analysis has to be adopted. In this research this was done and adopted as shown in table 2 
above. 
Finally, it is crucially important to mention that when one is researching on the 
interaction of national legal systems, it is not enough to merely establish correlations of ‘law 
in books’ or ‘law in action’ or both between selected legal systems. The golden rule of 
scientific inquiry – cum hoc ergo propter hoc (correlation does not imply causation) – must 
be kept in mind at all times. A correlation between two variables does not necessarily imply 
that one causes the other, i.e. established correlations are insufficient of revealing the 
interaction – true causal relationship between selected legal systems. In order for a 
correlation to be established as causal, the cause and the effect must be connected through 
an impact mechanism, i.e. the comprehensive research on the interaction.65  The pattern 
                     
65 Ibid. 
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discussed in this research is equally applicable in case of research on the interaction between 
three and more legal systems. Between legal systems requires analysing not just causes and 
effects, but also the related impact mechanisms. The attempts to complete such formidable 
tasks will require extensive usage of experiments and regression analysis.66  
Late twentieth century was marked by the beginning of the new conversation 
between socio- legal scholars and comparative lawyers. Today we can conclude that strict 
distinction between comparative and socio-legal research has outlived its utility. 
Moreover, real dichotomy exists in comparative legal research itself (between doctrinal 
and socio-legal approaches). Comparative interdisciplinary approach – the synthesis of 
doctrinal and socio-legal approaches within comparative legal methodology – is able to 
comprehensively coincide with contemporary methodological trends. 
The synthesis of comparative and socio-legal research methodologies is the starting 
point in long demanding voyage of scientific inquiry for the revelation of the interaction 
of national legal systems. Before embarking on this profound journey one must (1) carefully 
consider the necessity of inclusion in the research both doctrinal and socio-legal dimensions 
of law; (2) be prepared for the comprehensive interdisciplinary comparative analysis and (3) 
pursue to research not only causes and effects of the interaction of national legal systems, 
but also the related impact mechanisms. 
1.6 Research Limitation 
Like any research, the present study has certain limitations. The phenomenon of 
competition law is very new to the UAE, in particular, and in the Middle East in general. 
This raises some issues for consideration: first, the scarcity of publications (including 
books, articles and studies) which investigate several competition law aspects in the region 
and the UAE in particular. Second, the law has not been tested yet because, although it was 
stated as at 23rd February 2013 to be enforced; the enforcement was delayed for a maximum 
period of six months so that the concerned parties could reconcile their status according to 
the law. 
In addition, owing to the constraints of time and other circumstances beyond the 
researcher’s control (such as that the research was established on a model law and then 
was adjusted and based on the Competition Bill that was not available until Summer 2012 
                     
66 The application of such methods in social sciences is especially challenging matter. 
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due to confidentiality, and later the law was passed and became available by February 
2013), the most recent legal developments could not be incorporated in the actual body of 
the thesis. 
However, in order to help minimise the effect of such limitations and ensure an in-
depth analysis of both Laws (EU and UAE) as well as providing some insight on the 
development of the law in UAE based on the historical evolution of the EU competition 
law. 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
Chapter One: Introduction and Methodology 
This chapter will provide the background of the research and explore the aim and 
definition of competition law. In addition, it attempts to outline the objectives of the 
research and highlights the research questions of the study. It illustrates the significance of 
this study and provides a general statement of the research approach. The methodology 
that is used in this research is outlined with justification of the reasons why the research 
used each of them.  A brief outline of the research organisation is provided. 
Chapter Two: Competition law Background, Values, Origins and scope 
This chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part of this chapter of the 
research constructs an understanding of the area that is of interest in this thesis by giving a 
general discussion about the modern philosophy of competition law and policy, including 
the origin and development. Theories on competition law and policy and important trends 
in competition law and policy are provided to explain why it is an important area to conduct 
a study in. 
The second section of this this chapter is divided into four parts. The first part of this 
section aims to demonstrate the origins and values of the EU competition law from 
Ordoliberal thought to the recent developments in the competition field, particularly the 
economic-based approach. The second part demonstrates the Islamic law origins of the 
UAE competition law and values. Shari’ah law has influenced UAE law and is embodied 
in the UAE Civil and Commercial Codes, which is one of the main sources of the laws in 
the UAE according to Article 7 of the constitution. Although the UAE commercial law is 
directly influenced by other countries civil codes such as the EU, Shari’ah code culturally 
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is influencing this law like many others even though in principle, apart from family law, 
all codes in the UAE are civil ones. It must be clearly stated that the UAE commercial law 
is a civil and secular code. Thus, the researcher aims to give great attention to it in relation 
to the research area. The objective of the third part is to investigate the differences and 
similarities of the origins and values of both the EU and the UAE. The scope of EU 
competition law is illustrated next. Following the EU part, the scope of UAE competition 
law is demonstrated. 
Chapter Three: The Rational for Implementing Competition Law 
This chapter’s main aim is to examine the theoretical rationale justifying the adoption 
of competition law by the developing economies in general terms and the UAE in 
particular. Moreover, the secondary aim is to discuss the objectives of competition law and 
the relationship between an analysis of the goals of competition law and the arguments 
about the adoption of competition law by the UAE in particular and developing economies 
in general. 
Chapter Four: Anticompetitive Agreements and Abuse of Dominant Position 
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate and examine the prohibition provisions 
with regard to anti-competitive agreements and control of the dominant position that are 
under UAE competition law and later evaluate and compare it with the similar provisions 
under EU competition law. To accomplish this purpose, the EU provisions regarding the 
anti-competitive agreements, and the control of dominant position, will be examined. In 
light of the examined EU rules, the UAE competition provisions will be illustrated and 
evaluated. 
Chapter Five: Control of Mergers and State Aide 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss two main areas of competition law. The first is 
merger control, and the second is state aid control. The first part of this chapter aims to 
evaluate the merger control under the UAE competition law with a reference to EU 
competition law. Thus, the EU merger control with its history, concept, application of 
Merger Regulation, and significant cases will be provided first. Then, in light of the EU 
merger control, the UAE merger control will be evaluated, providing an in-depth analysis. 
The second part of this chapter aims to evaluate state aid in the UAE based on the same 
concept in EU law and find the reasons for similarities and differences. 
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Chapter Six: Enforcement of Competition Law 
The enforcement mechanism is very important to measure the effectiveness of any 
law, thus this chapter aims to examine the enforcement system of the UAE and provide an 
in-depth evaluation based on the experiences of the EU system. 
Chapter Seven: Conclusions and Recommendations 
This chapter will summarise the findings and draw conclusions from the preceding 
chapters. The principal aim of the chapter is to bring together and accentuate the primary 
thoughts related to the theme of the research. This chapter will set out a list of 
recommendations to the UAE law makers in terms of modifying the current competition 
law. 
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Chapter Two: Competition Law Background, 
Values, Origins and scope 
2.1 Introduction 
Success in businesses organisations is highly credited to the value that competition 
offers. This is explained by the many laws and policies that have been established since 
the 19th century by various governments across the world. In general terms, extensive 
social-economic growth has been achieved by developed countries as a result of 
implementing competition laws, which seek to enhance market competitiveness. Of 
importance especially are the theories and philosophies that form the basis of these 
competition (anti-trust) laws. The United States and the European Union are among the 
areas where competition law has seen great evolution since the concept was first develop 
and adopted.67 
The principal purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to demonstrate the definition and 
aims of competition law. In order to attain this objective, this chapter is divided into two 
main sections. The first section is divided into four parts. The following section discusses 
the historical development of competition law. Accordingly, section three deals with the 
theories and schools of thought on competition law. Section four addresses the conclusion 
of this chapter. The second section is consists of five parts. This includes, first, a discussion 
about the EU competition law origins from Ordoliberal thought towards a more economic-
based approach. Second, the values and origins of the UAE competition law under the 
Islamic law thoughts. Third, an evaluation of both the EU and the UAE competition law 
origins and values. Forth, the scope of the EU competition law will be examined. The fifth 
part will examine the UAE’s competition law scope. 
2.2 Historical Development of Competition Law 
2.2.1 Origin of Competition Law 
Earlier anti-trust laws owe a lot to the influence of behavioural approaches to 
competition analysis whose focus is directed towards competitive processes that are based 
                     
67 See Gavil, A. (ed.). An Anti-trust Anthology. Cincinnati: Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing. 1996, pp. 13-47  
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on rivalry. Formal learning about competition started in the 18th century through Adam 
Smith’s Wealth of Nations. Various terms were applied to describe this section of the law, 
including restrictive practices, combination acts, restraint of trade and monopolies law. 
Laws such as the United States Sherman Act (1890) were products of such influence.68 
The Sherman Act has mostly been associated with the origin of competition law. However, 
the literature shows that, although this statute can take a lot of credit for the leading part it 
played in the development of competition law, a lot about the concept of competition had 
already been conceived. 
According to Lauda, laws that govern competition can be traced over two historical 
millennia. Medieval monarchs and the Roman Emperors applied tariffs to stabilise prices 
and support local production.69 One example of competition law is the ‘Lex Julia de 
Annona’ that was enacted around 50 BC under the Roman Republic. Heavy fines were 
levied on any individual to safeguard the grain trade.70 This directly, insidiously and 
deliberately stopped the supply ships. Through Diocletian, an edict imposed the death 
penalty on any person violating the tariff system, for instance by concealing, contriving or 
buying up the scarcity of daily goods. Additional legislation emerged under the authority 
of Zeno’s constitution in 483AD traceable through the Florentine municipal laws between 
1322 and 1325.71 
 Banishment and property confiscation was facilitated by this law for any specific 
trade combination or the joint monopolies granted or private actions by the Emperor. Zeno 
entirely rescinded the previously issued exclusive rights. Justinian, as a result, introduced 
legislation to compensate the officials to enable them to manage the state monopolies. Just 
as Europe slipped into the dark ages, law making records did the same until a time when 
the Middle Ages brought about greater trade expansion.72 
Various studies have highlighted developments in English common law that could 
also be linked to the origin of competition law. England’s legislation for regulating 
monopolies and restrictive practices was operational before the Norman Conquest. For 
instance, it is well documented that a number of Saxon kings had been involved in the 
                     
68 Peritz, R. Competition Policy in America, 1888-1992: History, Rhetoric, Law. New York: Oxford University Press. 1996, p. 47  
69 Lauda, L. Essentials of competition policy. Volume II of European annual competition law. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998. 
70 Campbell, A. and Elles, N &Wilberforce, R. The Law of Restrictive Practices and Monopolies, 2nd ed. London: Sweet and 
Maxwell. 1966, p. 20 
71 Ibid. p. 22 
72 Ullrich, H. Evolution of competition law in Europe. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006. 
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implementation of actions against a number of trading practices. During this period there 
was the practice of purchasing goods prior to reaching the market and later inflating the 
prices. Fair prices concerns led to attempts to directly regulate the market.  
On other occasions, there were laws implemented to prohibit practices such as those 
involving the purchase of commodities, particularly agricultural produce to resell it at 
higher prices on a future date or in other markets. During the reign of Magna Carta (1215), 
for instance, there was also a legislative provision that all monopolies existed contrary to 
the law as they were associated with harmful implications for individual freedom.73 
The 1349 statute of labourers was also an important moment in modern competition 
law. This statute provided that merchants overcharging for their products were to be 
charged for multiple damages to the injured parties.74 The common law doctrine on 
restraint of trade was also significant as it specified that restraint of trade covenants were 
not enforceable.75 To this effect, the importance of the common law doctrine on 
conspiracy, which was adopted for the purpose of regulating the manner in which working 
individuals could organise themselves, emerged and was also employed in businesses to 
hinder conspiracies among businesses whose objectives were illegally founded and not in 
line with the intentions of improving a business’ position.76 In the year 1623, the Statute 
of Monopolies was enacted and provided the view that all monopolies operated contrary 
to the law of realism.  
However, all the laws discussed above were repealed later. In all aspects of common 
law, the existence and operation of monopolies were no longer prevented.77 Currently, 
competition law deals with issues concerned with the abuse of the power of monopoly 
rather than their existence. In the modern economic world also, a number of governments 
have adopted national competition laws as a strategic measure to promote fair and 
transparent business conduct and development of the various sectors.  
Competition theory experienced immense natural changes in the 20th century and this 
has had great implications for competition law as well as for competition policy. There has 
also been a great influence on competition law from the economic theory of competition 
                     
73 Shenefield, J. H. & Irwin, M. S. The Anti-trust Laws: A Primer. (3rd ed.). Washington: AEI Press. 1998, p. 68 
74 Gavil, A. Op. cit. pp. 9-21 
75 The US common law provided a basis for later development of anti-trust law. Ibid. p. 35 
76 Landes, W. M. & Posner, R. A. Market Power in Anti-trust Cases. Harvard Law Review. 1981. 94, p. 837.  
77 Posner, R. A. Anti-trust Law. (2nd ed.). University of Chicago Press. 2001. pp.24–6 
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which has always had an impact on the working of competition law (see section 2.3). 
Authors argue that competition law has, in the last century, been characterised by a cyclical 
movement, with competition rules altering as and when there are changes in the underlying 
economic theory.78 The microeconomic models on which monopoly and perfect 
competition are based are considered to have been a replacement of the classical economic 
approach to competition. 
2.2.2 Modern Evolution of Competition Law 
2.2.2.1 Emergence and Growth of Trusts and Combinations 
Competition law has evolved tremendously in recent past years. It became effective 
first in the US towards the end of the nineteenth century. The work of the anti-trust 
movement was very instrumental in the development of this law. After the Civil War, there 
was an emergence of large trusts and combinations in a number of industries, including the 
sugar, cotton, steel, railroad and petroleum industries. These combinations and trusts were 
largely responsible for the unfair treatment of farmers in the agricultural part of the US, 
such as increasingly high prices. The farmers were experiencing disproportionately high 
freight costs established by the railway companies, which usually combined to affect 
standard rates such that the farmers were not benefiting from the trend.79 It was at this point 
that there arose increased concerns regarding these trusts, their growth as well as their 
abusive conduct, and this triggered legislative support aimed at restricting the power of the 
trusts and combinations.              
The emergence and growth of these trusts and combinations formed the basis for the 
formulation of the Sherman Act in the year 1890. More specifically, sections 1 and 2 of 
the Sherman Act were an important basis for modern-day anti-trust policy. Section 1 states 
that,  
‘Every contract, combination in the form of trusts or otherwise, or 
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among several states, or with 
foreign nations’ is illigal.80 
                     
78 Wakker, P. & Deneffe, D. Mergers, Strategic Investments and Anti-trust Policy. Managerial and Decision Economics. [Online]. 
1996. 17: 3. pp. 231-240. Available from http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2487854.pdf. [Accessed: 14 November 2010]. 
79 Competition law has been through various stages of development, see O’Donoghue, R. & Padilla, A. J. The Law and Economics of 
Article 82. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2006, p. 9   
80 Sherman Anti-trust Act 1989. Section 1. 
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Section 2 of the same Act indicates that it is illegal for any individual to, 
‘Monopolise or attempt to monopolise, or combine or conspire with any 
other person or persons, to monopolise any part of the trade or commerce 
among serial States, or with foreign nations’.81 
It is evident that these two sections feature the central principles on which much of 
the modern-day anti-trust policy across the world is based, with importance in the 
consideration of conduct restraining trade or conduct responsible for the creation or 
maintenance of anti-competitive monopolies. 
On the other hand, in the European Union (EU) setting, Articles 81 and 82 (now 
articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) of 
1957’s Treaty of Rome form the basis of the control of abuse of dominant positions and 
control of anti-competitive agreements.82 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) points out 
that the treaties feature,   
‘…a fundamental provision of essentially a great implication in the 
accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the community and, in particular, for 
the functioning of the internal market’.83 
This illustrates a general agreement that the elimination of tariff barriers, which 
formed the basic objective of the European Economic Community, would not accomplish 
the intended purpose in the case of firms which are economically powerful or if private 
agreements were permitted in the manipulation of trade.84 
There seems to exist a great similarity between sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 
and Articles 101 and 102 of Europe’s Treaty of Rome. Irrespective of this similarity, 
however, and the fact that it came years after the Sherman Act, European Articles 101 and 
102 did not adopt wholly the American inspired model, it adopted an approach distinct to 
the European way of handling anti-competitive conduct.85 
                     
81 Ibid. Section 2.  
82 Odudu, O. The Boundaries of EC Competition Law. Oxford University Press. 2006, pp. 169–70 
83 Shuibhne, N. Regulating the Internal Market. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 2006, p. 253.  
84 Gormsen, L.  A Principled Approach to Abuse of Dominance in European Competition Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 2010, pp. 59-83. 
85 Hildebrand, D. The European School in EC Competition Law. World Competition. 2002. 25. 3, pp. 8–9 
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2.2.2.2 The impact of the development of US competition law 
The US competition law is one of the modern competition laws and therefore it is 
important to demonstrate the history of development of US competition law. The history 
of modern competition law in the US dates back to the end of the nineteenth century. 
Various anti-trust laws were later formulated to enable the US economy to reach 
equilibrium without restraints or otherwise being hampered by undue influence by 
powerful companies engaging in anti-competitive behaviour. Thus, anti-trust laws were 
developed to prohibit restraint of trade, as indicated in the 1890 Sherman Anti-trust Act. 
The federal anti-trust law constitutes not only statutes but also court decisions, 
administrative regulations as well as enforcement actions directed at regulating the 
restraint of trade and competition.86 US anti-trust law owes a lot to American common law 
in which laws were largely based on court decisions.87 
The US federal government formulated and implemented the Sherman Act with a 
very important theme – establishment of a more dynamic and open American economic 
system. As has already been noted, the Sherman Anti-trust Act pioneered the competition 
law and has since had a great influence on the economy of not only America but also of 
the whole world.88 The government enacted the Act to strengthen the stand on free 
markets.89 
The statute made the economic system not only open but also more open to new 
competitors as well as new technologies. Direct impacts of the law in the 19th century were 
witnessed in the view of extensive economic expansion and improved living conditions.90 
Thus, the major philosophy behind the enforcement of the Sherman Anti-trust Act was the 
elimination of behind-the-scenes manipulation of the market by powerful firms.  
Moreover, in 1897, a Supreme Court decision regarding a trust formed by 18 
railways to fix charges for transport of goods depicted clearly that price agreements were 
also illegal. Similar to this case, the judges in the Addyston Pipe and Steel case rejected 
arguments intended to justify price-fixing practice on the basis that the prices charged were 
                     
86 Homan, T. Notes on Anti-Trust Law. Quarterly Economics Journal. [Online]. 1939. 54. 1. pp. 73-102. Available from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1882488.pdf?acceptTC=true. [Accessed: 12 February 2011]. 
87 Posner, R. Anti-trust Law. (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2001, p. 123. 
88 Gerber, D. Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1998, 
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89 Ibid 
90 Harrington, J. Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Anti-trust Authority. The RAND Journal of Economics. [Online]. 
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unreasonable and fixing prices promoted unhealthy competition’.91 According to the 
Supreme Court’s perspective, through the Sherman Act, the government made illegal all 
manner of price agreements.92 
The prohibition of price agreements among competitors emerged as a strong theme, 
which is still operational and has minimal exceptions. In the Dr. Miles v Park and Sons 
case of 1911, the Supreme Court employed the Sherman Act philosophy of restriction of 
price prohibition, although this was a vertical arrangement situation.93 This position of the 
statute was confirmed by the court’s decision on a situation involving two vital trust cases: 
the American Tobacco case and the Standard Oil Company case. In this regard, the major 
aim behind the Sherman Act in seeking to control price-fixing and monopolisation power 
was to prevent the accumulation of wealth among a few individuals with the view that this 
trend led to a destabilisation of the economic order as well as of democracy.94 
In addition, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) drew its roots from the 1914 
Federal Trade Commission Act. The Commission emerged as an independent agency 
whose major theme involved the regulation of unfair trade and had authority to enforce 
anti-trust law at the federal level.95 The philosophy behind this law was that the Sherman 
Act employed broad language which allowed for fairly loose judicial interpretations. 
Hence, the Sherman Act was not used as precisely as possible at this period in time. 
Therefore, the FTC Act emerged as the highly needed, more definitive anti-trust law.  
Furthermore, the Clayton Anti-trust Act of 1914 was formed under similar 
circumstances as the FTC Act and did not feature any new anti-trust provisions per se. The 
philosophy behind the Act was thus the enhancement of the specificity of the anti-trust 
provisions that had already been implemented.96 
A number of other anti-trust laws have been document since then and their major 
philosophy revolves around hindrance of unfair trading practices or unfair competition and 
to avoid the more elusive definition of terms demonstrated by the Sherman Act. These Acts 
include: the Robinson-Patman Act (1936) focused on price discrimination; the Celler-
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Kefauver Act (1950) which was an amendment of the Clayton Act on mergers issues; and 
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (1976), an amendment of the merger provision of the Clayton 
Act. 
2.2.2.3 Case law: The Microsoft anti-trust case 
It is very important to mention a case that had an enormous impact on the history of 
competition law. Maybe one of the most important cases in history regarding anti-
competition practices is the Microsoft case. Since the 1990’s, Microsoft Corporation has 
been under investigation by the US Federal government, another 20 US states, the 
European Union and a number of other private plaintiffs.97 Microsoft has been under 
investigation under the Anti-trust Act adopted in the 19th century in connection with 
allegations of involvement in anti-competitive behaviour in high technology industries. 
The Windows Operating System dominates the PC sector. In its case with the US 
government, Microsoft was sued for seeking dominance in the industry by manner of 
intimidation where computer companies such as IBM, Intel and Apple were intimidated 
into withholding from the consumer products that had great potential to challenge the 
Microsoft Windows software.98 It was concluded by a number of tribunals that Microsoft 
illegally monopolised the PC operating systems market and it was ordered to stop its 
discriminatory product access and discriminatory pricing policies to allow rivals to engage 
in free and effective competition with Microsoft in the applications software market on the 
windows platform. One thing is clear, however, in the development of Microsoft cases: 
that the philosophy promoted by the Sherman Anti-trust Act is still relevant legally and 
has been of paramount importance in the regulation of commerce in the current information 
age. The next part will discuss the major theories that involved in the development of 
competition law. 
2.3  Theories and Schools of Thought on Competition Law 
Over 200 years ago economists first started to examine the notion of competition, 
how it was possible to theoretically analyse such a notion, and the policy conclusions that 
would result from such analysis.99 However, it would be much easier to understand today’s 
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concepts and the terms of competition theory and policy if the theoretical background and 
debates were clarified. 
Modern day competition law draws immensely from the theories and ideologies 
developed over time, especially in the 20th century, by various schools of thought. These 
schools emerged one after the other, all with a focus on establishing a more definitive 
approach to enhance competitive practices. The theories assert the importance of control 
of anti-competitive conduct within the free market situation.  
However, the objective of competition law has differed over time between economic 
systems and this is because competition law cannot be limited to an abstract discussion 
basis, since this law is highly impacted on by the economic situation specific to a country 
as well as the country’s own historical development. This explains the differing 
conceptions in the European and American views of competition.  
Therefore, the different school of thought and theories of competition law, and the 
development of this particular area, will be illustrated. 
2.3.1 Classical Economics: 
Competition was seen as “playing a central role in society,” particularly in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century which is known as the period of classical liberalism. 
Adam Smith is one of the famous classical economists and his 1776 ‘The Wealth of 
Nations’ is considered the starting point of the classical economics.100 Smith assumed, 
based on the notion of a ‘natural order’ that the common interest is advanced by the so-
called ‘invisible hand’ of the market. Basically, the ‘invisible hand’ encourages each 
individual agent to pursue his or her self-interest which results in advancing the common 
interest.101 According to this theory, with the intention of increasing social welfare, firms 
are forced to charge low prices so that demand will increase. Competition was considered 
as a system of power. Thus, once there is a change in prices in a market that differ from 
the natural prices, such a system of power takes an immediate effect to stabilise the 
situation.  
However, anti-trust law under the laissez-faire doctrine is observed as unnecessary 
since competition is viewed as being a dynamic long-term process in which firms compete 
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against one another to secure market dominance. Within some markets a particular firm 
may dominate through the facilitation of its competitive advantages in possessing superior 
skills and ability to innovate. According to the theorists of laissez faire, however, when a 
firm attempts to increase prices as a way of taking advantage of its monopoly position, it 
develops profitable opportunities for other firms to compete. As a result a creative 
destruction process starts and consequently erodes the monopoly.  
Moreover, according to the advocates of this theory, monopoly was caused only 
through public privileges. Therefore, they argued that Governments should avoid attempts 
at monopoly break-ups while allowing markets to work102 and demanded to erode policies 
regarding public restraints on competition.103 
In the late 19th century, it was clear that the large firms had emerged due to the 
development in the market economy. Stuart Mill used an approach that showed that trade 
was actually a social act. Any individual who undertakes to trade on any products 
description to the consumers does something that has an impact on the interests of the other 
people and society. The conduct of such a person thus comes under the society’s 
jurisdiction. Good quality and cheapness of commodities are effectually achieved through 
leaving the seller and buyers perfectly free under the control of supply and demand, a 
process called free trade doctrine. The doctrine rests on grounds that are distinct from the 
individual liberty principle.104 Trade restriction and production for trade purposes are 
restraints indeed.105 
However, the classical economics approach was criticised. Its opponents argued that 
market prices “did not necessarily reflect the ‘value’ so defined, for people were often 
willing to pay more than an object was ‘worth’.” 106 Thus, between the 1870s and the 1880s 
new ideas began to emerge when many economists in different places started to establish 
the foundation of what would later be called neoclassical economics. The different 
approaches, which were known as the Marginal Revolution in economics, aimed to “base 
value on the relationship between costs of production and ‘subjective elements,’ later 
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called ‘supply’ and ‘demand’,” and the development of this idea led to the establishment 
of neoclassical economics.107 
2.3.2 Neoclassical Microeconomics 
It is important to mention that credit goes to famous economists, such as Jevons, 
Marshall, Debreu, Launhardt, Walras, Arrow and Dupuit, who developed the neoclassical 
economics school. The development of microeconomic theory was completed by the 
1930s.108 Because the neoclassical economics approaches were various, it was difficult to 
reach an agreement on the meaning of such an approach. While the term competition was 
used as a competitive and dynamic process in the classical economics approach, the 
neoclassical economics considered it as a state of equilibrium with a number of desirable 
properties.109 
Economic theory’s shift emphasised heavily the theoretical and precise competition 
model. A simplified free market model for neoclassicals held that the distribution and 
production of goods and services within a competitive free market maximises social 
welfare. This model makes assumptions that there are no barriers to entry for new firms 
and they are free to venture into new markets and compete with the existing firms.110 Entry 
barriers, according to economists, hold the very specific meaning that free markets that are 
competitive deliver productive, allocative and dynamic efficiency.111 
 Contrary to the productive model, the allocative and dynamic efficiency models of 
the market are oligopolies, monopolies and cartels. When only a single or a few firms are 
existing in the market, with no credible threat generated from other competing firms 
entering, prices seem to increase beyond the competitive level towards an oligopolistic or 
monopolistic equilibrium price.112 
  Production decreases as well, further reducing social welfare through creating a 
deadweight loss.113 Sources of this kind of market power include the barriers to market 
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entry, free rider problem and the externalities. Market efficiency may fail due to a variety 
of reasons; however, if an intervention occurs due to the existence of competition law, that 
existence could be justified and exempt under the laissez faire rule if there is a possibility 
of avoiding government failure. Moreover, it has been acknowledged by some economists 
that the fact that perfect competition is rare in the real world means that it aims at what is 
referred to as workable competition.114 
One on the most important criticisms levelled at the neoclassical economics approach 
was that it had a normative bias. Opponents of this approach argued that its focus was not 
on the explanation of the actual economics, but rather on describing an ideal community 
or society which possessed a perfect legal, political and social system in which allocative 
efficiency applied. 
2.3.3 The Harvard School 
The Harvard school is linked to the structure-conduct-performance (S-C-P) 
paradigm. In this, it is established that certain market structures are responsible for 
influencing certain types of conduct of firms and that this conduct then influences certain 
types of market performance, such as efficiency and profitability.115 The school developed 
the view that concentrated industries are associated with conduct which results in poor 
economic performance, like monopoly prices and lowered output.116 
The initial work of this school was put forward by E. S Mason in the 1930s117 and 
the concept was later developed by J. S Bain in the 1950s using empirical studies.118 With 
the notion that performance was dependent on market structure, the Harvard school 
initiated the conception that competition law ought to be focused on structural remedies 
and not behavioural remedies. The Harvard school in the 1960s spurred the establishment 
of a highly interventionist anti-trust enforcement policy in the United States of America 
(USA).119 
The concepts underlying the Harvard school made an immense contribution to 
competition law. The Harvard school articulated the primary perception of the industrial 
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organisation theory in the widely known S-C-P paradigm and explained the relationship 
between the different variables.120 Similar to the competitive ideology of workable 
completion, the Harvard school ideology resulted in an immense and clear impact on 
completion policy.121 With the view on the relationship between market conduct, market 
structure and market outcome, competition law assumed the role of an instrument 
necessary to produce optimum outcomes, with direct implications for the market structure, 
i.e. controlling mergers.  
Legal proceedings in the 1950s often made reference to the school. Its application 
provided for the determination of whether given business activities with influence on the 
structure of the market should be addressed from a competition law perspective based on 
the impacts of those activities on efficiencies. The Harvard school doctrine also played an 
essential role in the evaluation of market concentration, which because of the presence of 
economies of scale meant that the perfect competition model was never appropriate. 
Harvard school focused on the attainment of desirable economic results, restriction of the 
extent of power of large firms, the development and promotion of competitive processes 
and the outlining of the norms characterising fair conduct. The S-C-P paradigm resulted in 
an anti-trust policy whose intervention sought to protect small firms from large ones, 
although Posner takes this as a populist move.122 The Harvard school considered that 
markets were fragile.     
However, there were many shifts in the 1970s and 80s in the American competition 
policy due to the emergence of a new school of thought, the Chicago school, which 
according to its scholars was mostly descriptive. They thus made use of the renewed idea 
of price theory to enhance an understanding of the market structure and the behaviour of 
the firm. However, the S-C-P paradigm is still relevant in competition analysis. 
2.3.4 The Chicago School 
In the 1970s, the Chicago school emerged and promoted different forms of opinions 
about the working of markets and hence proposed a rather lax level of scrutiny compared 
to the Harvard school.123 Chicago economists did not believe that the market was fragile 
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and this had an immense implication for the progress of anti-trust enforcement in the US. 
The school was concerned with free market and monetarist economics. Contrary to 
Harvard, the Chicago school was based on theoretical techniques. The school has also 
influenced greatly competition law in other parts of the world, such as Europe.124 
The proponents of the Chicago school argue that there is always a temptation among 
firms with large market shares to engage in anti-competitive behaviour by lowering output 
to increase prices and that this conduct signals to other market players that an unmet 
demand exists in the market, therefore inviting new market entries.125 It is apparent that 
entry into the market of new firms will drive prices down while reintroducing a substantial 
degree of competition, which is enough to sustain consumer desire. Thus, with the 
recognition that the structure of the market has a potential effect on economic performance, 
the Chicago school added the view that, in case economic performance triggered an unmet 
consumer demand, the entry of new firms would be evident.  
This economic approach implied that competition law was to a great extent 
unnecessary, except in situations that hampered new entry. The greatest reason as to why 
entry was hampered was limitation of the business freedom of firms.126 This argument 
makes clear the view that, with no barriers for new competitors, the market possesses the 
power to heal itself.  
The other explanation for the Chicago thinking is that more efficiency was achieved 
in concentrated markets as firms were in a position to exploit the economies of scale.127 In 
this regard, the Chicago school runs contrary to the view under the Harvard school that an 
increased concentration of firms is rather challenging. The Chicago school held that pursuit 
of allocative efficiency was to be the sole objective driving competition law, with its trust 
being laid in the market rather than in small businesses, and also being able to attain 
efficiency without any government or competition law interference.128 In another context, 
there was a belief among the Chicago school proponents that there was high likelihood for 
law enforcement to destroy the competitive process through their intervention as they 
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posed a great interest in the operation of markets. 
There is a clear divergence between the Harvard school and the Chicago school in 
their approach towards the enforcement of competition law.129 For example, a Harvard 
school technique could most likely assume that high prices enjoyed by monopolies were 
illegal while a Chicago school technique would encourage new market entry given that 
high prices signal an unmet demand; this has the advantage of rendering the market very 
competitive in the long run. 
The Chicago school considers itself neutral as its only emphasis is on the market 
forces, although claims of its apolitical position are challenged by Sullivan and Fox 
claiming that the law in this regard should not be limited to economics only.130 They argue 
that economics should only apply as a tool for the support of a system directed at enabling 
consumers to establish a dynamic system of competition law.131 
The literature depicts that the Chicago school is probably the school of thought which 
has had the most influence in competition law. The school has economics as the centre of 
its analysis of competition law and establishes a coherent perspective regarding the 
enforcement of competition law based on the confidence that markets have the most 
efficiency when there is limited court jurisdiction or regulations. From a Chicago school 
dimension, all non-efficiency objectives do not fall within the operations of the anti-trust 
policy. Bork, one of the Chicago scholars, argued that the entry aim of anti-trust law can 
be summarised as being an objective to enhance allocative efficiency without hampering 
productive efficiency, so extensively such as to compromise consumer welfare.132 It is a 
concept that stands on and also corresponds to pure economic considerations and hence 
this is often not easy to implement in an actual competition policy.    
Thus the view by Chicago scholars on economics depicts their view of an ideal 
society. Potential criticisms also arose regarding the Chicago view that outside government 
regulation and barriers to entry are rare. Criticism has also been raised in regards to its 
great emphasis on long-term impacts instead of short-term impacts and its regard for 
competition as a process. The Chicago model’s view on the neoclassical efficiency of the 
market is rather too simple to account for or make predictions on business conduct in the 
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real world, and therefore this saw the development of the Post-Chicago school.133 
2.3.5 Post-Chicago School 
The post-Chicago school brought a different approach to the concept of new markets 
and prices. Although the Chicago school has been criticised heavily, its rigorous economic 
analysis evidently played an important role in competition theory. The post-Chicago school 
arose from the urge to solve emerging ideas, such as qualifying the S-C-P paradigm. Post 
Chicago thinking draws from the extreme Chicago ideas tempered by new insights.134 The 
school follows the realisation that economics has the potential to provide an important 
indication of questions worth asking but fails to always yield a definitive answer.135 In 
view of the school’s conceptions, Khemani and Shapiro argue that modern-day industrial 
organisation theory emphasises the impacts that the strategic behaviour of firms can have 
in different market situations.136 
According to post-Chicago thinking, companies may engage in practices that deter 
strategic entry.137 It is evident that post-Chicago competition law scholars allow more 
complexities, unlike the pure Chicago and Harvard ideologies. The post-Chicago thinking 
also aims at addressing the benefits of dynamic competition. It is also evident that post-
Chicago thinking is rather complex in comparison with the pure Chicago or S-C-P 
paradigm.138 While acknowledging the objective of efficiency, the thinking provides for 
the realisation of real-life complexities basic to the process of devising competition rules 
to attain efficiency. In the context of applying an enforcement of this competition law, 
post-Chicago analysis seems to place more demands on decision makers and competition 
authorities.  
There are a number of theories and ideas that are known to play an immense role in 
informing the post-Chicago perspective and these include the theory of contestable 
markets, game theory, the theory of transaction cost analysis and the theory of raising 
rival’s costs.139 These theories were formulated to enhance the understanding and 
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application of the post-Chicago ideology. 
2.3.6 Other theories 
2.3.6.1 Transaction Costs Economics 
This theory derives from the work initially done by Ronald Coase and which argued 
that ‘transaction costs’140 comprise of the costs that are incurred by firms when they engage 
in trade with other firms.141 Coase’s argument was on the basis that transaction costs’ size 
in a firm and on a market depends on the activities that either occurred by the firm itself or 
bought from the market.142 In other words, a firm can save on costs by choosing to do 
things on its own or can also choose to engage the services of other parties, which in this 
case means referring to the market. For instance, a company manufacturing PCs could 
either choose to obtain inputs from other parties or produce them by itself. Doing things 
by itself involves vertical integration or agreements with other parties. In this regard, the 
comparative efficiency associated with each approach is relied upon when determining the 
method to use. 
Thus, according to the transaction economics point of view, competition law should 
follow an approach that would not compromise the firms’ ability to take highly efficient 
options for the end purpose of enhancing more competitive markets. The advocates of this 
approach argue that traditional microeconomics focused on the production costs and 
neglected the transaction costs.143 Thus, a new theory was developed by Williamson in the 
1970s, which was considered “as the first approach of the new institutional economics to 
be applied successfully to competition policy issues”144, and was known as the governance 
approach.  
Work in transaction cost has identified various efficiency purposes that prompt firms 
to employ a number of internal organisation forms. Moreover, the studies have also 
highlighted the benefit of contractual techniques in stopping opportunistic behaviour that, 
unless checked, harbours a great potential to deter business arrangements with the ability 
to increase efficiency.145 This is achieved by illustrating that the major purpose of most 
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forms of economic organisation - like vertical integrations, restrictive distribution contracts 
and joint ventures - is often to minimise costs. By using the behavioural assumption, 
Williamson showed that some vertical agreements and vertical mergers which were seen 
as potentially anti-competitive could increase efficiency through reducing transaction 
costs.146 
In connection with this, some transaction scholars demand the re-evaluation of 
doctrines on anti-trust that have impacted harshly on these arrangements. Hence, contrary 
to the other perspectives adopted by post-Chicago ideology, including the anti-competitive 
implications of strategic behaviour, the transaction cost economics address a less expansive 
application of the rules of competition.147 
2.3.6.2 Game Theory 
Game theory draws a lot from the 1940s work of Morgenstern and von Neumann and 
has over time become a central aspect in the field of modern industrial organisation 
theory.148 The importance of game theory lies especially in its use as a tool in the analysis 
of the conduct of oligopolies. It was defined as the study of mathematical models of 
decision-makers’ cooperation and conflict.149 The theory models a firm’s strategic 
interactions in respect to both cooperation and conflict, putting these interactions in the 
context of games whereby every firm devises its own strategy such as in respect to output 
and pricing, in line with the assumptions focused on what strategy the competitors will 
adopt.150 The concepts of game theory apply when different agents’ (such as firms, 
individuals, groups or a combination of any of these) actions are independent.151 
2.3.6.3 Raising Rivals’ Costs 
The idea of raising rivals’ costs demonstrates the strategic conduct of firms 
formulated to raise the costs of rival parties relative to its own.152 Competing with the less 
efficient corporations is much easier on the basis of the arguments of the raising rival’s 
                     
Evidence. Economic Geography. 2000. 76. 1. pp. 50-67. Available from http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2138746.pdf.  [Accessed: 
19 January 2011]. 
146 Kerber, W. & Schwalbe, U. Op. cit. 
147 Jones, J. Sufrin, B. Op. cit. p. 32. 
148 Von Meumann, J. & Morgenstern, O. The Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour. Princeton: Princeton University Pres. 
1944, pp. 231-47. 
149 Turocy, T. & Stengel, B. Game Theory. Encyclopedia of Information Systems. 2003, pp. 403-420. 
150 Jones, J. Sufrin, B. Op. cit. p. 31. 
151 Turocy, T. & Stengel, B. Op. cit. 
152 Krattenmaker, T. & Salop, S. Anti-competitive Exclusion; Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price. The Yale Law 
Journal. 1986. 96.2, p. 209. 
41 
 
costs.153 However, this calls for quite an extent of market power or political power (at least 
for some strategies).154 Normally, this involves interference with either the selling or 
production of techniques of rivals, supporting or lobbying for regulation by the government 
which would result in differential implications for the rivals’ costs, therefore leading to 
increased input prices or else raising, switching, and tying costs such that clients find it 
expensive or rather difficult to shift to the rival’s goods. Thus, it is possible for firms 
through strategies to increase their shares and prices in the market indirectly through 
increasing other firms’ production costs and consequently reduce their output prices.155 
Moreover, such a strategy also involves a company’s indulgence in rapid product 
innovation in primary markets. It is also worth noting that certain conduct raising rivals’ 
costs could also lead to increased welfare and, if competition law ought to allow or sanction 
such practices, then it is often dependent on the specific context of the case in hand.156 
2.3.6.4 Theory of Contestable Markets 
The contestable markets literature arose from a research programme which had a 
great impact at that time in regard to advancing economic knowledge by claiming two 
principal achievements and by introducing two significant policy contributions.157 The 
main emphasis of the theory of contestable markets lies in the freedom of entry to, as well 
as exit from, a given market. It should be noted that contestable markets theory is 
considered as a generalisation of the perfect competition theory’s development and more 
importance is attached to contestability rather than market structure.158 According to 
Baumol,    
“In the limiting case of perfect contestability, oligopolistic structure and 
behaviour are freed entirely from their previous dependence on the conjectural 
variations of incumbents and, instead, these are generally determined uniquely 
. . . by the pressures of potential competition. . . .”159 
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 The most important aspect of this theory is the fact that the ‘hit-and-run’ nature 
characterising entry by competing firms constrains the conduct of firms within the market 
such that competitive pricing and efficient performance become evident. According to this 
theory, highly competitive behaviour could be seen in a single-firm market.160 For 
example, if prices were increased in a contestable market beyond the normal price level by 
a firm in order to gain more profits, other firms (rivals), with the intention of making easy 
profit by exploiting the prices, will enter that market. Once that firm returns to the normal 
prices and makes normal profits, the other rivals will exit the market 
In addition, Hovenkamp points out that the minimum conditions for the existence of 
contestable markets constitute instantaneous entry as well as costless exit from the market 
and, more importantly, the inability of a firm to respond accordingly to the market or 
another competitor through a reduction in prices.161 This aspect is especially vital since 
otherwise the incumbent company can maintain its prices at the monopoly level only to 
reduce them when it deems it is necessary to respond to competition, which is the same in 
the case of the oligopoly of two or three firms.162 
 Like in the workable competition situation, the condition for perfect contestability 
is often not witnessed in the real context,163 and in case there are small sunk costs,164 private 
entry barriers may arise.165 In this regard, the term ‘contestable market’ arises to imply a 
market with low barriers to entry and exit in view of the fact that the threat of entry from 
competitors does considerably constrain the firm. Thus, this theory has contributed 
immensely to competition law discussions.166 
2.3.6.5 The Austrian School 
Schumpeter’s book ‘Theory of Economic Development’ is considered as the 
beginning point for innovation economics when he claims that economic development’s 
endogenous driving force is technological advancement.167 The Austrian school ideology 
takes the theory of dynamic competition which extends what was covered by 
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Schumpeter.168 Like in the case of the Chicago school, the Austrian school represents the 
perception that competition policy is one single face characterising a wider school of 
economic theory.169 Schumpeter asserted that applying neoclassical microeconomics with 
its concept of equilibrium (which includes the perfect competition theory) cannot analyse 
the economic development process, and rather it needs a different fundamental theoretical 
model.170 
Among the strongest proponents of the Austrian School in the 20th century was Hayek. 
His approach was to introduce the concept of new knowledge into the competition 
concept.171 He emphasised that competition is considered as a discovery procedure where, 
without the existence of competition, new knowledge cannot exist. Like the other 
economists of this theory, he stressed that the neoclassical economics approach is “entirely 
flawed” due to the fact that it ignores the knowledge concept. The concept of perfect 
competition assumes that the concept of knowledge is perfect and there is no problem with 
it and ignores the fact that the search for new knowledge is the main function of 
competition.172 
Moreover, he believed in untrammelled free markets as well as the capacity of 
potential competition to eliminate long-run exploitation by monopoly conduct. This, 
therefore, implied that competition laws should not hamper the competitive process, not 
even through prohibition of cartels.173 
2.3.6.6 Ordoliberalism (Freiburg School) 
This school had great implications, especially for the German and EC competition 
law.174 Ordoliberalism does not merely refer to a school of competition law but 
encompasses an entire economic and political philosophy. While the Ordoliberalism 
School made no contribution to competition theory, it has had an immense effect on the 
policy of competition in the EU. It developed a unique method for the identification of the 
most appropriate form of competition policy.175 
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The school was developed in the 1930s in Germany and later nurtured at Freiburg 
University during the Nazi era.176 It characterised a major aspect of thinking in the post-
war period in Germany, indicating a new relationship between the economic system and 
law; holding that for economic well-being, competition is necessary and that economic 
freedom dictates political freedom.177 
Ordoliberalism supports an economic constitution in which economic freedom and 
competition are incorporated into the law such that there are no discretionary interventions 
or even unconstrained private forces. According to Ordoliberals, competition law ought to 
establish as well as protect the conditions essential for competition. This implies that, in 
itself, competition is a value and not just a means for use to achieve purely economic 
objectives like efficiency.178 It is evident that the Freiburg school’s thinking enhances the 
protection of small and medium-sized enterprises as well as competitors irrespective of the 
implications for efficiency, instead of protecting competition. The approach seeks to 
promote the freedom of all citizens to enable them to enter and compete in the markets. 
Ordoliberalism played an essential role in the development of competition law in the EC 
Treaty’s Articles 81 and 82.179 
2.3.6.7 Workable Competition (Effective Competition) 
In the 1940s the workable competition approach was developed and linked with the 
Harvard school. It maintained the view that, since it was usually impossible to achieve a 
perfect competition market situation, competition policy should be aimed at producing the 
best competitive arrangement that is practically attainable.180 However, this approach also 
led to the emergence of certain difficulties.  
Approaches by which the concept of workability can be assessed encompass conduct, 
performance and structure and it is rather hard to determine if these have really been 
accomplished in any specific industry or if some are satisfied or some not. Amato argues 
that it is rather challenging to decide if workability has been really achieved without 
necessarily making judgments based on a subjective evaluation.181 Hence, workable 
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competition fails to provide an effectively workable basis for the establishment of a sound 
competition policy. The proponents of the workable competition concept believed that the 
competition structure was usually imperfect, in which conditions essential for perfect 
competition were not attainable although the situation was not a monopoly by nature. In 
the Metro I case of 1976, ECJ put workable competition in a context equating it with the 
extent of competition essential to make certain that the observance of the primary 
requirements as well as the accomplishments of the aims set out by the EC Treaty.182 
The philosophy of workability implies that the major tasks involved include the 
establishment of practically attainable conditions which play a central role in certain 
segments of the economy, making the economy operate in the context demanded of it. In 
this case, the criteria of workability, in combination with aspects like optimum 
competition, emphasise attaining the best attainable condition in individual markets.183 
Scherer argues that competition is considered to be workable only if various genuine 
alternatives are available to traders.184 He further states that the only significant issue for 
the workability of any single market comprises the importance, number and nature of 
product or price options or else their providers or receivers. The idea was put forward by 
economist J. M. Clarkin whose argument was based on the notion that policy should be 
focused on the enhancement of the workability of competition, but not necessarily the 
achievement of a perfect condition.185 However, today there is still a lack of consensus on 
what encompasses workable competition, though parties administering competition policy 
employ a certain degree of the concept.186 
Effective Competition regarding the EU 
The effective competition ideology was developed within the context of the 
competition law of the EC.187 However, even though there were some attempts to define 
effective competition, “there still remains a void both in the literature and the acquis.” 
Veljanovski asserted that “it is rare to find in the EC anti-trust texts, or in statements by 
the Commission, a clear expression of the nature of effective competition.” 
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According to the ECJ, a dominant position, for the application purposes of Article 
82 EC (now Article 102 TFEU), included an undertaking’s power to hamper effective 
competition being established in the relevant market.188 Also in the context of the EC 
merger regulations, mergers are prohibited on the basis that they harbour a significant 
potential to hinder competition. The literature shows that the actual meaning of effective 
competition has not yet been defined precisely. However, Walker and Bishop noted that it 
ought to be outcome-oriented.189 
The next part will discuss competition law development in the EU and compare it 
with the situation in the UAE, including historical evolution, principles and scope of the 
laws. 
2.4 Competition Law Values, Origins and Scope 
2.4.1 Introduction 
As discussed previously, Ordoliberal principles and thought have noticeably 
influenced the adoption of EU competition law. It could be said that this school of thought 
emerged in Germany due to the cartels and the use of economic power by the well-
established industries, which caused market distortion. The process of the Ordoliberal 
School’s emergence was accelerated due to the existence of economic and social 
inequality. However, the debate about the continued influence of the Ordoliberal School 
might increase, because of the increasing desire to adopt a more economic-based approach 
by the EU Commission. 
On the other hand, Islamic law (Sharia) stated as the main source of legislation in the 
UAE according to the constitution. In reality, all the law codes, apart from the family law, 
are civil and modern codes that either set locally or based on other similar codes that have 
been used somewhere else outside the UAE such as the EU codes. Shari’ah prohibits 
monopoly and punishes any monopolistic acts. Thus, it has been argued that the enactment 
of competition law in the UAE was due to the influence of the principles of Shari’ah. 
Hence, it is very important to understand the principles of Shari’ah on monopoly and other 
anti-competitive behaviour, and determine how compatible they are with the enacted UAE 
competition law. This chapter aims to investigate the differences and similarities of the EU 
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and the UAE origins and values and the scope of competition law. In essence, Shari’ah law 
has some thoughts and views on Competition law but the UAE competition law is a civil 
code that hardly relate to Shari’ah law. 
This section is divided into five core parts. The first part will address the origins of 
the EU competition law in Ordoliberal thought and the movement towards a more 
economic-based approach. The second part will address the Islamic law origins of the UAE 
competition law and values. The third part will evaluate the differences between the EU 
and the UAE’s origins and values. The fourth part of this section will discuss the scope of 
the EU’s competition law. The fifth part will discuss the scope of the UAE’s competition 
law. 
2.4.2 Competition Law Values and Origins 
2.4.2.1 Historical background of the EU competition law: Origins and 
Values 
The European Union emerged as a result of, first of all, economic integration efforts 
which removed to some extent the possible barriers for trade between member states. The 
EU market became more liberalised. Liberalisation of a market makes it necessary to 
provide transparent and efficient rules. It is impossible to develop an open market in a 
sustainable way without competition rules. Therefore, in the course of its existence, the 
EU elaborated a significant piece of competition legislation. The current and succeeding 
chapters are devoted to providing a comprehensive analysis of the competition law in the 
European Union and comparing it with the UAE’s competition law for the purpose of the 
study.  
In addition, the historical analysis should start with the scrutiny of both the historical 
roots of competition and the historical evolution of its regulation by the European Union. 
Therefore, before illustrating the current situation of EU competition law, the next part will 
give an insight into the roots and historical evolution of competition principles in the EU. 
2.4.2.2 The path to Ordoliberal thought and principles and the social 
market economy 
The Freiburg School, or what is known as the Ordoliberal School, was first established 
in Germany in the 1930s by economist Walter Eucken, and Jurists Hans Großmann-Doerth 
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and Franz Böhm. “Fakultät für Rechts- und Staatswissenschaften" in the University 
included economics and law and provided an appropriate framework for combining both 
economic and legal perspectives, which is the attribute of the Ordoliberal and Freiburg 
School tradition.190 What united the founders of this school was the need to address the 
matter of the constitutional foundations for a free economy and society. The scholars 
opposed the heritage of Gustav von Schmoller's Historical School which still had an 
influence at the time, as well as unprincipled relativism which, according to them, was a 
heritage responsible for the political economy and German jurisprudence.191 
On the contrary, the scholars said that their guiding principle on treating all practical 
politico-economic and politico-legal questions must be based on the idea of an economic 
constitution.192 Collaboration of economics and law was a task they termed as clearly 
essential. The Ordoliberalism of the Freiburg school was a significant section of the 
theoretical foundations which acted as the basis of creating the Social Market Economy 
(SME) in post-World War Two Germany. The SME came into being during times of 
economic hardship and socio-political crises. Political prerequisites and historical 
experiences formed the conceptual architecture of SME since Germany was preoccupied 
with the social question from the late 19th century onwards.193 
This was in addition to liberal capitalism, which was criticised for eliciting a calamity 
that occurred in the world economy in the year 1930, anti-collectivism and the anti-
totalitarianism which occurred as a result of Third Reich experiences. These experiences 
led to the formation of the Social Market Economy as a viable option and an economic and 
socio-political alternative to the extremes of a collectivist planned economy and laissez-
faire capitalism.194 This was not regarded as a compromise, but basically an amalgamation 
of conflicting objectives which included an additional social security establishment by the 
state and the protection of individual liberty. As the totalitarian Third Reich went down 
with its corporatist, statist economic policy, academicians together with the economists at 
Freiburg University advanced the neo-liberal and socio-economic order.195 
In the beginning, the model was contentious, but became widespread with time in 
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Austria and West Germany since achievements in the economy were noted in both states. 
SME from the 1960s became the basic economic model in mainland Western Europe. 
Administrators of both Centre-left (Social Democratic Party –SDP) and Centre-right 
(Christian Social Union of Bavaria –CSU and Christian Democratic Union – CDU) 
pursued this economic concept.196 The Social Market Economy concept has remained a 
common economic basis for several German political parties and a commitment to some 
type of Social Market Economy has been identified in the European Union Constitution. 
However, the project was abandoned in 2005 after the referenda in the Netherlands and 
France led to negative outcomes.197 
2.4.2.3 Ordoliberal Objectives 
The fundamental objective of Ordoliberalism is that the states need to regulate their 
markets such that the market outcome is able to approximate the theoretical results in a 
market that is flawlessly competitive. This implies that none of the actors will manage to 
influence or control the prices of goods and services. One important factor that is seldom 
discussed when it comes to the reasons why Germany stresses stability in price is based on 
the reasoning of Ordoliberalism by German economists. This theory, as mentioned above, 
was a reaction to the effects of unregulated liberalism in the 1930s that led to the 
consequent Nazi monetary and fiscal interventionism.198 
Another characteristic of Ordoliberalism is that it varies from other schools of 
liberalism, which also include the neo-liberalism dominant in the Anglo-Saxon world. It 
tends to place more emphasis on the prevention of monopolies and cartels. Similarly, 
Ordoliberalism is similar to neo-liberalism when it comes to opposing interventions by 
government on the economy. For instance, it opposes fiscal policies and expansionary 
monetary in recession aimed at stabilising the cycle in business, implying in this sense that 
it is anti-Keynesian.199 
The supporters of the Ordoliberalism approach argue that government intervention 
could lead to market distortion. They claim that it is possible that well-established market 
players are likely to influence the government (such justification is not based on fairness 
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considerations).200 
In political terms, between 1948 and 1966, Ordoliberalism had a close connection to 
the rise of the first phase of SME in Germany. Although it was broad and it encompassed 
social goals, the SME concept integrated the basic concepts of Ordoliberalism. The 
concepts were also portrayed in the then legislation, such as the law opposing competition 
restraints, the law on collective bargaining and the Bundesbank law. Ordoliberalism was 
instrumental in enhancing rapid reconstruction and an increase in people’s living standards. 
The road to Ordoliberalism and SME positively changed the German policy debate. It 
reverberates far beyond the individuals engaging in economic analysis, and although it is 
not as important as it was in Germany’s economy, Ordoliberal ideas have at some point 
influenced several economists in their careers.201 
2.4.2.4 The Ordoliberal framework: Competition law and the Economic 
constitution’s function and its influence in Europe 
The constitutional method applied by the Ordoliberals when it comes to competition 
in the market was that a competitive order has to be regarded as a public good. This implies 
that, just like in all cases of public goods, it is crucial to clearly differentiate between the 
interests of an individual enjoying the benefits of a public good and how he/she contributes 
to its protection.202 A public good is applied to a competitive order where it is important to 
differentiate, on one side, the issue of whether an individual enjoys the benefits offered in 
a competitive market environment and, on the other side, if the individual yields to the 
constitutional constraints of a competitive market order.203 The legislators and 
governments are required to act according to a constitutionally determined mandate for the 
benefit of all citizens.  
This includes creating, managing and preserving the regulatory framework that 
ensures efficient operating of the free market. Within the Ordoliberal framework, 
competition law notes that it is possible for some individuals to violate the rules at other 
people’s expense.204 This can be through explicit rule violation by cartel formation, or by 
advocating exceptional privileges. The latter is considered attractive since the person does 
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not engage in cheating but lobbies the government to raise the platform of cheating through 
protective duties, direct subsidies, and tax privileges. The state becomes enjoined in 
“orderly markets” or monopoly formation, thus overriding the regulations of the prevailing 
order to favour one individual at the expense of others.205 
Although the Ordoliberals never used the concepts of game theory, or the term public 
good, they recognised the function of the economic constitution and the game of 
competition. This presents a situation known as prisoner’s dilemma where, despite the fact 
that all individuals are better off functioning in a competitive regime, everybody is 
interested in being exempted from the constraints enforced in a competitive 
environment.206 Nevertheless, when all individuals manage to seek protection from 
competition, everyone will end up in a protectionist regime that is not beneficial for 
anyone. According to Ordoliberalists, this situation would not be chosen by anyone if the 
two alternatives were offered.207 
The most important case here does not entail the implications of Ordoliberalism in 
the economic and political lifestyle in post-war Germany, but its significance for the EU 
competition law, and other sectors of Europe. Therefore, one important element that should 
be noted is that economic freedom was regarded as the most crucial source of both 
prosperity and political freedom. It was believed that an economy that functions in the 
absence of government intrusion would grow and prosper. In this sense, freedom in the 
economy would also enhance political freedom and reduce the probability of a government 
or a dictator controlling the industry.208 
Nevertheless, the Ordoliberals in Europe argued that an economy that is liberated 
from interference by the government would consequently lead to the establishment of 
market powers and the formation of cartels. The result would not be in line with the norms 
of Ordoliberals, but result in economic power. Ordoliberalism believes in economic 
freedom where there is a character of positive liberty enabling all individuals to enter and 
compete in the market. Cartelisation in Europe would curtail this liberty and create market 
power. Therefore, Ordoliberal thinkers were in a dilemma, because their vision was to 
sustain freedom in the economy in Europe and allow the economy to operate without 
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meddling from the government so as to enable freedom in political terms, but also an 
economy that operates without the risk of creating cartels and market powers.209 The 
economy in Germany experienced very high inflation when the economic depression 
occurred in 1929. The core objective of Ordoliberals was to safeguard economic freedom 
where the private and governmental economic powers are secured.210 
The Treaty of Paris was signed in 1951, leading to the establishment of the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Its mission was to enhance economic expansion and 
support peace in Western Europe. The economic and legal provisions of organising trade 
were influenced by Ordoliberal ideologies since they contained provisions for competition 
law. There were three major provisions: outlawing the abuse of economic power, 
elimination of cartels and a system of monitoring mergers. One issue that contributed to 
the success of the ECSC was that the movement sought to integrate Europe further. Jean 
Monnet, who was the President of the high authority and a French administrator, played a 
crucial role in drafting the ECSC Treaty proposing cooperation on higher political and 
economic levels211.  
Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgian foreign minister, was appointed to head the 
commission that drafted a blue print for the Treaty of Rome, which was instrumental in 
creating the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958.212 Some of its objectives 
coincided with Ordoliberalism’s objectives, such as lifting living standards and 
establishing economic activities, raising stability and having close relations. For the 
objectives to be achieved, the EEC ensured that there was a system of promoting factual 
competition. It has not been disputed that Ordoliberal thoughts were of major influence in 
European integration.213 
2.4.2.5 Effects-based approach 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) managed to adopt a concept in its own 
jurisprudence when it comes to unrestricted movement of goods within the European 
internal market. The rule arose on the basis of Article 28 EC (now 34 and 36 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)), that forbade quantitative restrictions 
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on exports and imports, or actions which contained similar effects. In Cassis de Dijon 
Rewe-Zentrale AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung  für Branntwein, a distinction was made 
by the ECJ concerning actions that broke Article 34 of the TFEU that were applied 
indistinctly as opposed to being applied distinctly.214 It should be mentioned that, unlike 
Ordoliberalism’s approach, which aims is to protect the individual’s freedoms and at the 
same time to limit market intervention, the effects-based approach focuses on consumer 
welfare per se.215 
 Indistinctly applicable measures are those which prima facie fail to side with 
domestic producers over importers, but their impact is the same on both groups. According 
to the ECJ, indistinctly applicable measures which tend to favour people who trade 
domestically over those who import does not imply breaking Article 34 of the TFEU. 
However, they could be acceptable when they meet the compulsory requirements. This 
measure is essential for safeguarding the public and consumers. The European Rule of 
Reason basically proposes that a proportionality exercise has to be performed by the Court 
so as to establish whether the effect of Member State legislation on the free movement of 
goods has been justified. This is in light of the stated goals of the legislation. The ECJ put 
into application the proportionality exercise beyond the restrictions of Article 36 of the 
TFEU used from the beginning.216 
An approach which looks at effects in EU anti-trust enforcement has a real-world 
meaning where different cases are regarded as object constraints. Different practices have 
been lost from the anti-trust enforcement agenda due to the so-called effects-based 
approach to Article 101 of the TFEU. Nevertheless, it paradoxically appears as if it is trying 
to articulate Rule of Reason standards that provide legal substance to “effects” 
restrictions.217 There are several benefits which have been brought by the turn to an effects-
based approach to Article 101 of the TFEU. Reducing the anti-trust exposure has several 
common arrangements that are part of the day-to-day life of many firms. The ECJ has 
adopted the Rule of Reason in its own jurisprudence when it comes to the unrestricted flow 
of goods in the European internal market.218 
The rule arose in the context of Articles 35 and 34 of the TFEU (ex 28 EC) that 
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prohibit quantitative limitations on exports and imports. An effects-based approach placed 
an emphasis on anti-competitive effects which tend to harm customers. It is based on the 
analysis of each specific case, and sound economics that are based on facts. The foremost 
concern of such an approach is the enhancement of wellbeing of consumers and this 
suggests the importance of protection of competition rather than competitors.219 Consumer 
welfare is the foremost concern of the Rule of Reason and competition law. However, the 
limitation is that nowhere is it explained in detail how assessment of the effects on 
consumers is to be made. However, lip service is paid to embracing a method that is 
grounded on the probable outcomes in the market.220 
2.4.2.6 The departure from the Ordoliberal theory to a modern EU 
Competition Law 
One of the widely known dichotomies in European integration is the difference 
between positive and negative integration. References that are made to this distinction 
involve the impact of the integration process on national policies. The integration process 
seeks to foster market building by prohibiting trade barriers and the application of 
economic freedoms. Market corrective mechanisms in Europe seek to foster positive 
measures which are challenging to achieve based on the old unanimity rule. The 
negative/positive ideology is simplistic but provides a positive point of departure as well 
as an interpretive framework that informs out analysis.221 There are two interdependent 
reasons which can be drawn from this argument. First, positive and negative integration 
involves regulative (market-correcting) and constitutive (market-making) policies. It 
partially encompasses the range of policies implemented in the European welfare states. 
Defending state competencies when it comes to social policies and restricting the 
integration project to basic economic objectives can result in the rearrangement of social 
and economic objectives in Europe.222 
 It allows differentiation that is primarily driven by the economic wealth and political 
inclinations of the different member states. European bias is most of the time 
complemented by the objective of reinforcing capabilities and advancing positive market-
compensating policies. For the European level of governance to be reinforced, it must be 
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followed by democratisation and provoke an additional specified quest for the overcoming 
of the social deficit in Europe.223 This is considered the main reason why the 
positive/negative dichotomy is a good starting point for enquiring into the Convention 
process. Not only does it deepen constitutionalism, but it also enhances the politicisation 
of regulative into distributive policies.224 
In terms of the EU’s competition law, the first EU competition provisions can be 
found in the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community of 1951. The 
Treaty established the first Community organisation and regulated its operation. The 
Treaty of Paris contained European-wide competition rules in the coal and steel industry.225 
In particular, the treaty prohibited economic abuses and cartels in the coal and steel 
industries.226 The executive organ of the European Coal and Steel Community was in 
charge of the implementation of the competition provisions.227 
The further expansion of the competition rules is associated with the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community of 1957 (the Treaty of Rome). The Treaty 
signifies a full economic integration of the member states: it establishes the common 
market.  In the preamble to the Treaty the governments expressed their recognition of the 
importance of fair competition.228 The Treaty provides that the European Community has 
the power to institute a system ensuring that there is no distortion of competition in the 
common market.229 The Treaty covers three areas: mergers, dumping regulation and state 
aid. While the Treaty of Rome contains the rules of competition it does not establish any 
specific agency responsible for the enforcement of the rules. Geradin et al. reveal that such 
an approach was a compromise between the positions of the German government and the 
French government.230 The German government position was that the EC Treaty should 
contain competition rules.231 At the same time, the French government was reluctant to 
delegate the authority to intervene in market-related matters to the Community.232 
Therefore, the inclusion of the competition rules but the absence of the enforcement rules 
in the Treaty became a compromise between the French and German positions.  
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As far as the EU is concerned, the creation of the European Communities by Jean 
Monnet and Robert Schuman has logically led to the establishment of a single market.233 
Furthermore, the emergence of the single market logically required the enactment of a 
consistent, just, transparent, and unified regulatory framework for competition law, taking 
into account the fact that competition - or, in other words, the struggle for commercial 
advantage - is a salient feature as well as an intrinsic specificity of a vast and open single 
market.234 
To attain this purpose, in 1962, the Council of the European Economic Community 
passed Regulation 17/62.235 This regulation was the first legal document implementing 
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty Establishing European Union. This means that the 
regulatory framework of competition law in the European Union was born with the 
adoption of Regulation 17/62, while the incentives to create such a regulatory framework 
had been set forth in Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (hereinafter referred to as the TEC).236 
Despite the fact that the regulatory framework of the EU competition law was created 
in 1962, at the moment when Regulation 17/62 was given legal force, the EU competition 
law was not completely established due to the lack of a legal mechanism which could 
guarantee the supremacy of EC law over the national legal systems of the member states. 
This shortcoming of the Community law was brought to an end by means of judicial 
practice. Thus, the decision in Van Gend en Loos filled the gap. In a nutshell, Van Gend 
en Loos is a landmark case of the European Court of Justice which prescribes that the 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community is capable of giving rise to legal 
entitlements enforceable before the national courts of member states.237 
Furthermore, the Regulation implemented rules of merger control. The Commission 
was empowered by the Regulation to require undertakings and associations to bring an end 
to the infringement of competition rules contained in Article 81 of the Treaty of Rome.238 
Undertakings and associations were required to notify the Commission about integration 
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agreements that could give rise to claims under Article 81 (1) of the Treaty. After the 
adoption of Regulation 17/62 the Commission was loaded with notifications. In order to 
deal with them in a swift manner the Commission developed various guidelines, negative 
clearance decisions, block exemption regulations, de minimis notices and so on.239 Thus, 
one may observe that the Regulation gave the Commission significant powers to enforce 
the competition rules set forth in Article 81 of the EC Treaty. 
Forty years after the adoption of Regulation 17/62, the Commission decided to 
review the EU competition rules enforcement mechanism.240 The Commission issued a 
‘White Paper on the modernisation of the regulations implementing Articles 85 and 86 of 
the EC Treaty’.241 The White Paper revealed that EU and non-EU firms notified a huge 
number of agreements, many of which did not pose any threat to competition.242 The 
Commission, therefore, spent a lot of time reviewing this safe agreement, and was unable 
to spend time on the agreements that may indeed have distorted competition.243 
Subsequently, the Commission submitted to the Council a regulation draft reforming the 
competition enforcement system. In 2003, Regulation 1/2003 was adopted to replace 
Regulation 17/62. The main change introduced by the 2003 Regulation is decentralisation 
of the enforcement system. It replaced the notification system with an ex post legal 
exception system: from then firms were no longer required to notify the Commission on 
proposed agreements but to self-assess their business practices within the provisions of the 
core treaties.244 
In 2009 the Treaty of Lisbon came into force. The Treaty amends the Treaty of 
Rome.  The amended version of the Treaty of Rome is referred to as the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Competition rules, which were contained in 
the Treaty of Rome, were basically re-enacted in the TFEU. Only state aid provisions 
underwent considerable changes.245 Also, in TFEU the term ‘common market’ is replaced 
by the term ‘internal market’, which indicates a greater integration of economic activities.  
The modern EU competition law represents a system of general and specific rules. 
General rules are set forth in framework legislation such as Regulation 1/2003, Council 
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Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation (the Merger Regulation)), and a range of state aid 
regulations and so on. Specific rules are not universal but cover only certain industries and 
sectors. For example, Council Regulation (EC) No 487/2009 specifies competition rules 
as applied to certain categories of agreements in air transportation.  
To sum up, basic competition rules, including anti-trust provisions, merger controls 
and dumping have not changed dramatically over the last sixty years. The state aid 
provisions, however, have been modified significantly. While basic competition rules are 
more or less stable, the enforcement system constantly changes. This can be explained by 
adjustment to the existing practices in the market and by the newly appearing experience 
of the Commission in competition matters.  
2.4.3 Values and Origins of the UAE Competition Law: 
2.4.3.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter One, the UAE government has been keen to follow the 
Islamic (Shari’ah) principles within its legal system’s framework. According to Article 7 
of the UAE constitution, Islam is the official religion of the federation, and the Islamic 
Shari’ah (Islamic law) is a main source of legislation.246 Nevertheless, in order to discuss 
and analyse the UAE competition law, it is necessary to review the Islamic principles. 
Thus, the following section will review and discuss the Islamic legal system, including its 
origin, features and sources, which is part of the framework of UAE legislation. This is 
mainly to look at the cultural influence and how it influenced the formation of the UAE 
competition law which is purely civil code that meant to serve the country locally and 
beyond its borders. This must be stated that the competition code is a civil code that might 
be flavoured or influenced by the Shari’ah law. 
However, before taking a look at the sources of Islamic law, we should have a look 
at the nature of Shari’ah itself and whether it is purely a religious law. Because of its name, 
the mainstream of the literature believes that Shari’ah is purely a religious law. In addition, 
the other legal traditions, including common law, do not address the religious issues that 
are covered by Islamic law.247 It should be noted that Shari’ah law is divided into two main 
                     
246 United Arab Emirates Constitution, Article 7. 
247 Greiss, M. Evaluating the Influence of EU Competition Rules and Islamic Principles on the Treatment of Abuse of Dominance 
Under Egyptian Competition Law. Ph.D. Thesis, Sussex Law School, 2011, p. 97. 
59 
 
sections. The first section only addresses religious matters, which include praying, fasting, 
zakat, haj, etc. This section under Islamic law is called Ibadat. The second section covers 
transactions in society and is called Mu’amalat.248 According to Badr, only about 3 per 
cent of the Quran constitutes legal principles that deal with family law and inheritance 
issues. Shari’ah is not entirely a religious law, and only the Ibadat section is “manifestly 
divine.”249 It is the section of Mu’amalat that is a man-made law “with mere reflections on 
moral considerations and rationalisations behind prohibitions”250 which is the subject of 
this research. 
2.4.3.2 Islamic (Shari’ah) Law sources: 
It has been commonly agreed within Islamic society that Shari’ah law has two main 
sources of legislation. The first source of legislation is considered as the primary source of 
Shari’ah law, which consists of the Holy Quran, Sunnah of the Prophet Mohammad, (peace 
be upon him), Ijma and Qiyas. The Islamic jurisprudence (Usul Al Feqeh) is considered 
another source of legislation in Shari’ah law, which is viewed as a secondary source of 
Shari’ah law.251 
Today, in some Islamic law countries, the Holy Quran is the core source of 
legislation which includes some clear prohibitions and sentences. There is a clear 
obligation and responsibility in the Holy Quran on the states and their citizens regarding 
the prevention of economic exploitation as well as creating economic justice to ensure that 
all transactions in the society have been carried out with ‘fair play.’252 On the other hand, 
the Sunnah consists of the acts and statements or records of Prophet Mohammad (Peace be 
upon him), and the written statement or record is called Hadith.253 Each Hadith has to pass 
through a quite rigid process in order to be approved. The content and transmission of each 
Hadith has to be analysed in order to determine its reliability and validity.254 
The third Shari’ah source is Ijma (consensus). It refers to the agreement of the 
Muslim community on religious matters. Ijma could be explicit or implied. The fourth 
source of Shari’ah is Qiyas (Analogical reason). Qiyas literally means the weight, quality 
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or length measurement or ascertaining of something. Qiyas can also mean to propose a 
similarity or equality when comparing with another opinion between two or more things.255 
However, in the jurisprudential sense it is described as a procedure that offers a ‘methodical 
analogy’ in order to reach an indirect outcome.256 Dabbah has described this process of 
“systematic interference or analogy”.257 
The secondary source of Islamic law includes Istihsan, Almasaleh Almursala and 
Urf. Istihsan could be interpreted as a jurist’s preference. There are different definitions 
for the term Istihsan as some Muslim jurists defined it as moving from an analogy to a 
stronger one. Other jurists defined it as giving up an analogy for a stronger evidence 
whether from the Quran, Sunnah or Ijma.258 
Almasaleh Almursalah (Public interests) is another secondary source in the Islamic 
Shari’ah. It refers to accepting public interest when there is an absence of ruling in the 
Shari’ah regarding an issue.259 Thus, it seeks to permit or prevent something on the basis 
of serving the public interest. Urf is another source of the Islamic Shari’ah. It refers to the 
customs or knowledge of a society. It should be noted that urf must be compatible with 
Shari’ah in the Islamic society.260 Urf defined as recurrence of the practices that are 
acceptable to people. However, for urf to be acceptable there are some conditions to be 
met. First, it should be current and common. Second, it must be in practice at the time of 
transaction. Third, it must not violate the Quran and Sunnah. Fourth, it must not violate a 
term of a valid agreement according to Shari’ah.261 While It should be noted that, because 
of the secondary sources, Shari’ah law has been flexible enough to be applied to many 
different areas and adapted to social aspects in all times.262 
Shari’ah law could be divided into two categories that are Ibadat and Mu’amalat. 
The first category is concerned with worship obligations, while the other is concerned with 
the obligations of legal and civil matters. Competition regulation would be under the latter 
category. Rather than the main sources of Shari’ah law (Quran and Sunnah), the source of 
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Ijtihad has played a significant role in the development of competition regulation that is 
seen from the Islamic point of view. This is because the sources of the Quran and Sunnah 
are very limited in this matter. Since early Islam, many different schools have emerged 
which benefited from the flexibility of Shari’ah through using different Islamic tools, 
especially the source of Ijtihad, in order to develop their thoughts and opinions on the 
different disputed matters in law.263 
However, now there are four schools of thought whose major differences are referred 
to minor branches of Shari’ah and not the fundamental ideologies of faith. These schools 
are: the Maliki, Shafi’i, Hanbali and Hanafi schools, and it should be noted that they are 
all agreed on the primary source of Shari’ah law. These schools are known as “personal 
schools”264 and considered equally orthodox.265 The difference between these schools only 
arose in the areas of Hadiths’ narrations, analogy methods, meaning of words, and certain 
principles of admissibility.266 For the purpose of this study, it is important to mention that 
Shari’ah law includes many principles that are concerned with the economic sector, which 
includes: monopolies prohibition, economic sector freedom, the prohibition against 
abusing any right, etc.267 
2.4.3.3 Shari’ah Perspectives on Competition Law 
2.4.3.3.1 Maslahah 
Maslahah is harmonious with the Maqasid objectives in Shari’ah as they seeks to 
find a balance between private and public interests.268Maslahah could apply to either right 
of Allah or mankind aiming to protect both rights. It is known that the public interests aims 
to preserve law objective and thus, it is important to protect such to protect such interest.  
It could be noticed that Maslahah is related to competition law and policy with the 
principle of price regulation or what is known as (Tasi’ir).269 For example. The Ministry 
of Economy represented in the Consumer Protection Department prohibited merchandisers 
from selling rice and other products at prices that are higher than the ceiling.270 The traders 
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were penalised with a fine of AED100,000.271 The existence of such law would help 
protecting public interests and prevent inflation that is likely to harm them. Thus, 
Maslahah is very important as without having a law, inflation will be caused and traders 
will fix prices to the maximum profit ignoring public interest. 
Article 5 of the UAE Competition law prohibits agreements that may affect prevent, 
limit or prejudice competition such as price fixing and limiting production, market sharing, 
and technical developments. It could be said that Article 5 has followed the same principle 
of Maslahah, which reveals the comprehensiveness of the Shari’ah law in commercial 
transactions. Maslahah and competition law implementation and enforcement are tandem. 
Thus, it could be said that competition law is encouraged by Shari’ah law.  
2.4.3.3.2 Sadd Al-Dhara’i 
Literary Sadd Al-Dhara’I means blocking the means. In Usul al Fiqh it means 
blocking the means of evil272 or to an evil dead.273 It should be noted that there are several 
legal maxims regarding the principle of Sadd Al-Dhara’i. First, if any harm occurs then it 
should be redressed. Second, it doesn’t matter how big is the harm, since a greater harm 
must be avoided then if an action resulted in a minor harm it should be avoided to. Third, 
general harm has the priority over specific harm. Forth, avoiding a harm is always prior to 
promoting an interest. Fifth, normal rules of legality are ignored in case of emergency and 
restore to unlawful acts are allowed.274 Thus, it could be said that the reason of blocking 
means is to scrutinise the consequences of actions and what could lead to. If the 
consequences are leading to a harm and evil. Whereas, if the consequences are directed 
towards benefits, they are desirable.275 
An example for Sadd Al-Dhara’I could be seen in the prohibition of monopoly by 
the Prophet Mohammad (Peace be upon him).276 The Prophet in a hadith mentioned that 
Allah will curse anyone who monopolise others. Also, in another Hadith reported by Al-
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Tirmidhi, the Prophet stated that: anyone monopolises is not but wrongdoer.277  Also, 
hording of a product (Iktinaz) is prohibited under Shari’ah law. Through hording, products 
and supplies are kept less than the demand to rice prices and maximise profits. In Hadith 
narrated by Ibn Majah the Prophet said that it’s a crime to hoard grain in order to sell it at 
a higher price.278 
By mean of comparison, Article 6 of the UAE competition law regulates the 
behaviour of undertakings and individuals who are in a dominant position that are abused 
through -for example- imposing unfair prices, Obliging a client not to deal with a 
competitive establishment, and The total or partial rejection to deal in accordance with the 
usual commercial conditions. It could be said that the principle of Sadd Al-Dhara’I justifies 
the importance of implementing competition law. Competition law is there to prevent any 
act that might harm the society. Any absence of such law that regulate the behaviour in 
community, including commercial deals and trades, will cause a great harm to the 
community. Thus, it could be said that Sad Al-Dhara’i is a great principle that competition 
law is in line with it. 
2.4.3.3.3 Su Isti’mal Al-Haq 
Under Shari’ah law Su Isti’mal Al-Haq means the prohibition of the exercise of rights 
that lead to harming others. Abusing of rights are prohibited and condemned in Islam. 
Because a trader will be in a position of monopoly causing damage to other traders.  
Consequently, it is against the principle of justice in Islam. However, it should be noted 
that exercising the rights itself is valid per se. it is only unlawful and prohibited if it caused 
harm to others.279  
An example for Su Isti’mal Al-Haq, when Prophet discouraged his companions from 
meeting trader outside the city, so they don’t buy their goods for unfairly low prices.280 
Such a sale is unlawful if the seller is not allowed to cancel the transaction in case he found 
he was treated unfairly knowing the real market price.281 Thus, according to Shari’ah, the 
seller has the right to cancel the transaction when he arrives at the market place. This is to 
ensure fair commercial dealings. By contrasting with UAE competition law, Article 5 and 
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6 provides the rules to on the restrictive agreements to avoid abusing of rights.  
It could be noted that understanding and implementing the concept of Su Isti’mal Al-
Haq will lead to economic fairness and justice. Competition promotes the concept of Su 
Isti’mal Al-Haq as competition law has already adopted and implemented such concept 
nowadays. 
Based on the above, it could be said that Shari’ah views competition law as 
preferable and should be included in the administration of justice particularly, in this case, 
the economic and commercial felids. The principle of public interests supports this view, 
as well as blocking of the means of an evil deed. In addition, the concept of Shari’ah 
objectives and the concept of wrongful exercise of rights or abuse of rights are also in 
favour this view. In case of unfair competition, applying Shari’ah principle will lead to 
take a positive measure to avoid such conduct so no harm can be caused. 
 
2.4.3.4. Monopoly under Shari’ah law 
Competition scholars have generally observed competition law as barely linked with 
Shari’ah, which is why this concept has not been given sufficient consideration throughout 
the literature.282 It could be said that, in Islamic history, the concept of competition law 
could be traced back to the seventh century. From the tenth to the thirteenth century, works 
of prominent Muslim scholars such as Al-Farabi, Ibn Rushd, Ibn Sina and many others, 
are considered to be solid proofs for the enormous influence on economic theory and the 
development field.283 However, it was only in the twentieth century that some of the 
Islamic countries adopted competition law. This is because of the trade related matters 
between such countries and the Western countries, which adopted competition laws a long 
time ago, that inspired and made them realise the importance of implementing such laws 
among their legal systems.284 
With regard to monopoly, this is prohibited in Islam, and the Quran clearly states 
this prohibition in Sura Al-Hajj, verse 25, when it says: “…and whoever inclines to evil 
actions therein or to do wrong, him We shall cause to taste a painful torment”.285 The 
previous verse was interpreted by many Muslim scholars, and one of them was Ibn Kathir, 
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who interpreted it as the prevention of hoarding in Mecca.286 Also, the Sunnah prohibits 
monopoly as the Prophet Mohammad says that whoever practises hoarding (monopolising) 
is considered to be a sinner.287 
There have been several attempts to define monopoly by many Muslim scholars 
depending on each school’s principles. As was indicated earlier, there are four existing 
schools of thought in Islamic jurisprudence: Maliki, Shafi’i, Hanafi and Hanbli. Each 
school has different interpretations and opinions. However, practically speaking these 
schools are not exclusive or limited to rely on, and account is given to “decrees of rulers, 
and in part on simple custom”.288 Scholars of the Maliki School have defined monopoly as 
goods hoarding to increase prices in order to increase the profit. However, according to 
this school, food hoarding is not an act of monopoly if the reason was just for eating.289 
Therefore, according to the Maliki scholars, Ihtikar290 is monopolising different markets 
such as oil, cotton, food and other essential products to prevent “the society from gaining 
possession thereof.”291 
There are several definitions in the Hanafi School. Some scholars of the Hanafi 
School have defined Ihtikar (monopoly) as the act of withholding food to raise the prices 
and then sell it.292 This is what Al-Robi’s has pointed to, based on the principles of this 
school when he defined it as the act of food purchasing, either from the existing market or 
from neighbouring markets and hoarding it for forty days to raise the prices.293 
According to the School of Shafi’i, monopoly is the practise of purchasing food (such 
as grain) at periods when there is a demand for it, and withholding it to sell it at higher 
prices in the future. The difference in this school’s definition is that it included the intention 
to harm others, which was not the case in the other schools.294 
The Hanbli School requires three elements to consider the existence of monopoly. 
According to Ibn Qudamah, these elements are: first, the purchase of the goods; second, 
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the goods must be important for consumers; third, the harm caused to other consumers or 
buyers due to the purchase of the goods.295 
From the above, it is notable that there are common conditions between the different 
definitions of the four schools in order to consider the existence of monopoly under 
Shari’ah. Monopoly only occurs if trading was the purpose of holding a good and 
withholding it created a shortage until the price rose. This means that, in case a person 
holds a good and restrains others in order to fulfil family needs, this is not considered a 
prohibited monopoly in Islamic law. One of the conditions is the harm caused to consumers 
should be due to the practice of increasing prices. Moreover, the necessity of the goods for 
consumers without having any other alternatives in terms of prices and quality is another 
element.296 
Monopoly under Shari’ah is not only restricted to food, as many other scholars 
believe that it is widely applicable to different services and goods, not just food. According 
to El-Din, monopoly is not limited to food because if that was the case then monopoly 
would be permitted in other essentials, such as medicines, fuel, and clothes. This is a clear 
contradiction with the objectives of Shari’ah, which are based on generalised principles.297 
The reason behind prohibiting food monopoly is the fact that most monopolies at the early 
stages of Islam were food related as it was a commodity that was used on a daily basis. 
Each monopoly that may harm people and tend to increase prices “is faithless”. Thus, 
monopoly’s prevention includes all the other goods and services that are essential for 
living.298 
It should be mentioned that, even though monopoly is prohibited in Shari’ah law, the 
UAE’s competition law does not prohibit all kinds of monopoly. The UAE Government 
allows certain market players to operate in the market of certain goods and services 
(practice monopoly) in two cases. Firstly, the competition law excludes the Federal 
Government and any Emirates’ Government from the application of this law. Generally, 
certain sectors are controlled through government monopoly, such as public transportation, 
postal services, civil aviation, oil and gas, and telecommunications, which is called a state 
monopoly. Shari’ah law allows the government as a public sector to regulate the necessary 
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services for social purposes: however, Shari’ah does not allow the abuse of state monopoly. 
Secondly, the Commercial Agency law (1981)299 allows a legal monopoly in certain types 
of business. For instance: car dealership is one of the areas where legal monopoly exists, 
which in the view of Shari’ah is prohibited and considered illegal. 
As stated from the outset and from the above, it can be said that Shari’ah law has no 
influence on the UAE competition law at the current moment and does not prevent 
monopoly practices in some privet sectors and does not prohibit the Government (Federal 
and local) from abusing control of the public sector services. Islamic principles are not 
ingrained in all sectors of the UAE civil system. Shari’ah law is limited only to personal 
and family affairs (family law and inheritance issues), and to a certain extent in criminal 
affairs. However, further attention will be given later in this chapter to the UAE’s 
competition law, illustrating the previous points. 
2.4.3.5 Market Intervention, prevention of damage, control of prices under 
Islamic law 
The prohibition of causing harm to others is a major general principle that is applied 
in all different types of law, such as commercial, criminal, civil and family law. Hence, 
unfair competition certainly causes harm to the market and its players. The same principle 
of causing any sort of harm to others is prohibited in Shari’ah, as Prophet Muhammad 
stresses that no one shall harm himself nor cause harm to other people. 
It should be mentioned that, although the UAE competition law includes provisions 
to prevent anti-competitive practices that might cause market damage, such as price fixing, 
the enforcement mechanism is rather ambiguous. 
It was only during the 1950s that the debate over market intervention by governments 
and control of prices developed within the literature on economics and Islamic law. As a 
record from Sunnah, Prophet Muhammad refused a request from a person to fix prices in 
the market. In another case, the Prophet also refused a similar request saying that only 
Allah (God) increases or decreases prices, and “I do not wish to face Allah with a burden 
of injustice.”300 
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Another piece of evidence from Shari’ah is the report by Imam Malik on Caliph 
Umar. According to the report, the Caliph passed by Hatib bin Balta‘ah, who was selling 
dried grapes, and asked him to raise the price or else to leave the market. However, Imam 
Sahfi’i reported that this was not the complete story and the Caliph went back to Hatib and 
told him to sell the product at whatever price he liked. He explained that when he made 
that decision it was only a personal concern for people’s welfare and it was not a verdict 
or an expert‘s opinion.  
There has been a great debate on the topic of market intervention between the 
different Islamic schools. According to the Hanbali School, government intervention in the 
market’s prices should not be permitted. This view is based on the Hadith reported by 
Anas, as they argue that if the Prophet allowed the change of prices, then it would be legal 
to do so. However, according to this view, the Prophet pronounced that price control was 
equal to injustice, which is inherently prohibited by Shari’ah law.301 In addition, the 
scholars of this school believe that price control would lead prices to increase and imports 
to decrease, which will lead to hoarding and negatively affecting society.302 
However, the majority of Islamic schools are of the view that market intervention 
should be permitted to a certain limit. The Maliki and Hanafi scholars believe that state 
intervention should not be restricted. It is only permissible when it is detrimental to 
society’s interest. The majority of Islamic schools hold the view that the previous Hadith 
reported by Anas is not strong enough to refuse market intervention. The reason for this is 
when people asked the Prophet to raise market prices, there was no evidence that it was 
due to the merchants’ interference. The second reason is that the Islamic law prohibits price 
increase with no reason because this will lead to injustice, which is prohibited. With regard 
to the evidence of the Caliph Umar, the majority of Islamic schools points to the act of the 
Caliph when he returned to Hatib and allowed him to sell at any price he liked.303 
It should be noted that the majority of Islamic scholars allowed state intervention and 
control of prices in the market to a certain limit due to several reasons. First, Shari’ah law 
took into account the interests of individuals, thus the interests of the whole society should 
come first. This means that state intervention and price control should be acceptable when 
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the interest of a whole group is a priority, and at the same time there is no harm taking 
place. Second, the increase in prices at the time of the Prophet was not due to the acts of 
merchants, such as hording, but was rather due to other reasons, such as the lack of 
supplies.304 
2.4.3.6 Exclusive agreements in Shari’ah 
According to Ibn Taimiah, the behaviour of a group of sellers who monopolise and 
sell a particular product to buyers or provide products to a particular group of buyers is 
considered unfair in Shari’ah law. This is because such a product is only sold by a particular 
seller/s and not allowing other sellers to sell such types of products directly to 
consumers.305 Such arrangements are known as ‘exclusive agreements’ and are prohibited 
under Article 5(1)(e) of the UAE competition law, because they constitute limiting 
competition which may result in eliminating other competitors. Also, such agreements are 
prohibited under Article 6(1)(d), (e) and (f) because they constitute abuse of the dominant 
position in the market which may limit or prevent competition. This shows that some of 
the Islamic law principles are used in the UAE’s competition law. 
2.4.3.7 Precautionary measures 
A principle known as ‘market price’ is applied under Shari’ah law, which prohibits any 
conduct of sales that lead to unfair competition. For example, receiving products outside 
the market before the arrival of the seller is prohibited306 as the Prophet clearly stated that 
it is not allowed to buy goods before the arrival of the seller at the market place as the seller 
has the authority to approve or decline the sale after his arrival.307  
Also, the Sale by a resident on behalf of a nomad is prohibited under Shari’ah law.308 
The Prophet prohibited people from going to meet the caravan on the way to buy their 
products without letting them know the prices of the market. He said a town dweller should 
not sell the good of a desert dweller on his behalf. Because in that case the town dweller 
will tend to monopolise the market and sell the products in a higher prices. The purpose of 
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such precautionary is to prevent any monopolistic behaviour that might exist.309 
2.4.3.8 Enforcement under Shari’ah Law (Hisba) 
The head of the Islamic State appoints people to carry out the responsibility of 
supervising and enforcing commercial rules of the Shari’ah law in the market. It gives the 
responsibility of enjoying what is right in case of neglecting it and what avoid and forbid 
what is wrong in case of engaging in it. The purpose is to protect people’s faith and the 
society from deviance and guarantee the welfare of people.  
Hisba has emerged and developed from the time of Prophet Mohammed (PBUH). 
However, there is no existence for it within the current competition law or policy in the 
UAE unlike the Saudi Arabia as the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and 
Prevention of Vice’ does exist. It should be noted that there are four principle commercial 
tasks for Hisba as following: 
Hisba forbids unlawful trading in the market; it control the prices in the market; it 
prevents commercial fraud and cheating in the commercial activities; and it prohibits 
monopoly.310 
The current UAE commercial law grants the Ministry of Economy the power to 
enforce the provisions of the law that allows monitoring and control of the commercial 
activities and transactions in the market. It should be noted that the Hisba principles and 
functioning is as the same that of the functions of the Ministry of Economy. 
2.4.3.9 Shari’ah Law punishment 
Monopoly is prohibited under Shari’ah law and monopolisers are punished with one 
or more punishments. Shari’ah gives the head of the Islamic State the discretionary right 
to punish monopolisers by fine, jail, whipping, and confiscation of monopolised goods.311 
The UAE competition law punishes the anti-competitive practices that are provided 
in Articles 16-23. The maximum fine that is provided for in the law is 5 million Dirhams. 
However, there is no imprisonment punishment under the law. The efficiency of preventing 
violators under the UAE competition law would be enhanced in the case of implementing 
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an imprisonment sanction, as a criminal offence, as well as being compatible with Shari’ah 
law.312 The sanctions under the UAE competition law will be illustrated later in this 
chapter.  
2.4.3.8 Critical Analysis 
From the above, it is obvious that there are similarities and differences between the 
values and origins of Shari’ah and the Ordoliberal method. These differences and 
similarities can be referred to many reasons. First, on one hand it will be noticed that 
Shari’s is indeed a law. On the other hand, Ordoliberalism is not a law, but merely a method 
that had an influence on the enactment of a law (the EU competition law). Some scholars 
might arise an argument that Shari’ah is not an ordinary law, but a religious law that is not 
codified and deals with divine matters. However, Badr argues that Shari’ah should be 
considered like an ordinary law. Although Shari’ah and Ordoliberal theory emerged due 
to the anti-competitive conduct that markets were experiencing, the reason and justification 
behind their emergence is not the same. In regard to Shari’ah, it emerged based on day to 
day issues giving a divine message on what is desired from what is condemned or 
prohibited. Unlike the Ordoliberal thought, the emergence of Shari’ah was not due to 
resolving a specific matter. The Ordoliberal thought emerged in Germany after the market 
distortion aiming to change a specific situation; specifically, protecting competition from 
market intervention, cartels and economic power. 
The second reason of the similarities and differences between Shari’ah and the 
Ordoliberal approach is the objective of each of them. Shari’ah prohibits and condemns 
any injustice in society. Thus, Shari’ah’s core object is to protect society from any harm or 
injustice that may occur from monopolistic behaviour. On the other hand, Ordoliberal 
thought’s objective is to protect the process of competition and accomplish social justice 
and security. Thus, it could be said that the objectives of competition protection under both 
approaches are similar and overlap. 
Third, with regard to market intervention, supporters of the Ordoliberal approach 
oppose any market intervention in the process of competition. They argue that the market 
is able to maintain itself from any distortion and approximate its outcome if the market is 
flawlessly competitive. On the other hand, the views of Islamic jurisprudence, the Shafi’i 
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and Hanbali on market intervention could be seen as similar to the Ordoliberal approach, 
since the two Islamic views prohibit any market intervention with regard to price control. 
However, their view is not the prevailing model in Shari’ah. According to the views of the 
Maliki and Hanafi schools, nothing should restrict market intervention and it is only 
acceptable when it is detrimental to society’s interest. Under Shari’ah, market intervention 
and the control of prices is not permitted all the time. It is only permitted to a certain extent 
where the interest of a whole group of society is a priority and no harm takes place for any 
individual in that society. 
Based on the above, market intervention becomes inevitable if a company implies a 
pricing structure that is high and which may harm society. It should be noted that the 
reasons which justify non-intervention in the Shari’ah and Ordoliberalism approaches 
differ. The supporters of the Ordoliberalism approach claim that market intervention by 
governments often leads to market distortion since the well-established players influence 
the government. On the other hand, on the basis of fairness rationalisation, Shari’ah is 
likely to prevent market intervention by stressing the maintenance of equality and justice. 
Fourth, the influence of both approaches on the enactment of competition law is 
another reason for the similarities and differences. The aim of the Ordoliberalism approach 
was to protect the process of competition by implementing competition regulation and 
applying a social market economy (which was the case in Germany) in order to resolve 
market distortion. This approach has not only stayed in Germany, it has been expanded to 
the course of European unification. For instance Paul-Henri Spaak was the head of the 
Commission which drafted a blueprint for the Treaty of Rome. That was the basis of the 
creation of the European Economic Community in 1958. The blueprint’s objectives 
coincided with Ordoliberalism’s objectives, such as raising stability, improving living 
standards and establishing economic activities. However, it should be noted that the EU 
Courts and Commission are not obliged to follow this approach in relation to the adoption 
of competition law and they are free to adopt whatever they deem appropriate. On the other 
hand, the principles of Shari’ah have, at least to a limited degree, been included within the 
UAE’s legal system. However, the competition law has not been influenced by Shari’ah 
law. It is only limited to the personal and family level and to a certain extent in criminal 
affairs. When it comes to the commercial field, it is noticeable that there is no Shari’ah law 
but few Shari’ah principles applicable. Clearly, if Shari’ah law was applicable the banking 
system, for example, would follow Shari’ah rules, unlike the situation that prevails.  
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It should be mentioned that the Ordoliberalism method is not codified in the EU and, 
hence, it is not obligatory for EU Courts or the Commission to follow the model. On the 
contrary, Shari’ah has a constitutional underpinning under the UAE system.313 Although 
Article 7 seems to provide a desire for the government to comply with the Islamic 
principles within its legal system, there is no direct evidence that the Courts or the 
Competition Regulation Committee are obliged to follow Islamic principles in their 
approach. 
Fifth, to what extent are the EU and UAE legal systems obliged to follow their 
origins? By moving towards an economic-based approach, the EU Commission seems to 
support the effects-based approach. It should be noted that this approach is contrary to the 
Ordoliberalism approach and some of the Islamic jurisprudence in regards to price control. 
The effects-based approach aims for consumer welfare per se, unlike the Ordoliberalism 
approach whose objective is the prevention of market intervention and the protection of 
individual freedoms. The difference between the two approaches is that the Ordoliberalism 
method requires a minimum degree of market intervention, which is contrary to effects-
based analysis (that is more flexible). 
On the other hand, the UAE government does not agree with the Shafi’i and Hanbali 
views regarding pricing control restriction. However, the UAE adopted the interventionist 
approach that reflects its Islamic origins as long as the principle of no harm is given a 
greater consideration when intervening in the market. Accordingly, it is noticeable that, 
unlike the Ordoliberalism approach, Shari’ah coincides more with the effects-based 
approach. 
By departing from the Ordoliberalism approach and its origins, the EU Commission 
has adopted a less restrictive method by moving towards a more-economic-based 
approach. Thus, it is very important to mention that the EU competition law has inspired 
the UAE government to adopt an effects-based approach which is more or less the same 
approach as that of Shari’ah. The next section will illustrate the scope of competition law 
in the EU and the UAE. 
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2.5 Scope of Competition Law 
After illustrating the origins and values of competition law in the EU and the UAE 
and discussing the similarities and differences between them, the next section will 
demonstrate the scope of competition law both in the EU and the UAE. Under this section 
the similarities and differences will be discussed as well. 
2.5.1 Scope of the EU Competition Law 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the term “scope” means boundaries within 
which a particular phenomenon manifests itself. In the context of EU competition law, the 
concept of boundaries may have a different meaning. Thus, some experts in the field of 
EU competition law claim that this law has wide territorial scope, frequently reaching 
outside the borders of the EU and European Economic Area (EEA).314 In this sense, the 
scope of the EU competition law should be understood as the geographical boundaries 
within which this law has its effects. It is possible to agree with the arguments of Audia et 
al. that the EU competition law often has an effect on other countries which are not member 
states of the EU, but constitute the EEA. Thus, according to Article 53 of the EEA 
Agreement, the EU competition law may be regarded as a law which affects not only EU 
member states, but also the EEA and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA states) 
such as Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.315 
Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio and others v Commission as known by (the Wood Pulp case) 
was regarded as “a statement on the first importance on the scope of the EC competition 
law”316, especially over the non-EEC members. In this case, the Commission reached a 
decision that the applicants had violated European competition law and imposed fines on 
them.317 The ECJ validated the fines imposed by the Commission in Wood Pulp II on the 
wood pulp producers who were outside the EEC jurisdiction.318 The court reached the 
conclusion that it did not matter where the agreement of anti-competitive conduct was 
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formed. It only mattered where the anti-competitive conduct occurred.319 Thus, with this 
significant case, any firm will be subject to the European competition law in case of any 
violation no matter where the agreements were formed as long the effect is within the EU 
member states. 
Apart from the territorial scope, the EU law has boundaries in terms of subjects. In 
other words, Audia et al. correctly state that the rules of EU competition law aim at 
regulating competition, or, in other words, the struggle for commercial advantage. In this 
connection, many small business entities fall outside the scope of this law as they are not 
capable of showing a substantial struggle for commercial advantage or their market shares 
are negligible.320 Hence, it follows that the EU competition law regulates only those deals 
which involve commercial competition.  
Aside from the above, the scope of the EU competition law may also be analysed 
through the scope of its sources. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the boundaries of 
Article 101 of the TFEU are not definitely clear, there is an opinion that the aforesaid 
Article concerns only the issues of consumer welfare.321 From the contrasting point of 
view, Townley contends that the EU competition law in general, and Article 101 of the 
TFEU in particular, takes into account the issues of public policy, such as environment and 
public health, as well.322 
However, the EU competition law consists of three broad branches: cartel policy, 
merger control and state aid.323 Such categorisation was laid down by the Treaty of Rome 
which addressed competition issues in the context of cartel/anti-trust, mergers and 
acquisitions and state aid. Each branch addresses the scope of issues associated with 
artificial distortion of the internal market.324 Since the Treaty of Rome, the EU competition 
law has evolved in a more or less structured area: it has gained profile and stature.325 
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2.5.1.1 Cartel Policy 
2.5.1.1.1Prohibition of Agreements That May Harm Competition 
Article 101 of the TFEU (Previously Article 81 of the Treaty of Rome) prohibits 
agreements that distort competition and trade between member-states and, thus, harm 
consumer interests. The prohibition covers both horizontal agreements between companies 
operating in the same industry and vertical agreements between firms in the same supply 
chain. At this point, it is important to give due consideration to the concepts of horizontal 
and vertical agreements. 
2.5.1.1.2 Horizontal Agreements  
 Horizontal agreements are agreements between firms at the same level. For instance, 
an agreement between two manufacturers is a horizontal agreement. Horizontal 
agreements may take many forms. Thus, examples of horizontal agreements are joint 
development and research agreements and joint production agreements.326 Horizontal 
agreements are not illegal per se, but only if the aim was the distortion of competition in 
the internal market.327 Examples of illegal horizontal agreements are agreements providing 
for price fixing.  
2.5.1.1.3 Vertical Agreements  
Vertical agreements are agreements between companies at different levels of the 
supply chain. For instance, agreements between a wholesaler and a producer and between 
a retailer and a wholesaler are vertical agreements.328 Vertical agreements are generally 
regarded as less harmful to competition.329 As well as horizontal agreements, vertical 
agreements are not illegal per se. The European Commission points out that vertical 
agreements which define the price and quantity of goods do not usually restrict or harm 
competition.330 Vertical agreements become illegal only when they distort competition in 
the internal market. Examples of illegal vertical agreements are agreements that impose 
certain restraints on the buyer or on the supplier, when these distort competition.331 For 
instance, if the agreement obliges the buyer to purchase certain goods only from the 
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supplier, the agreement can be held as aiming to distort competition.  
However, there is a clear definition of vertical agreement under the Commission 
Regulation 30/2010. According to Article 1 (b), vertical agreement could be defined as a 
concerted practice or arrangement between two or more parties at different levels of the 
supply chain “and relating to the conditions under which the parties may purchase, sell or 
resell certain goods or services”.332 
2.5.1.1.4 Block Exemptions  
As has been mentioned above, not all horizontal and vertical agreements are illegal: 
their legality is assessed according the TFEU and other EU instruments. At the same time, 
the Commission can establish so-called block exemptions for some types of agreements.333 
Thus, the anti-cartel rules do not apply to the exclusive relationship between car dealers 
and their official distributors.334 
2.5.1.2 Mergers Control 
2.5.1.2.1 The Link between Abuse of Dominant Position and Merger 
Control  
Merger control is intrinsically tied to the threat of abuse of dominant position. 
Dominant position is not illegal per se. However, the abuse of a dominant position is 
illegal. Abuse of dominant position can take various forms: exclusive distribution and 
predatory pricing that drive the competitors out of the market. Predatory pricing can be 
defined as “a reduction of price in the short run so as to drive competing firms out of the 
market or to discourage entry of new firms.”335 The simple reduction of the price is not 
predatory pricing. Predatory pricing occurs when prices are reduced to an unreasonable or 
unprofitable level with the expectation of recovering the loss when the competitors leave 
the market. One of the simplest ways to maintain a dominant position in the market is 
merging with or acquiring the competitor. Because mergers may potentially give rise to 
the abuse of dominant position, there is extensive merger control.336 
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2.5.1.2.2 Mergers that Benefit Consumers  
As mentioned, mergers are not illegal per se. They are illegal only when they may 
distort competition. In some cases, mergers can even be beneficial to consumers. Indeed, 
the merger of companies may result in more cost-effective production and the reduction of 
prices for consumers.337 Another example: two-medium sized firms may merge so as to 
become an equal competitor to a large firm, and thus to increase competition. 
2.5.1.2.3 How Merger Control is maintained  
In order to maintain merger control the Commission has adopted the so-called Merger 
Regulation. The resolution will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five. At this point, suffice 
to say that the resolution establishes a threshold for the turnover of companies. If the 
merger exceeds this threshold the merger is subject to review by the Commission. The 
merger review is conducted in clearly defined stages.338 During the first stage the 
Commission experts identify whether a given merger has competition implications. If there 
are serious concerns about the detrimental impact of a merger, the Commission launches 
the second stage, which is a four month investigation.339 At this stage, the experts scrutinise 
the potential impact on relevant markets and discuss the options available to resolve the 
situation.340 During the investigation stage, the Commission and merging parties may agree 
on certain remedies to compensate for the possible detrimental effect of the merger. Apart 
from this official review, there can also be informal consultations between merging parties 
and the Commission before the formal notification.341 
2.5.1.2.4 Statistics on Merger Review  
In the period between 21 September 1990 and 28 February 2013, the Commission 
received 5,159 notifications about mergers.342 In 2012, out of 283 notifications, four were 
withdrawn at the first stage and one at the second stage. In the same year, 254 notifications 
were found to be compatible with the Merger Regulation.343 In 2012, only one merger was 
prohibited by the Commission: the merger between Deutsche Börse and NYSE 
                     
337 Bannerman, E. Op. cit. p. 9. 
338 Ibid. 
339 Ibid. 
340 Ibid. 
341 Ibid. 
342 European Commission. Merger Statistics. [Online] 2013. Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf 
[Accessed: 2 April 2013]. 
343 Ibid. 
79 
 
Euronext.344 
2.5.1.2.5 Organisational Issues in Merger Review 
The statistics suggest that the Commission is quite overloaded with merger 
notifications. There are concerns that at some point the Commission’s merger review 
workload may become unmanageable.345 Merger review is a knowledge-intensive and 
time-consuming process. In other words, it requires expertise and time.346 While 
conducting the merger review, the experts apply complicated economic models in order to 
assess whether a merger may distort competition. However, even such a knowledge-based 
approach is not able to provide 100 per cent accurate forecasts. The results of the 
assessment are always speculative. For this reason, negotiations regarding remedies can be 
difficult: the company may take a diametrically opposite view in relation to the 
Commission’s findings.347 In a word, the organisation process of merger review is quite 
complex.  
2.5.1.3 State Aid Control 
2.5.1.3.1 The Concept of State Aid 
The concept of state aid is quite old. In medieval times, kings and queens subsidised 
their subjects or the subjects of foreign kingdoms in order to achieve their political and 
geopolitical goals. Monarchs also subsidised the projects they were interested in. For 
instance, the Spanish monarchs, Ferdinand and Isabella, subsidised Columbus so as to 
enable him to reach new lands and enlarge Spanish territories. In the pre-industrial and 
industrial eras the concept of state aid or subsidies became more attached to the idea of the 
welfare of the state. At this stage, many European states acknowledged the importance of 
promoting welfare states. The industrial revolution was marked not only by the rapid 
developments in manufacturing, but also by tensions between workers and business 
owners. Many existing economic and social rights were claimed by workers in the era of 
the Industrial Revolution. In this period, subsidies were mainly confined to social needs: 
education, medical care and so on. However, another pattern of state aid was helping 
strategically important enterprises to cope with financial difficulties and not distort trade 
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and competition and have fair competition.348 It soon became apparent that state aid might 
distort competition.349 Indeed, it is very difficult not to discriminate between enterprises. 
To put it simply, why are some enterprises entitled to receive state aid, while others are 
not? In other words, in some situations state aid may represent an unfair competitive 
advantage.  
2.5.1.3.2 Evolution of State Aid Control in the European Union 
1. Treaty of Paris of 1951 and Treaty of Rome 1957 
The first Community-wide state aid provisions were set forth in the Treaty of Paris. 
Article 4 of the Treaty stipulated that subsidies or aid granted by member-states are 
incompatible with a common market of coal and steel, and thus should be abolished and 
prohibited.350 Article 54 proclaimed that the High Authority of the Community had the 
power to impose fines on firms who received state aid.351 
Similar provisions reappeared in the Treaty of Rome. However, these provisions were 
not confined to the coal and steel industry but extended to almost all, with a few exceptions, 
the industries of the European Economic Community (EEC). The Commission obtained 
powers similar to those of the High Authority of the Coal and Steel Community.352 
However, for a long period state aid control was a low-ranking priority. In the period 
between 1958 and 1968 the Commission issued only three final decisions under the state 
aid proceedings as it prescribed by the Treaty of Rome.353 
2. Activation of State Aid Control  
The activation of state aid control coincided with the completion of the customs union 
in 1968.354 The first significant case which was prosecuted by the Commission was the 
case of preferential rediscount rates granted by France to steel exporters in intra-European 
trade.355 The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) – now the European Court of 
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Justice (ECJ) - ruled that the grant of such rediscount rates was prohibited state aid.356 In 
the course of time, state aid control became more and more tight. The times when state aid 
was considered a low-ranking priority were left behind. At the same time the forms of state 
aid became increasingly sophisticated and complicated. Thus, in the 1990s one of the major 
issues in state aid control was whether outward investments constituted state aid.357 
3. Modern Approach to State Aid 
The EU competition law does not ban all forms of state aid. Thus, the Commission 
may allow the state aid designed to support certain public policy objectives.358 For instance, 
the Commission may uphold the state aid for companies located in the poorest regions of 
the EU so as to support industrial development. Another form of state aid which can be 
permissible is the support for small and medium-size businesses. Furthermore, in some 
cases, the Commission may allow state aid in support of inward investments. At the same 
time, one should bear in mind that all the exceptions are regulated in a very detailed way.359 
2.5.2 Scope of the UAE Competition Law 
Article 2 of the UAE Federal Law No. 4 of 2012 states that this piece of legislation 
is meant to protect and enhance competition in the UAE market.360 Further, the law is 
aimed at fighting monopolistic practices in the country by creating an environment 
whereby efficiency and competitiveness can be relied upon to safeguard consumer interests 
and economic freedoms. Additionally, the law bans anti-competitive behaviour such as 
restrictive agreements, abuse of dominant positions and unfair economic concentration 
activities among other activities that may hinder competition in the UAE. 
The competition law affects all commercial entities with operations in the UAE.361 
Additionally, the law not only covers entities’ operations which are located in the UAE, 
but also any operation that is carried out by any entity that is located outside the country 
which is likely to have an impact on competition in the UAE. This includes companies or 
entities that hold intellectual property rights in or outside the UAE. Article 4 of the UAE 
Federal Competition Law exempts certain enterprises from the provisions of this law. 
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According to Article 4 (1), these include sectors such as telecommunications, finance, 
petroleum and gas, the pharmaceutical industry, transport (land, sea and air), sanitation and 
the waste management sectors.362 These enterprises are largely under the control of both 
the federal government and the administrations of various emirates’ governments. The law 
authorises the Cabinet to add new activities or sector/s or remove any existing sector/s 
from the exclusion. Further, according to the law, certain small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) are exempted from the provisions of this law. Article 4 (3) provides that the 
Cabinet can exempt small and medium enterprises under certain conditions.363 The actual 
definition of small and medium enterprises to be excluded from this law remains unclear 
as there are many different definitions within the different sectors. However, the Ministry 
of Economy is about to finalise the new SME law which includes a clear definition for 
SMEs.364 In addition, Article 4 (2) of the law exempts the Federal or local governments’ 
activities and actions of enterprises upon the Federal or any local government’s 
authorisation or resolution or under the supervision of any of them, including the activities 
of the enterprises owned or controlled by the Federal or local governments according to 
the Cabinet’s guidelines.   
The extent to which the aforementioned state-owned enterprises are to be exempted 
should be well articulated, otherwise there is the likelihood of an uproar from private 
enterprises if there appear to be elements of undue favouritism. Private establishments can, 
however, find solace in the fact that the sectors excluded from the application of the UAE 
competition law are governed by other regulatory regimes specifically designed for 
them.365 
2.5.2.1 Cartel Policy 
Article 5 of the UAE Federal Competition Law is quite elaborate on what constitutes 
Restrictive Agreements. The government of the UAE recognises that cartels hide under 
these agreements. This article prohibits the making of agreements that have the objective 
to create bias against certain businesses or prevent competition. Some of the characteristics 
of such agreements include colluding in tenders or rigging of bids.366 Additionally, 
restrictive agreements could be made with the aim of refusing to buy from certain 
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businesses or establishments or selling exclusively to certain businesses or 
establishments.367 Such things are done with the aim of stopping these businesses from 
carrying out their operations. In addition, this section of the competition law warns against 
and ultimately outlaws practices such as price-fixing and hoarding of goods from certain 
markets with a view to creating unreasonably high demand for them (Article 5 Paragraph 
1(a) and (f)).368 
Any plans to divide market segments among establishments and along geographical 
considerations to the exclusion of other market players are also outlawed.369 Business 
enterprises are also prohibited from uniting with a view to blocking other businesses from 
accessing the same market.370 However, Article 5 (3) provides an exemption to Article 5(1) 
and 5(2) excluding paragraph (a) of Article 5(1) and paragraph (a) of Article 5(2), in case 
the impact of the agreements was weak “in which the total share of establishments party 
thereto fail to exceed the percentage specified by the Cabinet of the total transactions in 
the relevant market.” The finer details in Article 5 of the UAE competition law will, of 
course, be known once the accompanying executive regulations are published. This section 
of the UAE’s competition law is certainly in its nascent stage and that is why legal and 
business experts would be tempted to consider it narrow. Other jurisdictions’ competition 
regimes on cartels are significantly broader.  
2.5.2.2 Economic concentration (mergers and acquisitions) 
Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the UAE’s competition law address the issue of economic 
concentration.371 The definition of economic concentration is provided under Article 1. It 
refers to any transaction - for example mergers, acquisition of assets, proprietary rights or 
shares - which allows a certain entity or a group of entities to directly or indirectly control 
another entity or other entities. The precise meaning of control is not yet clear under the 
competition law. The concept of economic concentration under the UAE’s competition 
law is so broad that it could be used to govern transactions such as joint ventures.372 
 Mergers and acquisitions that contain aspects of economic concentration must be 
scrutinised by the minister of the economy and subsequently cleared by the same authority 
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through the issuance of a resolution. What the competition law requires is for the parties 
to a merger or acquisition to file a written notification with the Ministry of Economy 30 
days before the start of the implementation of the merger or acquisition deal. It would then 
take around 90 days (from the day of the filing of the notification) for the minister to 
scrutinise the deal and approve or disapprove it. If the minister is in need of further details 
about the merger or acquisition deal and has made a request to this effect, the clearance 
period by the minister can be extended by 45 days (on top of the 90 days) as provided for 
under Article 10 Paragraph 3 of the UAE competition law.373 Additionally, if the minister 
did not have communicated after the expiry of the aforementioned period, the merger or 
acquisition will be deemed to have been approved. The purpose of this scrutiny by the 
minister is to ensure that the merger or acquisition does not raise any competition issues 
such as the formation of a dominant position and the likelihood of abuse of such a position 
by the merged enterprises. The minister is given powers by the competition law to revoke 
a merger or acquisition even after having approved it. This could be occasioned by the 
discovery of falsehoods (if the parties to the merger obtained clearance from the minister 
using misleading or inaccurate information) in the initial deal or a breach of the merger 
agreement by the parties. It is important to note that the threshold of the market share (the 
percentage of the market) that a merged enterprise can control is set by the Cabinet through 
the advice of the minister. This threshold is flexible and can be adjusted from time to time 
by the Cabinet depending on the prevailing economic situation. Businesses should bear in 
mind that the failure to seek approval from the minister of the economy over merger and 
acquisition deals will attract hefty fines as provided for under Article 17 of the UAE 
competition law.374 
2.5.2.3 State Aid 
Over the past couple of decades, the UAE has been encouraging foreign investors to 
do business in the country. In fact, the federal government has instituted policies that make 
the country’s business environment very conducive for foreign investment.375 The new 
UAE federal competition law is part of the policy reforms aimed at streamlining the 
business legal regime in the country. It was preceded by several pieces of legislation 
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including the Federal Companies Law, Commercial Agencies Law, Federal Industry Law, 
and the Government Tenders Law.376 The competition law goes a long way in cementing 
the UAE’s position as one of the most investor friendly nations in the Gulf region.   
Economic liberalisation has been noted as the way to go in many parts of the world. 
This has often entailed the privatisation of state enterprises and corporations. However, 
there is not a single nation in the world that can be said to have completely liberalised their 
economy. The UAE, among other high growth economy countries, views overall 
privatisation with scepticism and that is why it pursues a system of hybrid liberalisation 
whereby the state owns enterprises in the critical sectors of the economy while at the same 
time encouraging private investment.377 It is against this backdrop that the UAE’s 
competition law is enacted.  
A close scrutiny of the competition law will not reveal any prohibition of government 
aid to businesses. It appears that government aid could be provided using the exemption 
routes provided for under Article 4 of the competition law. It is Article 4 that provides for 
the exemption of certain sectors, especially enterprises run by the federal or local 
(individual emirates) government, from the provisions of this law. It seems that the 
government is also keen on aiding small and medium enterprises by insulating them from 
the likely effects of the competition law.378 As has previously been mentioned, the UAE 
Cabinet is yet to decide on what precisely constitutes small and medium enterprises. The 
exemption of small and medium-sized enterprises from the application of the competition 
law is provided for under Article 4 Paragraph 3, while both federal and state enterprises 
(and private businesses acting for the state) are exempted under Article 4 Paragraph 1. The 
complete list of the sectors and activities exempted from the application of the competition 
law is found in Chapter IX.379 It should, however, be noted that the exempted sectors are 
regulated by other less stringent legal instruments and bodies.  
The reluctance of the EU to shield member state enterprises from competition from 
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private enterprises could be informed by the fact that most state enterprises have long been 
liberalised. That is, they have long been privatised and therefore the member states do not 
carry out commercial activities on a regular basis except for a few cases. This is contrary 
to the situation in the Emirates. Several of the most prosperous enterprises in the UAE are 
owned and run by the Federal or local government. This is especially true for the petroleum 
and gas industry as well as the telecommunications sector whose largest operator, Etisalat, 
is state-owned.380 
2.5.3 Critical Analysis 
Since the term ‘scope’ means boundaries, it has been suggested that the EU 
competition law has a wide territorial scope that covers outside the EU and the EEA. In 
addition, the EU competition law has boundaries in terms of subjects as it aims at 
regulating commercial competition. In general terms, the boundaries of Article 101 of the 
TFEU are ambiguous as it deals only with consumer welfare issues since it takes into 
account public policy issues. On the other hand, similarly to the EU competition law, the 
UAE competition law does not only cover all commercial entities that operate within the 
boundaries of the UAE; it covers any operations that are carried out by any entity which 
likely to affect competition in the UAE, even if it was outside the country. This means that 
the law has the power to look at the activities no matter whether the entity was based in or 
outside the country. The UAE law aims to protect and enhance competition within the local 
market. In addition, the law aims to safeguard economic freedoms and consumer interests 
through establishing a competitive and efficient environment that can tackle monopolistic 
behaviour. Unlike the EU competition law, the UAE competition law granted an exemption 
to various sectors in the market such as finance, petroleum and gas, transport, 
telecommunication, etc. However, some similarities can be found between the UAE and 
the EU competition laws in regards to the SMEs. The UAE competition law exempts SMEs 
under certain conditions, while the EU in the past did not have any exemption for small 
agreements. This has now superseded been by certain exemptions, particularly the 
agreements on block exemptions. Also, the law provides an exemption to the activities of 
the federal and local governments, and activities of enterprises upon Federal or any local 
government’s resolution or authorisation, which includes the actions of establishments that 
are controlled or owned by the federal or local governments in accordance with the 
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guidelines provided by the Cabinet. 
With regard to cartels, the scope of the EU’s competition law can particularly be seen 
in Article 101 TFEU. Article 101 prohibits agreements that may harm the economy within 
the member-states and consumer interests. Both horizontal and vertical agreements are not 
illegal per se; however, they would be illegal if the aim was to distort competition in the 
market. On the other hand, the scope of the UAE competition law regarding cartels can be 
seen in Article 5, which has quite an elaborate discussion of what are considered restrictive 
agreements, since cartels hide under such agreements. This article prohibits the agreements 
between establishments that aim to prejudice, limit or prevent competition. The law grants 
an exemption to Article 5(1) excluding paragraph (a) and Article 5(2) excluding paragraph 
(a). It should be noticed that, similarly to the EU competition law, the UAE competition 
law grants exemptions. However, the difference is that the EU competition law grants the 
Commission the power to issue block exemptions for some types of agreements, where the 
UAE law does not grant that authority. The UAE’s competition law is very specific as 
regards restrictive agreements, unlike EU competition law which is significantly broader. 
With regard to mergers control, it should be noticed that a dominant position in the 
EU is not illegal per se. However, mergers control is linked with abuse of dominant 
position which is illegal per se. The EU Competition Commission adopted the Merger 
Regulation to maintain merger control if a merger is subject to the Commission’s review, 
which has two stages. In case the merger was found to have serious competition 
implications then a second stage of 4 months of investigations will be launched. In 
addition, the Commission and the merging parties could have informal consultations before 
the formal notification. Because of the heavy load of notifications, which is a time 
consuming process, there are concerns that it could become unmanageable.  
On the other hand, the UAE competition law addresses the issue of economic 
concentration, which is defined under Article 1, within Articles 9, 10 and 11. Economic 
concentration refers to any transaction that allows an entity to directly or indirectly control 
another entity or entities, such as assets acquisition, mergers, etc. It is worth mentioning 
that economic concentration’s concept is very broad under the UAE competition law and 
could regulate transactions such as joint ventures. Similarly to the EU Merger regulation, 
the parties to a merger or acquisition in the UAE have to file a written notification. 
However, the difference is that the notification should be submitted before the 
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merger/acquisition takes place. At the moment the UAE competition law does not provide 
any guideline on how to apply for economic concentration or the type of documents that 
should be attached with the application. Such guidelines are set up in the accompanying 
executive regulation, which has not been published yet. In addition, the executive 
regulation will provide the guidelines of economic concentration verification procedures. 
In regards to state aid, the concept of state aid in Europe has roots going back to the 
medieval era. This concept developed to become more attached to the idea of state welfare 
in the pre-industrial and industrial era. However, it has been recognised that state aid might 
lead to an unfair competitive advantage. The Treaty of Paris of 1951 set up the first modern 
state aid provision to be incompatible with a common market of coal and steel. 
Specifically, Article 4 prohibits and abolishes aid or subsidies provided by member-states. 
In addition, the High Authority of the Community had the authority, under Article 54, to 
impose fines in regards to state aid. The same provisions were introduced into the Treaty 
of Rome 1957 to be applicable to almost all EEC industries. It is worth mentioning that the 
current EU competition law does not prohibit all types of state aid. The laws permit state 
aid in cases where it is designed to support certain public policy objectives, such as 
supporting industrial development in the poorest regions of the EU, and supporting SMEs 
and foreign investments. Such exceptions are regulated within detailed guidelines. 
On the other hand, the UAE competition law does not provide any prohibition on state 
aid to businesses. The UAE has been following, like many other countries, an economic 
liberalisation policy to a certain limit. State aid could be provided through the exemptions 
that are provided to the enterprises owned or controlled by the federal or local 
government/s under Article 4 of the UAE Federal Competition Law. Like the EU 
competition law, Article 4(3) provides an exemption to SMEs from the application of the 
law. In addition, the law exempts several sectors which are provided under Chapter IX of 
the law. It should be noted that the concept of state aid control in the UAE is different from 
the EU. Most of the enterprises in the EU are liberalised and privatised, and thus the 
member states are not involved in commercial activities except for few cases. The situation 
is totally different in the UAE as many enterprises are owned or run by the federal or local 
government. 
2.6 Conclusion 
It is indisputable that competition law has contributed immensely in streamlining 
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trade and commerce within and between nations. However, of great importance is the 
extent of consumer welfare achieved through the establishment of these laws. This can be 
attributed to the evolution of competition law over time as explained by the various theories 
and schools of thought developed to address the issues pertaining to anti-competitive 
behaviour. These schools emerged one after the other, all with a focus on establishing a 
more definitive approach to enhance competitive practices. 
There are specific objectives - including economic efficiency, distribution of wealth, 
preservation of liberty, and protection of competitors, among others - that drive 
competition law in any country. However, there also tend to be country-specific factors, 
such as the economic situations specific to a country, that influence competition law. Such 
is the reason why there tends to be a difference in the conception of competition law 
between the EU and the USA for instance. Currently, competition law addresses issues 
concerned with abuse of dominant positions, mergers and restriction of competition. In this 
regard, the law controls the conduct of monopolies rather than the existence of monopolies 
themselves. 
Although studies have shown that there were other laws, such as the English common 
law, that type of regulated trade earlier, it was the US Sherman Act (1890) which lay the 
foundations for competition law to be established 
The Ordoliberal approach has been considered to have deep roots in the origins of 
the EU competition law. The influence of this approach is still open to question because of 
two assumptions. First, the European Courts and Commission are not obliged to follow 
this approach on competition principles based on the fact that there is no constitutional 
underpinning. Second, the EU Commission has adopted a more economic-based method 
which does not represent the Ordoliberal theories. 
On the other hand, over the past fourteen centuries, Shari’ah principles dealt with 
competition regulation through preventing monopolies and the harming of other 
individuals in the market by establishing a fair competitive market. The Shari’ah approach 
to competition regulation prohibits any conduct that may affect prices, such as price fixing 
and monopoly. Moreover, Islamic scholars developed a theory to prevent other types of 
anti-competitive behaviour such as exclusive agreements. 
Shari’ah has influenced the legal system in the UAE. However, it has no influence 
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on the enactment of the competition law. Failing to adopt or develop a modern legal system 
that is derived from Shari’ah in order to regulate market activities has led to government 
monopolies that abuse its right in the UAE market. In addition, even though Shari’ah has 
constitutional underpinning under the UAE system, there is no direct or indirect evidence 
that the UAE government is obliged to follow Shari’ah principles in practice. 
The scope of the EU competition law is quite broad. Indeed, the EU law regulates 
matters of mergers and acquisitions, abuse of dominant position, state aid and cartel 
agreements. The EU law demonstrates a comprehensive approach to the arrangements and 
transactions which may potentially give a rise to distortion of competition. Thus, the EU 
does not prohibit certain conduct (horizontal and vertical agreements, dominant position, 
and mergers) per se. The law prohibits only the conduct that aims to distort competition in 
the intra-European market.  
Being the first of its kind in the UAE and probably the entire Middle East, Federal 
Law No. (4) Of 2012 (commonly referred to as the competition law) ushers in a new era 
of business competition in the UAE. By enacting this piece of legislation, the UAE joins 
other recognised global competition jurisdictions like the United States’ (US) anti-trust 
laws and the European Union’s (EU) competition rules. This law will help in eliminating 
anti-competitive practices in the conduct of business within the UAE. In fact, the new 
competition law addresses issues that jeopardise competition, much the same as the EU 
competition rules do. These issues include restrictive agreements, abuse of a dominant 
position, and unfair acts of economic concentration like uncontrolled mergers and 
acquisitions. In addition, the competition law provides legal redress (through the federal 
and local courts) channels for aggrieved parties. Eleanor Fox observes that the primary aim 
of any competition policy is to provide a level playing field for businesses with the ultimate 
goal of protecting the consumer.381 It suffices to mention that the competition law will 
significantly contribute to the creation of a level playing field in the UAE market. 
It would be a disservice to entirely judge the UAE’s new competition law using the 
EU competition regime since the former has not yet been tested. Even the EU competition 
rules display some ambiguities from time and time, and when the Commission notices 
them, it is quick to propose a review. Therefore, business and legal experts who have 
worries over the scantiness of the details in the UAE competition law should give the law 
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a chance to evolve. After all, even Rome was not built in a day. However, when drafting 
the executive regulations, the UAE government should employ the European experience. 
It is the details contained in the executive regulations that will give meaning to the various 
provisions of the competition law. Uncertainties over issues such as what constitutes a 
small and medium enterprise as well as the circumstances under which a private enterprise 
can apply for exemption from the application of this law should be settled by the provision 
of such details through the executive regulations. Learning from the experiences of the 
European competition regime would help the UAE government avoid the pitfalls 
encountered by the EU Commission. In spite of the aforementioned inadequacies, investors 
are in agreement that the UAE’s competition law is a landmark piece of legislation. 
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Chapter Three: The Rationale for 
Implementing Competition Law 
3.1 Introduction 
Competition law is a concept adopted by various states and jurisdictions so as to 
restrict, regulate or deter the tendency of businesses or similar entities to enter into 
contracts or engage in activities that impair trade.382 The most common examples of 
antitrade behaviour include the creation of cartels and monopolies383, violation of 
intellectual property rights and hoarding, among many others.384 The adoption of 
competition laws has been effectively practised in the United States as anti-trust laws and 
in the Europe as the European competition law.385 Within the commonwealth states’ laws, 
the law of contract provides for non-recognition of the contacts by the courts as long as 
they contain the clauses either by implication or in express terms excluding contracts in 
restraint of trade.386 It is, however, evident that most developing economies have not yet 
fully and effectively implemented competition laws.387 In addition, those that have adopted 
the laws lack the institutional and the operational mechanisms to effectively implement 
them.388 The need for effective competition laws from another perspective has been 
critically examined by various scholars, including law experts and economists, some of 
whom differ in thought with respect to the need for the laws and policies.389 It is thus 
important to examine whether competition laws can positively or negatively have an 
impact on the developing economies and by extension whether such laws are needed in the 
developing economies. 
Thus, this chapter aims to examine the theoretical disputes and the rationale 
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justifying the adoption of competition law in developing economies in general and the 
UAE in particular. For that, the objectives of competition law in developing economies 
will be demonstrated. The arguments regarding the implementation of competition law in 
relation to the analysed goals of competition law will be illustrated. Then the arguments 
against the implementation of competition law will be discussed.  
Before discussing these issues and ideas it is worthwhile to revisit the relevant 
economic factors, mentioned, at a glance, earlier in section “1.1 United Arab Emirates 
Economy - Overview”. These factors that made it impossible for the UAE legislators to 
ignore the introduction of the Competition Law within the country’s civil code.  
3.2   Economic Development 
3.2.1   Economic Background: 
Even before the federation was established, particularly before 1957, the economy 
of each emirate relied on the available human and natural resources.390 Each emirate had 
different economic resources based on the population, area and abundance of resources of 
each of them.391 The economic situation at that time was poor and dependent on 
agriculture, trade, fishing, pearl diving and grazing.392 However in 1957, another period of 
economic development started when the oil was discovered and produced and later 
exported. During this period, oil became the backbone of the economy because of the huge 
amount of revenues it provided. On the other hand pearl diving and trade lost their 
importance.393 
When the UAE was established in 1971, a new era started “which necessitated the 
merger of the emirates’ economies and utilising available resources to build up the country 
and form a unified economic entity.”394 Since that time the federal government has been 
playing an important role with regard to building a modern state and society. However, 
since the mid-seventies the UAE witnessed a rapid economic and social development 
which led to the achievement of high levels of economic growth and thereby an increase 
in the income rate.395 
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The country has witnessed a huge growth in the economic sector, especially between 
2001 and 2004. The country’s annual economic growth was 14 per cent each year.396 Thus, 
that growth placed the country among the highest ranked countries in terms of some 
economic indicators, such as per capita income rate and per capita rate of consumption of 
energy. The productive and service sectors, which are part of the economic sector, have 
achieved relatively high development rates, which contributed directly in accelerating the 
rate of economic growth overall and therefore contributed to increasing the living standards 
of the citizens and expatriates all over the country.397 However, the reasons behind the high 
growth rate are: free market regulations and policies, free trade, “an enabling business 
environment, economic diversification away from oil to non-oil industries,” and the 
enhanced private sector role “as a contributor to growth over the long run.”398 
3.2.1.1 Oil and Gas Sector: 
Although the current policy of the government of the UAE seeks to reduce the 
dependence on natural resources, the country extensively depends on the production and 
export of oil since it is the mainstay of the economy. The majority of oil production is 
derived from the emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah and exported in the form of 
raw material, even though there are several oil refineries which are able to refine crude 
oil.399 
It has been proven that the economy of the UAE has been dominated by petroleum 
since the rise of oil prices in 1973, “accounting for most of its export earnings and 
providing significant opportunities for investments.”400Approximately 10 per cent of the 
global oil supply and about 5 per cent of the world’s proven natural gas reserves are 
controlled by the UAE.401 The UAE has proven oil reserves estimated at 97.8 billion barrels 
in 2009, according to the Oil and Gas Journal (OGJ), although it was slightly higher in 
1998 with 98.2 billion barrels. The leading Emirate for oil production is Abu Dhabi with 
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92.2 billion barrels, followed by Dubai (4 billion barrels), Sharjah (1.5 billion barrels) and 
Ras Al Khaimah (100 million barrels).402 
The UAE produced three million barrels per day (bbl/d) of total oil liquids in 2008. 
Of the three million bbl/d, crude oil was 2.57 million bbl/d and 356,000 bbl/d was natural 
gas liquids (NGLs). Approximately (2,475,000) bbl/d was exported mainly to Asian 
countries (with 40 per cent going to Japan), while only (525,000) bbl/d was consumed 
locally. However, due to a decision by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) in late 2008, the crude oil production was reduced to an average of 2.2 million 
bbl/d. The following figure demonstrates the increase in the oil production and 
consumption from the year 1999 to the year 2008.403 
 
Figure 1: UAE Oil Production and Consumption, 1999-2008
404 
Regarding natural gas production, the UAE is number six in the list of countries with 
the largest proven natural gas reserves. It comes after Russia, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and 
the United states with proven reserves of 214.4 trillion cubic feet (TCF) as of January 
2009.405 According to the OGJ, Abu Dhabi holds the largest reserves of natural gas with 
198.5 TCF. Sharjah follows with reserves of 10.7 TCF, then Dubai with reserves of 4.0 
TCF and finally Ras Al Khaimah with 1.2 TCF.406 
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Because of the rapid growth in the consumption of natural gas rather than production, 
the UAE became a net importer of natural gas in 2007. Figure 4.2 below illustrates the 
production and consumption of natural gas from 1999 to 2008. The UAE consumed 2.1 
TCF of dry gas in 2008, while the production was less than that at 1.77 TCF.407 
 
Figure 2: Natural Gas Production and Consumption 1999-2008
408 
However, it is expected that, at the current production rate of energy reserves, it will 
take at least 100 years before it runs out. Thus, the UAE has already recognised the need 
for diversification by focusing on the development of other sectors such as the “service 
sector and non-oil and gas industrial base” sectors.409 Currently, beside the oil and gas 
exports (which comprise 44.9 per cent of the total exports), other exports including textiles, 
foodstuffs, base materials and chemicals comprise the rest of the exports.410 
Moreover, the UAE not only depends on the oil and gas, but also other sectors, such 
as agriculture, tourism, trade and foreign direct investment, play an important role in the 
economic development of the country. The next part will illustrate such sectors. 
3.2.1.2 Non-Oil and Gas Sector: 
The non-oil and gas sector has contributed with 62.1 per cent of the total GDP in 
2008. The following part will discuss such sectors. 
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A. Agriculture: 
Agriculture has contributed only with 3.8 per cent of the UAE’s GDP as was stated in 
1999.411 This is because the total area of land under agriculture and forestry consists of less 
than 1.5 per cent of the total land area of the country. However, it has been claimed that, 
although the country faces such limited agricultural potential “with unsuitable land, water 
scarcity and harsh climate,” it never became an obstacle to its economic development.412 
The cultivated area was 15,000 hectares (ha) in 1977 and increased to 71,000 ha in 1994, 
reaching around 269,923 ha in 2008.413 The UAE’s agricultural production consists of 
dates (which are the UAE’s main crop and there are over 40 million date-palm trees in the 
UAE, with 16 million of them lining the roads), vegetables and fruit (mainly citrus and 
mangoes), and green fodder. In addition, the UAE produces livestock as well as milk, eggs, 
and meat and poultry.414 Agriculture in the UAE has shown remarkable progress since 
independence. This is due to the encouragement and help provided by the federal 
government through several methods such as: providing free land to the farmers, offering 
financial assistance to them in the form of low interest loans, and providing them with 
significant physical and technical assistance.415 
B. Tourism: 
Tourism is another important economic sector for the UAE. From the late 1980s up 
to the early 1990s, plans to establish an entirely new tourism industry were laid which have 
exceeded expectations. The different emirates have already considered tourism “as an 
important factor in their future growth and prosperity.”416 While Abu Dhabi has invested 
in the development of the tourism industry, “tourism is now worth more to Dubai than its 
income from oil.”417 Each emirate of the federation has invested in the tourism industry’s 
related infrastructure, such as golf courses, cultural centres, shopping malls, theme parks, 
and airports and aviation.418 
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According to the Trade Policy Review, approximately 5.4 million tourists visited the 
UAE in 2004.419 However, that number had increased in 2009 to reach 8.7 million 
tourists.420 The industry of tourism represented about 5.4 per cent of the total GDP of the 
country as of 2009 and is expected to rise by the year 2016 to 9.1 per cent.421 Tourism 
directly contributed with $12.8 billion to the country’s economy according to the World 
Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC).422 
C. Trade 
Trade has always played an important role in the economy of the UAE. It was and 
still is one of the most important sources of livelihood after oil.423 In terms of global trade, 
the UAE has been named as a leading Arab economy and “one of the top 30 nations in the 
world.”424 About 10 per cent of the GDP was consistently contributed by trade and 
commerce.425 The trade surplus was estimated at USD 28.1 billion in 2004 and 53 billion 
in 2007. Around one third of the exported merchandise is re-exported, which makes it the 
second source of revenue after petroleum exports.426 
To demonstrate the importance of the UAE’s trade on the international level and 
make it a key player in the global market, the UAE’s government established the Ministry 
of Foreign Trade (MoFT) in 2008. The Government believes that it is a fact that free trade 
in the long run will be an essential element for “increased competitiveness and 
productivity.”427 
Since the UAE has noted the importance of free trade as “a pre-requisite for 
strengthening the international trade system”428, it has worked hard to overcome any 
obstacles. Regionally, the UAE seeks the creation of a common market with the other Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) members to achieve a regional economic and trade integration 
and cooperation. In addition, the GCC has a trade facilitation agreement with the European 
Commission (EC). Moreover, the UAE joined the Greater Arab Free-Trade Area 
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(GAFTA)429 in 1997, which came into force in 1998. The agreement eliminated all trade 
barriers between the member states in 2005.430 
D. Other non-oil sectors: 
The sector of real estate is considered as one of the most important sectors in the 
UAE. Real estate has witnessed rapid progress since 2006 as it has contributed with 8 per 
cent of the total GDP in 2008.431 Only in 2006 was the real estate market of Abu Dhabi 
opened to foreign investors. The emirate has designated three areas which permit foreign 
ownership. However, in Dubai the situation is different. The property boom started in May 
2002 when the ruler of Dubai issued a decree allowing foreigners to buy and own properties 
in the emirate. Now there are over 30 designated areas that permit foreign ownership.432 
Another non-oil sector that has contributed to benefiting the economy is Free Zones 
and Special Economic Zones as they generate thousands of jobs, which helps “in the 
transfer of knowledge, expertise and technology to the country.”433 The framework of the 
free zones has resulted in many advantages, such as FDI, since the free zone regimes allow 
100 per cent foreign ownership of enterprises.434 
3.2.2 Economic Features: 
The economy of the UAE is characterised by different key features, which makes it 
different from most of the developing economies. Similar to the rest of the oil producing 
countries, the economy of the UAE relies heavily on oil revenues, which were invested 
directly on the implementation of development projects and infrastructure projects 
(schools, hospitals, telecommunications, airports, etc.). Knowing that oil is a depleted 
resource, the Government has already started to depend on other resources, as was pointed 
out above. 
The geographic location of the UAE enabled it to establish excellent economic 
relations with the surrounding countries, such as the Gulf, Arabian and Asian states, which 
led to an increase in the domestic exports that positively reflected on the economic growth 
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rates.435 The UAE has adopted an open economic policy, which depends on freedom of 
investments and trade in all sectors where the role of the government is limited to designing 
macro-economic policies which reflect the overall strategy of the free economy, and at the 
same time the private sector plays a leading role in the national economy.436 
In conclusion, the economy of the UAE has witnessed rapid progress since 
independence. The economy of the UAE largely depends on the oil and gas sector. 
However, this has been changed in recent years when the Government started to look for 
new resources and started to depend on the non-oil and gas sectors such as trade, tourism, 
free zones, and agriculture. The economy of the UAE is different from other developing 
economies for several reasons, such as the reliance on a free economic system, the 
geographical location, and the dependence on oil. 
3.3 Reason for implementing competition law 
There has been a view that several fundamental pillars of economic development are 
heavily linked with competition law and policy, which can be persuasively evidenced from 
all over the world. Many examples could be used as evidence to demonstrate that the 
increases in investment, productivity, average living standards and economic growth are 
clearly due to the high level of competition.437 According to the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), competition law is essential for markets to work 
well. That is because the governments of the developing economies, in regards to achieving 
rapid and sustained development, need to create conditions that permit the private sector 
to flourish.438 Advocates of this view claim that consumers are benefited directly and 
indirectly because of the competition between firms.439 The proponents of adopting 
competition law in developing economies agree on the view that competition law 
contributes to economic growth and competitiveness.440 The following part will 
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demonstrate the advantages of implementing competition law. 
3.3.1 Fighting anti-competitive practices: 
3.3.1.1 Cartels 
It has become easy to recognise the existence of anti-competitive behaviour in the 
markets of developing economies, particularly the UAE, because of conditions that allow 
for anti-competitive practices to flourish.441 Many scholars recognise the need for an 
effective implementation of competition laws to fight such practices. That is because it will 
allow such countries (just like it did in the United States (US) and the European Union 
(EU)) to directly tackle hard-core cartels that engaged in bid rigging, market sharing and 
market allocation and price fixing.442 
There has been an increase in cartels’ activities in recent years.443 The existence of 
monopolisation would seriously damage the fabric of competition.444 Other firms that exist 
in a market and are not in a position of monopolisation would struggle to compete with the 
monopolising firms. Therefore, such firms have no choice but to join a cartel in order to 
survive in the market, otherwise they will be eliminated from competing in the same 
market.445 
Many studies have paid more attention to the influence of cartels on the developed 
countries rather than developing economies. It is surprising that there is a little action taken 
by governments or consumers in the developing economies regarding the cartels issue, 
even after they have been found to exist.446 Scholars such as Singh argue that, if cartels can 
exist and operate in a country like the US, with a long history of anti-trust laws and their 
enforcement, there is a higher chance that they exist in developing economies.447 
It cannot be neglected that this has become a serious issue for some authorities of 
developing states that are not manned by the right people, especially when dealing with 
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cases that have an international dimension. The authorities of developing economies do 
not take any action against cartels that exist in their own countries, or there is little attempt 
made to cooperate and gather information from developed countries’ competition 
authorities. This is because of the fact that the authorities in such developing economies 
are unaware of the international cartels’ anti-competitive practices or prosecution in the 
developed world.448 
The narrow domestic industrial base of the many developing economies has made 
them dependent on imports in their early industrialisation stages, as was the case of the 
UAE.449 Such imports would be subjected to anti-competitive behaviour, either by 
domestic firms or international suppliers. Therefore, it is possible that the importing 
country could be penalised by import prices higher than what they are supposed to be, as 
well as being penalised by import cartels and by abuses of dominant position firms in 
export countries.450 
Therefore, competition laws should be enforced and used as a tool to abolish the 
harmful practices of international cartels, as Singh has emphasised.451 Many scholars have 
supported this view, claiming that not only consumers but also producers in developing 
economies may face the harmful effects of international cartels if no action is taken against 
such practices.452 
A great deal of evidence demonstrates that there are some concerns that the economic 
development of developing economies could be at risk and might be damaged in the long 
run by private corporations’ arrangements of international cartels that are involved in 
restrictive practices.453 In 1997 a study conducted by the World Bank showed that goods 
worth $81.1 billion were imported by developing economies (which represented 6.7 per 
cent of imports and 1.2 per cent of GDP) from industries where conspiracies of price-fixing 
were discovered during the 1990s, although several other conspiracies had not been 
discovered at that time.454 The study illustrated that such cartels were made up of producers 
that were based in developed states. Heavy electrical equipment is a good example 
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illustrating many of these points. Almost every developing economy needs such items to 
meet their growing energy demand through installing electricity generation plants.455 
However, cartelisation led to higher prices for such equipment, which consequently led to 
higher prices of electricity generating plant installation and therefore expensive energy 
prices. 456 
Another example is the liberalisation of the cement industry in Egypt in 1999, which 
did not have any competition law at that time. The liberalisation meant the market was 
controlled by three firms: Lafarge, CEMEX457 and the Suez Cement Company.458 Due to 
the increased demand in the cement industry another local cement company (the Egyptian 
Cement Company) entered the market. However, in 2002 the demand decreased, which 
made the Egyptian Cement Company export cement to the Canary Islands where the other 
three companies were serving that market. Thus, the three firms decided to decrease their 
prices in the Canary Islands in order to force the Egyptian Cement Company to lower its 
sales and eliminate it from that market.459 Not only that, but the three firms also conspired 
to fix prices and eliminate the local firm from the local Egyptian market. Neither the EC 
Commission nor the Spanish government carried out any investigation with regard to the 
conspiracy.460 In addition there was no enforcement taken in Egypt because of the absence 
of a competition law.  
This example shows that, in the absence of competition laws, not only consumers 
but also the economies of developing countries (such as Egypt) could be damaged through 
the existence of cartels. Thus, implementing and enforcing an effective competition law 
would help protecting the state’s economy and consumers, and eliminating such harmful 
practices. The UAE recognises this issue and the implementation of the new competition 
law is evidence of prohibiting such behaviour.461 
3.3.1.2 Merger control: 
Another reason for which competition law would benefit the UAE is related to the 
increased international cross-border merger movement that has reshaped the world 
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economy over the past decades.462 According to the data of the 2001 and 2002 United 
Nations Conferences on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), cross-border acquisition had 
a global value of 0.5 per cent of the world’s GDP in the mid-1980s. However, this value 
rose to 2 per cent in 2000.463 International mergers, especially between huge companies 
located in developed countries, call for critical review of competition policies, which 
authorities have put in place in developing economies.  
It should be noted that, during the time of a merger taking a place, the value of the 
acquired firm tends to increase by an average of 20 to 30 per cent while that of the acquiring 
firm basically remains the same. This implies that the combined result basically leads to a 
high value of the involved firms. However, authorities must implement effective 
competition laws and policies pertaining to mergers and acquisitions to ensure that certain 
stakeholders are not negatively affected. On several occasions, stakeholders of the 
acquiring firm have suffered from systematic losses six months after a takeover and this 
may continue for a number of years.464 Although the companies involved may experience 
an increase in revenue and profitability levels, it may take several years before this is 
transferred to the shareholders of the firm.  
In the modern world, one of the most important concepts of competition laws is 
merger control. In the first half of 2008, the worldwide mergers and acquisitions was equal 
to $1.6 trillion, while the figure in India alone was $33.1 billion. India has outpaced the 
USA as the largest foreign investor in the United Kingdom465, because of the adoption of 
a more effective Competition Act in 2002.466 
As the global economy continues to experience increased mergers, developing 
economies, including the UAE, must ensure that appropriate competition laws and 
economic policies are not only implemented but also efficient in avoiding any monopolistic 
tendencies.467 Since mergers can have their roots both locally or from a multinational 
perspective, the need for an effective competition law to address their functionality is 
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extremely important.468 
3.3.2 Attracting foreign direct investment 
One of the greatest benefits that would result from the effective implementation of 
competition law in developing economies, particularly the UAE, is the attraction of foreign 
direct investment (FDI), which would promote economic growth and development. In a 
similar way, altering trade tariffs between countries makes it easier for firms in different 
jurisdictions and regions to move their goods and services around the world. This can only 
happen in countries that have strong institutional policies and mechanisms that would be 
able to guard the right to property ownership469, not just as a fundamental right but also as 
an initiative to encourage the honest pursuit of ownership of property. 
As the UAE has adopted and open-door policy with foreign investments, the 
adoption of a proper competition law will ensure fairness in the market and prevent any 
anti-competitive behaviour that are likely to exist. In addition to the current consumer law, 
there has been an excessive need for a regulation that aims to control the market giving a 
sufficient protection for the market players. 
There should be laws that guide and regulate competition between firms, including 
granting foreign firms a level playing field to operate in the developing economies without 
adversely harming the infant industries.470 These laws are assumed to be existed in any 
developing economy involved. However, if such laws are not clearly spelled out as 
competition laws, the enforcement agencies will find it hard not only to understand but 
also to enforce such laws. 
It has been argued that there is particular economic and political importance to 
having Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in developing economies.471 However, Dabbah 
argues that developing economies do not have an unconditional, open door policy for the 
‘welcomed’ FDI. Rather, they are subject to 'strict conditions laid under the law, such as 
are required to lead to development in technologies, sustainable development, economic 
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growth and the quality enhancement of products.472 Moreover, some developing 
economies might have stricter conditions to ensure that foreign firms do not get involved 
in a monopolistic position in their local market.473 
Borissova believes that, when such policies are effectively implemented, they put 
a nation in a better position for attracting FDI.474 This is because, firstly, multinational 
companies will be in the position of identifying the way these laws operate and dealing 
with several concerns within different business processes. Secondly, multinational 
organisations usually expect authorities to establish a level playing field between domestic 
and foreign companies, as well as among the Multinational Corporations (MNCs) 
themselves.475 
This implies that developing economies which have effectively implemented 
competition laws have a higher chance of creating a favourable economic environment to 
invite foreign investors.476 Over the past several years, developing economies have 
implemented macroeconomic reform programmes, which significantly relied on the 
market instead of state intervention.477 Noticeably, there has been a renewed confidence 
that individual consumers and market forces can contribute greatly to social and economic 
development compared to a centralised economic system. In the UAE, the FDI has 
contributed to the enhancement of the economy with $9.6 billion.478 
 Competition laws have been known to enhance competition and create a level 
playing field for all companies. However, it would be difficult to realise some potential 
benefits when it comes to a market oriented economy, if companies are forced to enact 
some measures that are intended to restrict competition. Thus, competition authorities 
should critically analyse competition laws to ensure that organisations do not take 
advantage of their current dominant position in the market. This includes state-owned 
enterprises that managed to establish ‘natural monopolies’ and this calls for competitive 
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authorities to analyse their competitive practices so as to establish a competitive market. 
Additionally, a robust economic policy must be implemented if a country needs to 
establish an effective economic reform. Chen and Lin emphasise that price liberalisation 
that is carried out in the absence of competition laws can lead to a significant increase in 
prices and thus reduce the general benefit of the entire economy.479 Whenever 
monopolistic organisations are allowed to carry out their activities without an effective 
regulation, the economy will not bear any fruit from price liberalisation. Evenett highlights 
that, in any developing economy that wants to open up its markets through FDI competition 
and import competition, authorities must put in place some safeguards to ensure that 
foreign organisations do not engage in anti-competitive behaviour or take advantage of 
their dominant position.480 This calls for a strong and effective competition law, which will 
lead to an end to anti-competitive behaviour and thus enhance net public benefits. Thus, it 
could be said that implementing a strong and effective competition law will lead to the 
enhancement of the economy through providing a safeguard for foreign investors and their 
local competitors. 
3.3.3 Enhancing sustainable development 
A wide range of information has been documented arguing that competition laws do 
not frustrate, but in fact foster, broader sustainable development goals. In addition, 
sustainable development is considered as an overarching objective.481 As societies 
continue to modernise, anti-trust laws are a major characteristic of economic regulation as 
countries continue to implement new competition laws in their economic system. The 
international community has a major role to play when it comes to integrating competition 
regimes in order to enhance sustainable development goals.482 
Gehring argues that competition laws improve economic governance, and they 
indirectly enhance sustainable development.483 This is achieved through stimulation of 
constant product improvement and innovation among companies, thus enabling a country 
to achieve sustainable development. Based on this notion, cartels and monopolies have 
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been known to evade markets, leading to economic injustices, poor quality and higher 
prices of goods and services for customers. Therefore, competition laws aim at enhancing 
greater equity, which leads to economic growth and development. In addition, more 
competitive practices enable companies to develop healthier, safer and more socially and 
environmentally friendly products whenever customers require such goods.484 
 Dakolias and Said state that companies which are protected by cartels or hide under 
the monopolistic practices usually lack the incentive to change and develop new 
practices.485 However, organisations which are exposed to competitive practices look for 
means of developing new product lines, changing old practices so as to fulfil the social and 
environmental expectations of their customers. To achieve these appropriate standards, 
authorities must be ready to implement good governance, which is one of the most 
important principles of sustainable development laws. When competition law is enforced, 
companies are provided with an incentive to enhance their efficiency, avoid wasteful 
practices and thus ensure that there is sustainable use of natural resources.486 
Most significantly, lack of enforceable and sound competition law can lead to few 
benefits from any trade liberalisation programme if not harming it. This could mean that 
the first organisations that enter a market may block other competitors. Such a practice 
would effectively deny consumers access to competitive goods and services.487 
Whereas these arguments are not exhaustive, they are certainly worthy of 
consideration, particularly in emerging economies. However, since competition law is also 
exposed to certain negative attributes, these arguments do not entirely address the central 
question of whether it is possible to implement a sustainable international competition law 
agenda, and the means of achieving it. Dakolias and Said are of the view that it is 
challenging to develop and maintain a successful competition authority. A huge amount of 
financial investment and political and human resources are needed, as well as appropriate 
mechanisms to monitor and enforce the procedures laid down.488 
According to advocates of competition law and sustainable development, theories 
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alone cannot be effective in enhancing development and ensuring that there is free and fair 
competition in a market. Therefore, if competition law is to be made a priority, such that 
decision makers are persuaded to invest their scarce political capital, it is important to look 
for ways of ensuring that competition law directly enhances sustainable development.489 
This leads us to one of the most important factors in competition policy and law: whether 
different kinds of public concerns can be allowed to influence competition decisions. Thus, 
any developing economy, including the UAE, would benefit from the effective 
implementation of competition law through enhancing its sustainable development, 
leading to the benefit of consumers and other market players. 
3.3.4 Economic growth and productivity enhancement 
Competition laws have been cited as significant in the attainment of long-term 
productivity and growth in developing economies. With regard to economic growth, firstly, 
it has been suggested that to achieve high economic growth and development, a strong and 
effective market economy is necessary. However, to keep such a market functioning 
efficiently, a competition policy with well-designed and administered competition laws is 
needed.490 Not only that, but also to ensure that competition considerations are an essential 
part of “the background to business decisions, and to government decisions affecting the 
market”, it is required to promote competition culture.491 
Competition law has many advantages, such as enhancing productivity. In a healthy 
market, goods and services will be delivered to consumers at competitive and lower prices 
due to market competition, which will result in more production and consumption.492 
However, such producers are consumers as well, who purchase different products (goods 
and services) to cover the whole production process, from raw materials to the end process. 
Any lack of competition in those markets will lead to an increase in the prices of such 
products. Eventually, it will make firms suffer in the market due to a lack of competition 
and at the same time it will lead to an increase in the prices of products that are delivered 
to consumers.493 Thus, the existence of a well-designed and well-administered competition 
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law will result in strong and healthy competition which will be beneficial for both 
consumers and producers. 
Secondly, another benefit of competition law is that it encourages the sectors that 
lost competitiveness to restructure at the right time.494 It has been proven that the 
competitive process is unbiased because it depends on economic market factors (demand, 
technologies, cost, etc.), rather than governments who are always under political pressure 
and restrictions.495 Governments are not able to determine the right sector and the right 
time to restructure. Thus, due to competition for capital and other resources, such capital 
and other resources will be transferred from uncompetitive weak sectors to more 
competitive sectors, which in the end will lead to economic growth.496 
 Thirdly, a well implemented competition policy will promote productivity and 
efficiency.497 It will lead such firms to adopt new techniques, not only to survive but also 
to gain more profits through investing in new technologies that will deliver products and 
services with cheaper and quicker methods and better quality for consumers, leading to 
economic growth.498 
Fourthly, competition has a positive effect on innovation (see section 3.2.5). It 
promotes innovation since innovation results in new technologies for the purpose of 
production and creating new products.499 It is obvious that ‘firms who do not innovate are 
left behind.’500 Competition allows new competitors to enter markets, thus the existing 
competitors will be under pressure to find new methods and innovative technologies and 
create new products to carry on their previous success; otherwise, they will be left behind 
and lose international competitiveness.501 
There have been several empirical studies carried out mainly in the developed 
countries, which have proved that welfare losses could be caused because of the 
competition restraints within an economy, and it does not matter whether such barriers 
were caused by governments or the private sector.502 According to a survey, there was a 
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substantial “negative relationship between the level of per capita income and the size of 
mark-up ratios in 1985.”503 
With regard to the developing economies, numerous case studies have underlined 
the relation between competition laws and extensive economic growth. A case study was 
conducted by Dutz and Hayri504 which tested the strength of association between economic 
growth and economy-wide competition intensity.505 The study “constructed three types of 
variables related to policy, structure and mobility.”506 It concluded that the correlation 
between competition policy and economic growth is very strong and the effect is robust, 
which “goes beyond that of trade liberalisation, institutional quality and a generally 
favourable policy environment.”507 
In another case study which was conducted between 1993 and 2002 in Tanzania, 
Kahyarara indicated that after implementing the Fair Trade Practices Act 1994, firms’ 
production increased by 50 per cent and investment increased by 100 per cent.508 The study 
emphasised that firms’ productivity and investments had been positively affected through 
the different efforts made to tackle anti-competitive conduct, which in the end increased 
the economic performance.509 
With regard to productivity, the correlation between productivity and competition is 
robust. A lot of evidence in the empirical literature shows that productivity could be an 
incentive for competition in a product market.510 Firms would be under intense pressure 
due to strong competition in a product market that would lead to a decrease in cost prices.511 
In order to demonstrate the effect of competition and entry on productivity growth, 
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Griffith, Harrison and Aghion et al. used different policy variables as competition 
instruments. One of the instruments they used was the introduction of the EU single market 
programme. The different tests confirmed the positive effect of policies on competition 
and entry, which have increased productivity.512 
It has been asserted that total productivity and growth could be affected by the level 
of competition.513 Based on the results of several empirical studies, it has been recognised 
that firms’ productivity performance would be reduced if there was any restriction on 
competitive pressures due to the regulation of the product market.514 
It is important to point out that the practice and implementation of competition laws 
has a direct bearing on the economic growth of any economy.515 Just as the effects of such 
laws were observed in the developed countries like the United States516, the developing 
economies, including the UAE, could be even better placed with the implementation of the 
laws.  
An analysis of welfare gain by both producers and consumers also depicts how an 
efficient competition law can lead to economic growth by assessing the welfare losses by 
both the producers and consumers of goods and services that are avoided.517 Studies carried 
out by various economists have pointed to deadweight loss as being caused by the exercise 
of market power by monopolies and some oligopolistic entities.518 There are circumstances 
that a firm or an entity may find itself in an advantageous position to execute monopoly 
behaviour.519 One of the ways is a situation in which a firm has strategic control over the 
resource requirements in the industry. In this case, the entity will simply prevent 
competition by restricting the supply of resources to the competitors, thus guaranteeing the 
fact that it remains the dominant player in the industry, which would have otherwise been 
served by many other competitive firms. Under this scenario, it is deemed necessary for 
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the government and the judicial system to step in so as to provide conditions that ensure 
trading, fair competition and fair allocation of resources.520 
3.3.5 Enhancing innovation and technologies 
With regard to innovation, one of competition’s aims is to promote innovation of 
new products and production processes since corporations need to remain competitive to 
survive and retain customers.521 It is more likely that firms will tend to innovate and the 
competition in the product market will increase due to the fact that a firm will have the 
“incentive to acquire the market or increase its technological lead over its rivals.”522 
Many economists have claimed that companies would be forced out of the market 
by other competitors if those companies fail to innovate new products or fail to introduce 
new technologies which reduce costs, enhance quality and save time.523 Moreover, feeling 
under pressure, especially from foreign firms, would lead domestic firms to innovate new 
technologies and products for their continuing existence in the market.524 
On the other hand, innovations by individuals can only take place if there are 
intellectual property laws that protect their knowledge from going to waste. When such 
individuals realise that they can be actually benefited from innovations, they have an 
inducement to invest their resources in innovations.525 The expected returns from investing 
in the project are also in turn determined by the possibility of the risks inherent in the 
process of investing in the project in question.526 The absence of  effective competition law 
that protects intellectual property renders investing in innovations a highly risky venture 
because such projects, ideas or knowledge could be hijacked by the competitors through 
unfair means. 
The advancement in the level of technology in terms of the internet and other 
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technologies is rendering the world a global village.527 The methods of transactions, 
specifically payment techniques, have become more and more advanced. The transport 
sector across the world has also significantly changed. The globalisation activities call for 
new measures.528 Thus, the efficient implementation of the competition laws is important 
so as to guide and regulate the activities that could abuse the gain in the advancements. 
The impact of advancement in technologies in terms of transportation and 
communication also means that countries that fail to implement effective competition laws 
will find it hard in terms of both the cost and the technicalities to maintain the system and 
the laws in restraint of trade.529 A good example is the mobile communication sector where 
whenever the companies in question confront each other in the market, some resort to the 
unfair practice of tariff wars.530 
From the above it could be said that there is no doubt that a strengthened competition 
regime could be beneficial for the developing economies and the UAE in particular in the 
wider aspect.531 
3.4 Reasons against implementing competition law 
The opponents of adopting competition law in developing economies have a 
fundamental objection. They argue that the rules of competition law are unnecessary due 
to the fact that markets are open and any threat of imports would lead to limiting domestic 
producers’ power. The proponents of this view argue that small economies could be 
regulated through trade liberalisation instead of competition law. Thus, they view trade 
liberalisation as a desirable substitute for competition law.532 
This view has been supported by some economists, such as Boner and Langenfeld. 
They claim that there is no need for competition law to regulate the markets in developing 
economies because the markets are too small. They argue that competition will be 
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sufficiently encouraged once trade borders are opened in these countries through the 
elimination of import and export quantitative restrictions, convertible currency creation 
and reduction of the barriers of external tariffs.533 
In addition, there is no need for any extra regulation because the trade liberalisation’s 
additional competitive pressure will benefit the economy and consumers at the same time. 
In this view, firms are obliged to reduce the prices of products to benefit consumers and to 
advance their productivity.534 However, for many reasons the argument for substituting 
competition law in developing economies with trade liberalisation policy is weak. There is 
an acknowledgement that trade liberalisation does not by itself insure appropriate 
competition levels. According to Gray and Davis, it has been noted that even in small 
economies with open trade policy, firms will remain engaged in anti-competitive conduct 
which will require authorities for additional observation in the market.535 
Moreover, there is no guarantee that the elimination of import barriers, due to market 
liberalisation, will abolish anti-competitive practices and thus the conduct of market 
dominance will remain. For instance, it has been claimed that governments’ regulation of 
non-tariff barriers does not benefit consumers as much as it benefits producers. Thus, this 
will harm the liberalisation objective by reducing competitiveness in the market. 
In addition to the above, the private interest groups’ role in trade liberalisation was 
totally ignored by the opponents of adopting competition laws in developing economies.536 
As a result, the point of view that free trade policies are not a substitute for competition 
law in developing economies is on the increase. Consequently, this objection will not be 
given consideration in what follows. 
The next part shows the disadvantages of implementing competition law, such as the 
weak institutional system, long-term economic performance, reduced opportunities for 
investment.  
3.4.1 Reduced investment opportunities 
The intensity of investment is one of the most important determinants of economic 
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growth and development. This has made authorities in developing economies facilitate 
investment projects at an organisational level. However, when investment projects appear 
to be selective, implying that only specific industries are targeted, this may contradict the 
fundamentals of competition law.537 Several developing economies share a common 
concern that competition laws negatively affect investment activity in their country. 
Evernett argues that, when developing economies fully implement competition laws, they 
tend to reduce the amount of resources available for Research and Development (R&D), 
new products and new technologies.538 Moreover, organisations in developing economies 
lack enough resources, large amount of profits and collateral compared to firms from 
developed nations. Therefore, certain developing economies argue that some form of 
oligopolistic or monopolistic power is usually acceptable under special circumstances.539 
Moreover, competition law exposes developing economies to the risk of reduced 
investment opportunities especially pertaining to FDI.540 There are two major reasons 
raised pertaining to FDI, which argue against the implementation of a national competition 
policy. First, although FDI is a significant source of technological advancement and 
economic growth, implementation of competition laws could adversely affect the structure 
and inflow of FDI in developing economies.541 In most of the developing nations, FDIs are 
given preferential treatment and this implies that the introduction of competition laws may 
inhibit continuation of this practice. In Poland, for instance, it was alleged that provisions 
which require the consent to the Anti-Monopoly Office for capital mergers negatively 
affect FDIs.542 Therefore, developing economies have sought to draft competition laws 
which create a balance between continuance of FDI and competition.543 Due to the 
perceived positive impacts of FDI, developing economies give a lower priority to 
competition laws compared to FDI.  
The second claim argues that Multinational Corporations (MNCs) from 
industrialised nations are more powerful, such that if they are allowed to compete on the 
same playing field as the weaker domestic industries, they would ultimately dominate the 
host economy. The companies which would emerge as winners in this ‘unequal’ 
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competition are MNCs and this implies that welfare losses of developing economies would 
accrue. Several reservations were held by the UNCTAD secretariat on behalf of developing 
economies, arguing against full liberalisation of their economies. Therefore, opening 
borders and fully liberalising foreign trade as a result of competition laws may adversely 
affect the welfare of developing economies.544 It has been claimed that MNCs usually take 
advantage of free and open markets to dump standards goods into developing markets and 
this may have adverse effects for local consumers.  
Motta argues that the main aim of FDI is to generate profits and maximise the 
economic impact of the foreign market.545 However, profitability mainly depends on the 
preferential treatment given by the host country, such as tax cuts and competition reducing 
import restrictions. However, when these factors are considered, it becomes questionable 
if the host country is the major beneficiary or if it basically leads to inefficient allocation 
of resources.546 
Theoretically, investment and capital accumulation enhance people’s welfare and 
economic growth. In addition, developing economies that lack enough capital could 
prosper through the high intensity of investment. However, this may not be applicable in 
each case. Based on macroeconomic terms, each investment has an opportunity cost-
related to decreased actual consumption. Economic theory argues that a free competitive 
market is the most appropriate mechanism that identifies welfare enhancing investment. 
Fox states that competition motivates firms to invest their capital in the most appropriate 
way.547 Moreover, without competition, companies may lack an incentive to increase the 
level of their investments.  
However, Correa argues that, since developing economies have missing and 
incomplete markets, competition that is not restricted could have ruinous tendencies 
leading to detrimental investment activities.548 Therefore, an optimal degree of competition 
should be adopted in developing economies that provides sufficient rivalry to decrease 
inefficiency. High levels of competition, often stimulated by implementation of 
                     
544 Motta, M. Op. cit. p. 65. 
545 Ibid. 63 
546 Motta, M. Op. cit. p. 70. 
547 Fox, E. M. In Search of a Competition Law Fit for Developing Economies. NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-
04.2011. p. 11. Available from: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1761619 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1761619. [Accessed: 3 
March 2012]. 
548 Correa, C. M. Intellectual Property and Competition Law: Exploring Some Issues of Relevance to Developing economies, ICTSD 
Intellectual Property and Sustainable Development Series Issues Paper No. 21. 2007, p. 4. 
118 
 
competition laws, can have negative effects on the propensity to invest.  
However, the statements above are not necessarily true. Recent research has revealed 
that competition law in developing economies offers an avenue for a balanced framework 
of investment, with possible investors competing on successful grounds in an equitable 
manner. With an eligible legal framework that controls the scope with which corporations 
can carry out their operations, it becomes arguable that competition laws act as the basic 
bridge with which selective investment can be done across all the industries within the 
economy.549 Thus, competition law is basically good for a well-coordinated investment 
process, especially for the UAE. For businesses, knowing that a law does exist, which 
provides a protection for them from anti-competitive behaviour550, would make them carry 
on their business with confidence and without any fear of any anti-competitive practices. 
It has been argued that, if competition law harmed undertakings, it wouldn’t be possible 
for them in the first place to continue their businesses internationally as laws might been 
stronger and harsher. One might suggest that such firms has the knowledge and experience 
to deal with different regulations such as competition laws. In addition, firms will not be 
negatively affected by the law, because of the economic freedom principles of supply and 
demand that the UAE has adopted that the firms has the knowledge and experience to deal 
with. 
3.4.2 Weak institutional structure 
The recent law and economic development literature shows that the effective 
operation of the law relies on the institutions supporting vitality.551 Scholars argue that the 
arguments against implementation of competition laws in developing economies are 
attributed to weak institutional structures which lack the capacity to enhance a competitive 
business environment, thus competition enforcement will be unsustainable.552 Most 
institutional structures in developing economies lack the capacity to effectively regulate 
the business environment. This implies that, due to the implemented competition laws, 
most domestic organisations lack a strong ground to compete with foreign investors due to 
the lack of efficient mechanisms to enhance appropriate business practices.553 Competition 
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laws seek to establish rules, which are different from regulation and thus minimise direct 
involvement by the government in businesses. However, most developing nations are yet 
to enact measures that will strengthen institutional structures to regulate competition. This 
implies that, instead of implementing competition laws, authorities should come up with 
certain rules that will strike a balance between stiff competition from international 
investors and the fragility of domestic organisations.554 
The authorities should seek for measures which stabilise the domestic industries as 
well as enhancing economic growth.555 Studies have revealed that, due to weak 
institutional structures, some of the biggest companies may implement barriers to internal 
markets through discriminatory policies, which would hinder competition.556 Some 
scholars argue that liberalisation and deregulation are efficient in the promotion of a 
competitive business environment.557 
However, a weak institutional framework has been termed by scholars as a leeway 
and a jargon to blindfold the interests of the few, with the elite part of the society benefiting 
beyond the average expected margin.558 As this is not symbolically enough, the political 
institution has failed to create a legal framework that addresses competitiveness. Scholars 
on this point of concern have termed it as a mere tool to enrich themselves from the trickle-
down effects of the weak institutional framework. The basic thing here should be 
modalities of governance that enhance competition both within and from the international 
community.559 
In terms of the UAE, for many years - due to the policies that it has adopted - the 
country has proven a strong institutional structure that has the capacity to enhance a 
competitive business environment. Thus, the implementation of the competition law would 
not hinder its effectiveness. 
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3.4.3 Lack of trust and weak judicial systems 
Scholars have revealed that weak judicial systems in developing economies lack the 
capacity to enforce competition laws. Therefore, when such laws are implemented, 
powerful individuals in the government may be compromised to award certain companies 
better opportunities at the expense of their competitors. Due to a lack of trust on the rule 
of law, competition laws may not be applied to the latter, implying that a level playing 
field among companies may not be enhanced.560 Despite the merits that have been stated 
by many studies on the role played by the competition laws in the growth of economies, 
lack of belief could make such laws turn out to be non-beneficial.561 
Some argue that, as long as there are no mechanisms to create awareness among the 
citizens of the benefits of such arrangements, it is better to do without such competition 
policies in the meantime.562 Developing economies lack adequate channels for raising 
awareness among there population of the benefits of the formulated competition policies 
and laws. Governments in developing economies should therefore collaborate with other 
stakeholders to establish mechanisms that will ensure a rapid reform in commercial justice 
so as to enhance the competitiveness of the business environment.  
In addition, another challenge eminent with the developing economies is the fact that 
there are weak judicial mechanisms to tackle cases arising from the breach of such laws.563 
While most of the developed countries have set up special benches courts to deal with cases 
arising from the breach of such laws, most developing economies treat them like many 
other cases and they are thus not given special attention. The justice system is made even 
weaker by the fact that there is an inadequate number of competent persons to prosecute 
the offenders. The worst case scenario could be a situation where the law enforcement 
agencies that are charged with the responsibility of investigating are either compromised 
or simply incompetent. The absence of adequate evidence before the court results in a 
situation where those in breach of the competition laws go unpunished thereby rendering 
the law ineffective. The competition laws would not be effectively implemented owing to 
the incapacity of the system to handle such cases.564 
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In addition, studies have revealed that a weak judicial system has been one of the 
greatest hindrances to investment. MNCs have been able to use the judicial system to seek 
for favours and unfair business practices.565 It is believed that the judicial system in 
developing economies needs urgent reform, which will ensure that the rule of law is 
followed. 
However, the weak judicial framework is just a weakness, a small concept that may 
just require a small adjustment to suit the broad economic interest of the nations. The 
judicial system should thus be changed to appreciate the need for an environment that 
offers competition. The benefits of competition laws significantly surpass the underlying 
threshold of a weak judicial system. Even with modulations in the legal framework, 
competition laws would act to enhance wider economic benefits. Thus, the need for 
effective competition laws entails the need to re-formulate weak judicial systems.566 With 
regard to the UAE, the judicial system has proven its effectiveness. The system is strong 
and independent that does not allow any interference with or influence over the court’s 
decisions.567 It should be noted that these arguments are general criticisms and not 
applicable solely to competition law. These arguments are based on the lack of basic 
prerequisites for the successful enforcement of any law. 
3.4.4 Innovation, Research Development and intellectual property rights 
 Several analysts have argued that implementation of competition laws in developing 
economies tends to minimise the intensity of R&D at the organisational level.568 Therefore, 
for R&D to be maximised, it is important to allow some form of cooperative behaviour. 
These claims made Indonesia and Taiwan remove certain provisions of the competition 
laws from issues pertaining to inter-firm efforts. However, experts warn that when 
competition laws are used to exempt cooperative behaviour for R&D, there is a high 
possibility of creating anti-competitive practices.569 
It has been argued that even problematic behaviour relating to huge organisations 
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may not be considered abusive when they play a significant role in enhancing technical 
progress. In addition, profits from monopolies may be used to create new products and 
stimulate innovation while state aid can be used to stimulate R&D.570 However, when all 
the requirements of competition laws are implemented in developing economies, all these 
benefits may actually go to waste since all companies may be required to operate on the 
same playing field.  
 According to Williams, a monopoly or dominant position of a single organisation 
may not necessarily lead to adverse effects on the economy.571 Organisations constantly 
engage in competitive behaviour through the introduction of new products and innovations 
to enhance efficiency and this may create a competitive advantage for their rivals. 
Therefore, firms that emerge the best can attain a monopolistic or dominant position at 
some time and thus be enabled to reap extraordinary profits.572 However, this may go on 
for a specific amount of time until other competitive companies emerge and overtake them. 
This implies that the desire to make some monopolistic profits may act as an incentive to 
organisations to innovate and thus lead to economic growth.573 Therefore, when 
competition laws are introduced in developing economies, organisations may lack an 
incentive to innovate and thus reduce the possibility of attaining economic development.  
However, scholars have opposed this view on the basis that this view is one-way 
ended and lacks the balance. In contrast, however, they have argued that competition law 
is the main tool to soothe the need for extensive investments in R&D, by all the 
stakeholders, both the governments and the private organs.574 In fact, they have 
hypothesised the need to create a framework of workable competition laws that would 
foster coordinated support for R&D. They have argued that the need to improve quality 
and increase the production by corporations can only be facilitated by a competitive 
environment instigated by strict competition laws. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has established that, compared to developing economies, developed 
economies have for several years implemented competition laws to protect their industries 
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and enhance economic growth. Despite the arguments against the adoption of competition 
laws in developing economies, economic experts believe that countries can reap huge 
benefits when they create a level playing field in their economies.575 Competition policies 
create sustainable economic growth by ensuring that firms are innovative in a free market 
that is not dominated by cartels and monopolies.576 Moreover, competition laws enhance 
the competitiveness of a market by curtailing different forms of harmful business practices 
such as mergers and acquisitions.577 In addition, adopting and enforcing competition laws 
in developing economies will help protect the market economy and consumers through 
eliminating the harmful practices of international cartels and controlling other anti-
competitive practices, such as mergers.  
This positive effect, however, results from effective implementation of the rules 
contained in the competition laws. It follows, therefore, that the extent of the effectiveness 
of the competition laws could depend on the capacity of the jurisdiction to handle the 
implementation. Some analysts believe that the creation of a level playing field may hurt 
domestic industries since they lack enough finance and technological innovation compared 
to MNCs.578 
In the context of the UAE, the benefits to be derived from implementing the 
competition laws significantly outweigh the negative effects of implementing the laws in 
the country. Some lessons could be drawn for those who have reservations about the 
adoption of competition laws in developing economies in general and the UAE in 
particular. Economic benefits could be achieved if enforcement of competition law occurs 
while the judiciary system was independent and rule of law exists. Furthermore, R&D 
would be able to increase production and improve quality through a competitive 
environment that is guided by strict competition laws. 
From the above it can be said that the benefits of competition laws far outweigh the 
negative attributes and thus developing economies in general and the UAE in particular 
would benefit from the implementation of competition laws to enhance the economy. 
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Chapter Four: Anti-competitive Agreements 
and Abuse of Dominant Position 
4.1 Introduction 
One of the significant elements of competition law is the control of anti-competitive 
agreements. Anti-competitive agreements include any arrangement that involves collusion 
between two parties with the aim of restricting competition in the market. An obvious 
example of such collusion can be seen in cartel agreements.579 Thus, competition law 
includes specific rules with the objective of protecting consumers and small entities from 
anti-competitive conduct. The UAE’s competition law includes such provisions, which 
control anti-competitive agreements and prohibit such practices between undertakings. 
Such rules are found under Article 5 of the UAE’s competition law. 
In addition, another important part of competition law is the control of abuse of 
dominance. Competition law includes rules that prohibit undertakings from hampering 
competition and harming consumers and other competitors through the abuse of their 
dominant position. Through dominant position, undertakings are granted extra power 
against other competitors. Such power could be abused through, for example, refusing to 
deal with other firms. The UAE competition law includes provisions that aim to prevent 
the abuse of dominant position found under Article 6. 
This chapter aims to evaluate the provisions regarding anti-competitive behaviour in 
the UAE and compare it with the similar provisions of the EU competition law. To do so, 
the provisions regarding the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements in the EU will be 
illustrated first. Then the UAE provisions will be illustrated and evaluated in the light of 
the EU provisions. In addition, this chapter will demonstrate and evaluate the provisions 
that regulate the control of dominant position in the UAE in the light of the similar EU 
competition law. 
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4.2 Key legislation of the EU competition law. Articles 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU 
The key legislation of the EU competition law consists of Articles 101 TFEU and 102 
TFEU. The fundamental essence of these Articles stems from the fact that they are applied 
directly while the European Commission ensures their enforcement.580 Also, it should be 
taken into consideration that the fundamental essence of the above-mentioned Articles 
stems from the fact that they were the first legal provisions of the EC competition law 
(originally adopted as Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome) which prescribed 
prohibitions of various practices and undertakings restricting or impeding competition.581 
As far as Article 101 of the TFEU (former Article 81 of the EC Treaty) is concerned, 
it needs to be stated that its legal provisions prohibit all practices which may influence 
trade between Member States by way of preventing, restricting or distorting competition 
inside the internal market,582 such as price fixing, control over production, investment, etc., 
sources of supply or share markets, anti-competitive conditions, and unfair complementary 
obligations.583 
As far as Article 102 of the TFEU (former Article 82 of the EC Treaty) is concerned, 
it needs to be elucidated that its legal prescriptions prohibit any abuse connected with a 
dominant position within the internal market, especially those which lie in the imposition 
of unfair trading conditions, restriction of production or technical development to the 
detriment of customers, dissimilar conditions in terms of equivalent trading relationships, 
and unfair complementary obligations.584 
4.2.1 Control of anti-competitive agreements 
4.2.1.1 Introduction 
It is very important to illustrate the objective of Article 101 (1) of the TFEU. This 
article prohibits agreements between firms, concerted practices and decisions adopted by 
association of companies which: affect the internal market trade between states; and their 
object or effect is a distortion or restriction of competition in the internal market. Article 
101 further specifies the kinds of prohibited conduct in a so-called non-exhaustive list:  
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(a) direct and indirect price fixing (whether sale or purchase price); (b) restricting 
and controlling markets, production, investments or technical development; (c) sources of 
supply or markets sharing; (d) application of disparate conditions to equivalent transactions 
and thus, putting them in a competitive advantage; (e) linking the conclusion of contracts 
to acceptance by other parties, of additional obligations, which in their character or in 
accordance with commercial usage are not connected with the subject matter of the 
contracts.585 Thus, one may observe that Article 101 provides non-exhaustive examples of 
anti-competitive agreements and practices. 
Article 101 (2) mentions that any agreement or decision that infringes the 
prohibitions will lead to an automatic voiding of these agreements or decisions. At the 
same time, Article 101 (3) provides certain defences against anti-competitive practices. 
Thus, Article 101 (3) provides that the provisions of Article 101 (1) can be declared 
inapplicable in the following cases: if an agreement between firms, decision of association 
of companies and concerted practices contribute to the improvement of production or 
distribution of goods or promote economic and technical progress. Such agreements can 
be held valid if they allow benefits to consumers. Furthermore, such agreements, decisions 
and practices should not impose restrictions on the undertakings concerned.586 Finally, 
such agreements, decisions and practices should not afford the possibility to restrict 
competition in regards of the considerable part of the product concerned.587 
It is worth mentioning that Article 101’s prohibitions are construed very broadly so 
as to capture all types of arrangements between companies that aim at or lead to restriction 
or distortion of competition in the internal market. The EU competition rules, including 
Article 101, are based on the presumption that every undertaking is an independent 
economic operator which autonomously defines and pursues its commercial policies.588 
Therefore, there should not be any coordination, perhaps with a few exceptions, of 
commercial policies of different companies.589 The most common forms of anti-
competitive agreements are cartels, price fixing, limitation of production, share markets or 
customers, and resale price fixing (between a producer and its distributors). These 
agreements and practices are considered in detail in the following parts. 
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4.2.1.2 Cartels, price fixing, limitation of production, market sharing, and 
resale prices fixing 
According to Nolo’s English Law Dictionary, the term “cartel” should be understood 
as a conglomeration of independent business entities which is formed to either control 
distribution, or fix prices, or diminish competition.590 Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines the concept of “cartel” an agreement between undertakings, whether formal or 
informal, “in an industry or market’ in order to limit competition through “setting 
minimum price levels or maximum output quotas, and/or by segregating products or 
markets.” 591  Even though a cartel is likely to “lead to profit growth in the short run, 
members may find it difficult to monitor each other.”592 These two legal definitions help 
to make the inference that a cartel is an association of business entities which seek to 
control prices, production and other facets of competition. 
In the context of EU competition law, the term “cartel” means a collective 
conglomeration whose participants arrange an agreement to impede competition among 
themselves.593 This definition emphasises the endeavours of the participants of a cartel to 
impede competition between them. Also, the aforesaid conception of cartels is 
incorporated into the EU anti-cartel policy. Both Geradin, et al.,594and Slaughter and 
May595are disposed to think that Article 101 of the TFEU underlies the EU anti-cartel 
policy as it prohibits conglomerations of business entities which aim to suspend 
competition.  
The EU Commission explains that cartel refers to a group of similar, independent 
undertakings which join together to share markets or customers between them, to fix prices 
or to restrict production.596 Thus, one may observe that cartels are horizontal agreements. 
There is no doubt that the concept is covered by Article 101 since the latter specifies that 
price fixing, sharing markets and limiting production are prohibited forms of conduct. 
The Rhône-Poulenc case is one of the landmark cartel cases. In this case the Court 
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upheld that the regular meetings of polypropylene producers at which target sales volumes 
were determined constituted a cartel.597 In addition, the Court drew attention to the fact 
that polypropylene producers regularly, for a certain period, discussed matters of sales 
volume targets and exchanged information about sales.598 Therefore, the principle 
established by Rhône-Poulenc suggests that the cartel may operate in the form of meetings 
of its members and of exchange of pricing information. To form a cartel it is not necessary 
to conduct institutionalised meetings among the participants.  
Secret meetings also may give a rise to a cartel, as was the case in Europa Carton 
AG v Commission.599 Slaughter and May assert that cartels are usually secret arrangements 
between competitors which seek to fix prices, share markets, restrict output, etc. In light 
of this, the practices of cartels, such as price fixing, restrictions of production, sharing of 
markets or customers, and fixing of resale pricing, should be viewed as the kind of 
impediments on competition which are prohibited under Article 101 of the TFEU.  
In Hercules Chemicals v Commission the Court established a principle according to 
which even if the company was present at the meeting conducted with an anti-competitive 
object and publicly desists from such a meeting, such a company can be held as 
participating in the cartel concerned in case it gave the impression to the participants that 
it is bound by the result of the meetings.600 This principle was reaffirmed on a number of 
occasions, for instance in JFE Engineering v Commission601 and Corus UK v 
Commission.602 Therefore, the intention not to participate in a cartel is irrelevant unless 
publicly expressed at the cartel meeting.  
Overall one may observe that the ECJ regards a cartel as an informal organisation, 
which operates through meetings at which the anti-competitive objects are pursued. The 
mere innocent participation in such a meeting may give rise to allegations of participation 
in a cartel.  
To recall, Article 101 of the TFEU explicitly prohibits price fixing when it impacts 
the trade between member states and restricts or distorts competition in the internal market. 
The CJEU has considered on a number of occasions what may constitute price fixing. In 
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the framework of the EU’s competition law, the practice of price fixing means either direct 
or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices.603 The fact is that the protection of price 
competition is one of the core objectives of the European competition policy.604 
That is why any practice impeding this form of competition is prohibited under the 
EU competition law. Apart from direct and indirect price fixing, the EU competition law 
also prohibits horizontal and vertical price fixing.605 Thus, price-fixing, like any practice 
infringing on competition, is conducted through the agreement between competitors who 
seek to fix their resale or sale prices. 
It follows from A. Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio and others v Commission of the European 
Communities606 that price fixing should necessarily arise out of concerted action. If there 
is no concerted action, price fixing cannot be established. Furthermore, Ahlstrom 
Osakeyhtio suggests that parallel conduct is not necessarily evidence of concerted action. 
In this case the undertakings announced their prices and at the same time to be found that 
other prices were similar. Because of this, the Commission argued that there was a 
concerted action to fix prices. The Commission treated the parallel conduct as the evidence 
of concerted action. However, the Court pointed out that “the parallelism of prices and the 
price trends may be satisfactorily explained by the oligopolistic tendencies of the market 
and by the specific circumstances prevailing in certain periods.”607 The Court further 
rejects that in this case parallelism is an indication of the concerted action.  
In  Vereniging van Samenwerkende Prijsregelende Organisaties in de 
Bouwnijverheid & Ors v Commission of the European Communities608 the court ruled that 
joint fixing of price increase by participants of the tendering procedure was an infringement 
of Article 85 (1) (a), which is now Article 101 (1) (a) – direct and indirect price fixing. The 
Court specifies that such joint increase constitutes fixing the part of the price and it restricts 
the competition between companies, as far as their calculation costs are concerned. Finally, 
the Court notes that fixing of price increase results in a general rise in prices.609 
Another case, in which the Court clarifies what may constitute price fixing, which 
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violates the EU competition law, is Deutsche Bahn AG v Commission.610 In this case, the 
German national railway company attempted to establish with other EU national railway 
carriers a common administration for tariffs and prices for carriage of maritime containers 
from the territory of one member state to the territory of another one. The Court ruled that 
the establishment of the common administration of prices and tariffs constituted an 
infringement of then Article 85 (1) (a) of the Treaty of Rome, now Article 101 (1) (a) 
TFEU.  
Thus, it could be said that in order to be illegal price fixing it should: (1) arise out of 
concerted action or concerted arrangements (mere parallelism in prices and their 
announcement is not enough to establish price fixing, as was the case in Ahlstrom 
Osakeyhtio); (2) restrict or distort competition in the internal market (as was the case in 
Vereniging van Samenwerkende Prijsregelende Organisaties); (3) have an impact on the 
trade between member states (as was the case in Deutsche Bahn). 
To proceed further, the limitation of production or sources of supply is another type 
of practice prohibited by Article 101 of the TFEU. This practice is intrinsic to the activities 
of cartels. The European Commission, coupled with the European Court of Justice, has 
found over and over again that the sharing of production quotas among competitors 
constitutes a serious encroachment on the EU competition law.611 Article 101 (3) (b) 
prohibits agreements between companies, decisions of associations of companies and 
concerted practices which limit or control production. Thus, the important question is what 
kind of conduct may constitute or give rise to limitation of production.  
One of the important cases clarifying the meaning of Article 101 (3) (b) is Wouters 
v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Ord van Advocaten. In this case the Court points out 
that per se a prohibition of multidisciplinary partnership between members of the Dutch 
Bar and accountants limits production and technical development within the meaning 
provided by Article 81 (1) (b) of the Treaty of Rome, now Article 101 (3) (b) TFEU.612 At 
the same time, the Court made a reservation that prior to deciding whether such a 
prohibition violates Article 81 (1) (b), one should look at the purpose and the whole context 
of the prohibition.613 Then the Court specified that the prohibition was enacted so as to 
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avoid conflicts of interest. The Court found that it was a legitimate reason to uphold the 
arrangement which resulted in limitation of production and technical development.  
However, in another case, the Court took a more rigid approach. In Beef Industry 
Development Society & Barry Brothers614 the association of beef processors decided to 
take measures to reduce the number of processors because there was an overcapacity in the 
Irish processing industry. Such a decision was taken in the wake of the conclusions of a 
market study commissioned by the Irish government.615 The study concluded that the 
efficiency measures (e.g. reduction of processors) may result in cost benefits of IEP 14 
million. The association planned to reduce the capacity of the processing industry by 25 
per cent within one year.616 The question was whether such an arrangement would infringe 
Article 101 of the TFEU because its effect was a limitation of production. The ECJ ruled 
that such an arrangement would be incompatible with Article 101 of the TFEU. Thus, this 
case suggests that measures to limit or control production, notwithstanding their efficiency 
goals, infringe EU competition law.  
The allocation of markets or customers constitutes the next infringement of the EU’s 
competition law. Some scholars express confidence that the sharing of the market may take 
place not only as a geographical division of market and production restrictions, but also as 
the division of consumers or certain products.617 Market sharing arrangements may take 
various forms. In particular, market sharing can be set forth in agreements to abstain from 
exporting goods from domestic markets, in agreements to provide sales only through the 
domestic manufacturer, and in agreements to confine sales to domestic markets and in 
agreements by EU and non-EU companies to protect the internal market from low-priced 
imports.618 Sometimes, market sharing may take industry specific forms. For instance, in 
Scandinavian Airlines System v Commission619 it took the form of a code-share agreement 
(SAS and Maersk Air shared a number of Maersk’s domestic and international routes) and 
sharing the frequent flyer programme.  
Also, there are cases when market-sharing arrangements were directed at the 
restriction of trade with member states. For example, in Cimenteries CBR SA v. 
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Commission, cement producers divided markets between them on the ground of domestic 
market principle: they refrained from exporting to other member states so as to secure their 
home markets.620 The same pattern of market sharing can be found in Peroxygen Products: 
the manufacturers of hydrogen peroxide agreed to limit their operations to their home 
markets.621 In these cases, market share is based on a purely geographical principle, which, 
in simple terms, can be described as follows: I do not intervene in your territory, you do 
not intervene in mine.  
Another type of market sharing is sharing on a customer-based principle. For 
instance, in Methylglucamine the companies agreed not to compete for each other’s 
customers. Thus, the companies divided the customer market.622 Similar arrangements can 
be found in Synthetic Rubber and Kaucuk v Commission.623 
Resale price fixing is another practice prohibited by Article 101 (1) of the TFEU. It 
refers to a restriction according to which the manufacturer defines the final price to be 
charged by the retailer to consumers.624 Thus, one may observe that resale price fixing is a 
vertical arrangement since it exists between the companies situated at different levels of a 
supply chain.  
Although there is a view that vertical arrangements are less harmful to competition 
than horizontal ones, the Commission still takes resale price fixing very seriously. Thus, 
in the case of Volkswagen the Commission imposed a fine in the amount of € 30.96 million 
on Volkswagen for resale price fixing in Germany.625 Also, in Yamaha the Commission 
imposed fines for resale price maintenance.626 
Significant cases: 
The phenomenon of price fixing is particularly analysed in Imperial Chemical 
Industries Ltd. v Commission of the European Communities (hereinafter referred to as the 
Dyestuffs case). In this case, the European Court of Justice held that the contrived fixing 
of prices by dyestuff producers aimed at substituting the risk of competition by 
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collaborative concerted practice was forbidden under Article 81 (1) of the TEC.627 Also, 
the Court found that the amount of the fine was consistent with the gravity of the 
infringement of the EC rules on competition.  
To proceed further, in the Graphite Electrodes case, the European Commission ruled 
that eight producers of graphite electrodes made an agreement on deliberate and joint 
increases in price. Also, the Commission indicated what producer led the price increases 
in every national market through the circulation of current and future target prices in order 
to coordinate the general increase in the Community.628 
Similar findings and responses were adopted by the European Commission in the 
Vitamins case and the Carbonless Paper case. In the Vitamins case, the Commission 
unmasked eight producers of vitamins which participated in eight distinct cartels fixing the 
prices of various vitamin-related products.629 In like manner, in the Carbonless Paper case, 
the Commission exposed the manufacturers of carbonless paper which had participated in 
a secret Europe-wide cartel aimed at encouraging the profitability of its participants 
through arrangements concerning join price increases.630 
After the case law concerning price fixing has been discussed, it is the right time to 
gain an insight into the cases of limitation of production or sources of supply. In all 
respects, the most noteworthy case is the case of the International Quinine Cartel. This is 
the case of multiple oral arrangements (gentlemen’s agreements) among German, French, 
Dutch and British manufacturers which forbade the British and French parties from 
producing quinine without the consent of the other parties, in exchange for territorial 
protection of their respective markets.631 
To proceed further, in the Italian Cast Glass case, the European Commission judged 
and disapproved of the practice of production quotas exercised by Italian producers of 
glass, detecting that the quotas were deemed to keep safe each company’s respective 
market share.632 Thus, it was disclosed in the case that, by restricting their production, the 
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parties were no longer eager to decrease their prices to conquer a larger market share in 
order to cease the opportunity of drawing the maximum advantage from their production 
quotas. 
As far as the practice of allocation of customers or products is concerned, one of the 
most noticeable cases exemplifying the practical dimensions of this prohibited activity is 
the BP Kemi-DDSF case.633 According to this case, BP Kemi made an agreement with 
DDSF that the latter would enjoy the exclusive entitlement to sell ethanol in Denmark, 
with the exception of this practice being condemned by the European Commission as 
unacceptable under the EU competition law because it assigned which consumers were to 
be supplied by each party and thus removed the incentive of BP Kemi to sell ethanol to 
new consumers. 
4.2.1.3 Exemptions 
Exemptions from the EU competition rules are called block exemptions and cover 
various types of restrictive agreements which correspond with every one of the four 
conditions of Article 101 (3) of the TFEU.634 These exemptions cover the following: a) 
vertical agreements; b) horizontal cooperation agreements; c) technology transfer 
agreements; d) insurance; e) motor vehicles; f) transport. 
In addition to this, Article 106 (2) of the TFEU establishes the general interest 
exception, providing for a narrow exception, equalising the public interest issues and the 
competition provisions of the Treaty. Article 106 (2) of the TFEU provides three reciprocal 
conditions under which the exception will have effect. The first condition is the 
requirement for the company to be in charge of the “operation of a service of general 
economic interest”. The second condition is the causal nexus. The third condition is 
proportionality. 
Also, for the purpose of the current research, it is necessary to gain insight into one 
of the block exemptions covered by Regulation No. 330/2010. The EU Commission 
Regulation 330/2010 deals with the application of Article 101 (3) of the TFEU to 
categories of concerted practices and vertical agreements.635 This Regulation enumerates 
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conditions under which vertical restrictions are released from the prohibition on anti-
competitive agreements as defined in Article 101 (1) of the TFEU. 
The diligent analysis of Regulation No 330/2010 reveals that the Regulation 
introduces a large number of novelties, such as (1) new market share thresholds necessary 
to have recourse to the “safe harbour” exemption, (2) the elucidation of the allowed 
restraints to sales via the Internet, (3) the alteration of the definition of selective 
distribution, and (4) the interpretation of the Commission’s opinion concerning the legal 
effects stemming from the incorporation of hardcore restrictions in agreements on 
distribution.636 
In addition, a number of empowering regulations have been published by the Council 
to grant block exemptions. Council Regulation 19/65637, which was amended by 
Regulation 1215/99638, authorises the Commission to grant block exemption to intellectual 
property bilateral licences (Regulation 772/2004 on technology transfer agreement)639 and 
vertical agreements (Regulation 330/2101 on vertical agreement)640 as was discussed 
above. Regulation 461/2010641 also grants the Commission the authority to issue block 
exemptions on vertical agreements in the motor vehicle sector. 
Moreover, the Commission can grant block exemptions in respect of research and 
development agreements, standardisation agreements and specialisation agreements based 
on Council Regulation 2821/71.642 The Commission has passed the following Regulations 
in this regard: Regulation 1217/2010643 and Regulation 1218/2010.644 
Regarding the insurance sector, Council Regulation 1534/91645 allows the 
Commission to grant block exemptions. In this regard, Commission Regulation 
267/2010646, which amended Regulation 358/2003, was passed. With regard to agreements 
between small and medium-sized undertakings, Council Regulation 169/2010647 authorises 
the Commission to grant block exemptions. However, there are no Commission 
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Regulations allowing block exemption under the Council Regulation. 
Council Regulation 246/2009648 allows the Commission to grant block exemptions 
to consortia between liner shipping corporations. Regulation 906/2009649 was adopted by 
the Commission in order to grant block exemptions in this regard. Furthermore, for certain 
agreements in the air transport sector, the Council has adopted Regulation 487/2009650 in 
order to authorise the Commission to grant block exemptions in this area. However, there 
are no regulations adopted by the Commission yet. It is worth mentioning that there is an 
expiry date for each block exemption regulation. For example: on 31 May 2022 Regulation 
330/2010 will expire.  
4.2.2 Control of abuse of dominant position (Article 102 TFEU) 
4.2.2.1 Introduction 
Control of abuse of a dominant position is one of the key anti-trust provisions of the 
TFEU. As has been mentioned in the previous chapter, dominant position is not punishable 
per se. If the company has a dominant position in a market and does not pursue anti-
competitive conduct, such as, for example, predatory pricing, there are no grounds to 
punish the company. However, if the company abuses its position, it may infringe the 
relevant provisions of the TFEU. In such a case, the Commission may start prosecuting the 
company. The main objective of this part of the present research is to conduct an in-depth 
analysis of the phenomenon of dominant position and its regulation under EU competition 
law. For this purpose, the research will provide an overview of the TFEU provisions 
designed to prevent abuse of dominant position based on providing a comprehensive 
answer to the following question: What are the main regulative specificities of Article 102 
of the TFEU in controlling the abuse of dominant position? 
4.2.2.2 Dominant position 
Article 102 of the TFEU prohibits the abuse of dominant position. In order to find 
out whether the Article is applicable to a given case, one should first define the dominant 
position. Traditionally, the dominant position is associated with substantial market power. 
The economist would say that an undertaking has a dominant position if it has the ability 
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to raise prices above the competitive level without losing sales to competitors and without 
attracting new entrants to the market.651 Under US law, the company has a monopoly if it 
has the power to control prices or exclude competitors.652 
The main shortcoming of Article 102 of the TFEU lies in the fact that it does not define 
the term “dominant position”. Nonetheless, the concept of dominant position has been 
elucidated and construed in the practice of the European Commission and the European 
Court of Justice. In United Brands Company and United Brands Continental BV v 
Commission, the European Court of Justice illustrates that a trader may enjoy a dominant 
position only if that trader has gained a large part of the market. Thus, the Court associates 
a dominant position with market share.653 Furthermore, the Court observes that the dominant 
position “relates  to  a  position  of  economic  strength  enjoyed  by  an  undertaking, which 
enables  it  to  prevent  effective  competition  being maintained  in  the  relevant market  by  
affording  it  the  power  to  behave  to  an  appreciable  extent  independently  of  its  
competitors,  its  customers  and  ultimately  of  the  consumers.”654 
The same position is expressed in Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission. In 
that case, the Court specifies that the dominant position does not preclude some degree of 
competition.655 The company which enjoys a dominant position has “an appreciable 
influence on the condition under which that competition will develop.”656 Alternatively, 
the Court assumes that the company having a dominant position may disregard the 
competition situation in the market so long as the situation does not become detrimental to 
the company.657 
Subsequent cases have proved that the aforesaid definition of the term “dominant 
position” is the standard legal criterion for the application of Article 102 of the TFEU. The 
circumstantial analysis of United Brands and other cases will be made in the next section 
of the present chapter. 
Summarising the legal definition of “dominant position”, it needs to be iterated that 
this concept includes the following distinguishing characteristics: a) the economic strength 
                     
651 Jones A. & Sufrin. Op. cit. p. 303. 
652 Ibid. 
653 United Brands Company and United Brands Continental BV v Commission of the European Communities. [1976] EUECJ C-
27/76R 
654 Ibid. 
655 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH. [1978] EUECJ R-102/77 
656 Ibid. 
657 Ibid. 
138 
 
and superiority of one business entity to the rest of the competitors in the market; b) the 
real possibility to both make business decisions and implement them independently from 
competitors, customers and consumers. 
After the definition of dominant position has been given, it is prudent to discuss the 
ways to assess the instances of dominant position in practice. According to Van Bael and 
Bellis, before making any deliberations concerning the criteria and assessment of a 
dominant position, it is importantly to define the relevant market.658 The concept of 
relevant market is particularly explained in the London European-Sabena case. In this case, 
the European Commission delineated two aspects of the relevant market: a) the provision 
of services by an operator to one or more air carriers; b) the supply of such services by the 
operator to travel agencies. In the ultimate analysis, the Commission arrived at the 
conclusion that it was necessary to ascertain whether the business entity in question held a 
dominant position in all segments, which altogether constituted one relevant market, in 
order to determine whether this business entity had infringed on Article 102 of the 
TFEU.659 
After the relevant market is identified, it is possible to assess dominance under such 
criteria as the market share in relation to all segments of the relevant market.660 Thus, the 
assessment of the market share in relation to all segments of the relevant market may 
provide the most complete information about the dominance. The criterion of the market 
share underlies the legal assessment of such a phenomenon as “super-dominance”. In the 
Cewal case, the European Court of Justice defines super-dominance as an overpowering 
dominance which verges on monopoly as its market share constitutes more than 90 per 
cent.661 
4.2.2.3 Abuse of Dominant Position 
Having defined the main features of a dominant position, it is now necessary to 
explore what constitutes an abuse of dominant position. Article 102 of the TFEU 
exemplifies that abuse of dominant position may consist of: 
“(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other 
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unfair trading conditions;  (b) limiting production, markets or technical 
development to the prejudice of consumers;  (c) applying dissimilar 
conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage;  (d) making the conclusion of 
contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no 
connection with the subject of such contracts.”662 
This list is not exhaustive and there can be other types of conduct which can be 
treated as abuse of dominant position.  
Depending on the number of undertakings involved, dominant position can be either 
individual or collective. Individual dominant position, as its name suggests, occurs when 
one company has a dominant position in a given market. As far as a collective dominant 
position is concerned, in Airtours plc v Commission663 the Court reveals the conditions 
necessary to establish it. In particular, the Court points out that, in order to create a 
collective dominant position, the following conditions should be met: (1) each member of 
the dominant oligopoly should be able to know how other members are behaving so as to 
monitor whether they adopt a common policy; (2) tacit coordination should be sustainable 
over time; (3) the anticipated reaction of current and future competitors would not 
jeopardise the results expected from the common policy.664 If at least one of these 
conditions is not met, it is almost impossible to establish a collective dominant position. 
Thus, in Impala v Commission665 the Court found no collective dominant position because 
a lack of market transparency did not allow the market participants to monitor each other’s 
conduct so as to monitor whether they had adopted a common policy.  
In a word, a collective dominant position can be defined as a position sustained over 
time, maintained by two or more undertakings that are able to monitor each other’s 
behaviour in order to control the adoption of a common policy, and safe against the reaction 
of current and future competitors. 
Legal cases (critical discussion of significant legal cases) 
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After the theoretical dimensions of dominance have been pointed out, it is possible 
to critically discuss some noteworthy cases involving abuses of dominance. One such case 
is the United Brands case. In the United Brands case, the European Commission arrived at 
the conclusion that the United Brands had contravened Article 82 of the TEC (currently 
Article 102 of the TFEU) by way of charging, among other things, redundant prices for the 
branded Chiquita bananas in the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany and Belgium.666 
The decision of the European Commission in the aforesaid case was underpinned by 
the following arguments: a) the comparison of prices charged by United Brands in Ireland 
and other countries showed a very big discrepancy which proved that United Brands had 
produced a “very substantial profit”; b) the differential between the two grades of bananas 
was not justifiable under the criteria of cost and quality differences; c) the Commission 
found out that the prices of competing brands were much lower than those of Chiquita 
bananas.  
As a result, the United Brands case is based on the comparative analysis of different 
brands and competitors leading to the finding that the dominance of United Brands 
infringed on the competition in the market of bananas. The European Commission 
correctly determined that United Brands had abused its dominant position. At first, the 
Commission defined the relevant market in order to prove that United Brands occupied the 
dominant position in that market - the market for bananas. Second, the prices of various 
competitors were compared in order to show that United Brands charged 100 per cent 
higher prices than other companies producing bananas of the same quality. In the ultimate 
analysis, it should be conceded that the European Commission’s decision on the abuse of 
United Brands corresponds with Article 102 of the TFEU, which clearly articulates that an 
abuse of a dominant position particularly consists in direct or indirect imposition of unfair 
purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions.667 
Despite this, the European Court of Justice ruled against the decision of the European 
Commission in the United Brands case. The decision of the Court was based on the finding 
that there was no evidential support for the Commission’s claim that United Brands had 
gained a “very substantial profit” as United Brands suffered losses in Ireland. Also, the 
Court mentioned that the differences in prices between Member States can be presented as 
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evidence of unfair pricing only if the markets in the Member States are objectively 
comparable.668 Thus, the concept of “objective comparability” became a new criterion for 
the assessment of a dominant position. 
The aforementioned decision of the European Court of Justice seems to be dubious 
and uncertain. The term “objective comparison” does not settle the issue in question but 
gives birth to new uncertainties and encourages further abuses of dominance. The Court 
meant that it would not be unfair if the company could justify excessive prices with 
pertinent and objective divergences in the management in one Member State as compared 
to other Member States. However, the Court failed to acknowledge that Article 102 of the 
TFEU had no legal provision concerning management of pricing but unconditionally 
emphasised both direct and indirect imposition of unfair prices. 
Another instance of the abuse of a dominant position may be exemplified with the 
European Union Microsoft competition case. This case started as a complaint from Novell 
over Microsoft’s practices of licensing in 1993. The decision was reached in 1994, bringing 
to an end some of Microsoft’s licence practices.669 Afterwards, Sun Microsystems raised a 
complaint concerning the lack of disclosure of certain interfaces to Windows NT. The 
examination of streaming media technologies and their integration with Windows widened 
the case. The main specificity of the Microsoft case is the fact that it involved the trilateral 
negotiations between Microsoft, the US federal authorities and the EU authorities. The 
case unfolded the shortcomings of cooperation between the US and EU.670 Another 
peculiarity of the Microsoft case was the fact that this case involved two jurisdictions and 
thus two systems of competition law: the EU competition law and US competition law. 
The abuse of a dominant position by Microsoft consisted in the lack of disclosure of 
the interfaces to Windows NT, which prevented other competitors from creating alternative 
competing networking software to fully interact with Windows servers and desktops.671 As 
a result, the European Union ruled against Microsoft, ordering it to pay €497 million as a 
fine. In light of this, it is possible to agree with the European Commission that Microsoft 
jeopardised open source and open standards in the domain of information technologies. 
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Moreover, the EC correctly stated that Microsoft had abused its dominant position by 
limiting the ability of other competitors to innovate in Windows. The actions of Microsoft 
were prohibited under Article 102 of the TFEU as an abuse limiting technical development 
to the detriment of consumers. The main drawback of the EC’s decision in the case was 
the restriction of dominant companies to innovate. 
It should be noted that, unlike anti-competitive agreements and practices, such 
violation as abuse of dominant position does not have exemptions. Thus, in Tetra Pak 
Rausing SA v Commission672 the Court clearly stated that the exemptions provided by 
Article 101 (3) are not applicable to the abuse of dominant position. In particular, the Court 
observed that article 102 “by reason of its very subject-matter (abuse), precludes any 
possible exception to the prohibition it lays down.”673 In this case the Court ruled that when 
a block exemption is granted on the basis of Article 101 (3), Article 102 still applies. In a 
word, the block exemption obtained pursuant to Article 101 (3) does not exempt the 
company from the liability for abuse of dominant position. 
4.2.2.4 Concluding Remarks 
After everything has been given due consideration, it should be generalised that the 
abuses of a dominant position are prohibited under Article 102 of the TFEU. Also, it has 
been ascertained that the TFEU provides only general regulation of a dominant position, 
while the criteria for the assessment of dominance are established through the case law of 
the European Commission and the European Court of Justice. 
Dominant position refers to a position in the market that allows the company to 
influence the market substantially and, to a certain extent, disregard the competitors. There 
can be individual or collective dominant positions. The examples of dominant position are: 
limitation of production and technical progress, imposing unfair sale prices, applying 
dissimilar conditions for the equivalent transactions, and making conclusions of contract 
subject to acceptance by other parties of restrictive obligations. The prohibition of abuse 
of a dominant position is strict and does not foresee any exemptions.  
4.3 Key Provisions of the UAE Competition Law 
Until the enactment of the competition law, the UAE had no law that 
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comprehensively addressed anti-competitive behaviour.674 This statement 
notwithstanding, there was some considerable regulation of anti-competitive behaviours 
through provisions that were scattered across various legislation. These include Federal 
Law No. 18 of 1993 (commonly referred to as the Commercial Code), and Federal Law 
No. 4 of 1979 (also known as the Suppression of Fraud in Commercial Transactions Law). 
These laws guarded (they still do) against poaching of workers from a competitor and 
spreading of false information about a competitor’s product with the aim of attracting 
customers to their product. Additionally, there were provisions guarding against 
monopolistic tendencies and the sale of defective products to consumers.675 The EU can 
be said to have crossed this bridge (regulation of anti-competitive practices) much earlier 
than the UAE. The EU’s journey towards a robust legal framework aimed at curbing anti-
competitive practices has also been long and arduous,676 culminating in the creation of the 
EC Treaty and eventually the TFEU.  
Investors, business proprietors and consumers entirely agree that the new UAE 
competition law is more comprehensive than the earlier pieces of legislation. This is 
because it contains key provisions which are essential for curbing anti-competitive 
practices. These include merger control, banning of restrictive agreements and abuse of 
dominance. Additionally, the law contains provisions for the exemption of various sectors 
from the application of its provisions.677 These three distinct areas are also contained in 
Article 101 of the TFEU. The difference between the UAE competition law and the EU’s 
competition rules is in their detail. The EU regime is quite elaborate compared to the UAE 
competition law. However, it is expected that the details on this law will be clear when the 
implementing regulations are published.678 
4.3.1 Control of anti-competitive agreements and exemptions 
4.3.1.1 Introduction 
Generally, the UAE Government has adopted a free market policy, which implies 
that the prices of services and goods are set according to the supply and demand principle 
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in the market. Most of the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements has the objective of 
safeguarding the market and guaranteeing a free market in products.  
Several anti-competitive practices are prohibited under the new UAE competition 
law. The most notable prohibition is that of restrictive agreements. Article 5 of the UAE 
competition law is extremely important because it forbids agreements between 
undertakings whose aim is to affect commercial activities in the market.  
Article 5 of this law defines such agreements as those whose objective is to distort, 
contain, eliminate or reduce competition.679 Some of the practices targeted by this law and 
which may be the subject of restrictive agreements include fixing of prices above the usual 
market levels, selling below the normal cost with the aim of frustrating competitors, 
agreements restricting the supply of goods or services to certain businesses, and refusal to 
sell to certain businesses.680 Additionally, practices such as colluding to obtain tenders and 
bid rigging are considered to constitute a restrictive agreement and therefore outlawed by 
the competition law. Agreements between or among enterprises whose objective is to 
assign markets to such enterprises in terms of geographical locations are also considered 
restrictive and thus prohibited under this law.681 
4.3.1.2 Non-exhaustive list: 
Several practice and agreements are prohibited under Article 5. However, such 
prohibitions are for examples only, which are included in the non-exhaustive list as 
follows: 
4.3.1.2.1 Prohibitions under Article 5 (1) 
Price fixing is the first prohibition under Article 5 (1)(a) of the UAE competition 
law. It concerns the control of goods and services prices. The Article prohibits any 
agreement between establishments that directly or indirectly controls the selling or buying 
prices of goods or services through creating the increase, decrease or stabilisation which 
affects competition. Price fixing is common behaviour in the UAE. Thus, the legislators 
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aim to gain control over the pricing (regulate pricing). 
Undertakings aim to control the supply of goods and services so that the prices 
increase, which will result in a high profit. Through such behaviour, consumers will be 
affected and will not enjoy the benefits of fair competition. It should be noted that the law 
not only includes the direct actions of the undertaking in fixing prices; it also includes 
indirect conduct. Whether the Committee will be able to discover and punish such 
behaviour will depend on the Implementing Regulation that will be issued sometime later 
this year. The law also prohibits any conditions on buying, selling or performing of services 
and the like, which is found under Para (b) of Article 5(1). This prohibition is similar to 
the one found under Article 101 (1)(d) of the TFEU. The determination of such trade 
conditions would cause prices to rise, which would affect the principle of fairness of 
competition leading to harm to consumers. 
The third prohibition under Article 5(1) is so-called bid-rigging. Para (c) prohibits 
any conspiracy between establishments “in tenders or offers in bids, tenders, practices and 
all supplying offers.”682 It should be noted that there is no similar provision under the 
TFEU. 
In addition, Article 5 (1)(d) prohibits the restriction or freezing of the operations of 
manufacturing, development, distribution or marketing, and all other investment aspects, 
or limiting it. Similar prohibition is found under Article 101 (1)(b) of the TFEU. Wouters 
v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Ord van Advocaten is a significant case regarding 
the restriction of production.683 
Furthermore, Article 5 (1)(e) consists of what is called ‘refusal of supply’. The aim 
of this Article is to prevent a practice which aims to prevent goods and services in the 
market from a competitor (establishment), leading to causing damage to that firm. 
According to the Article, the practice of refusing to buy, supply or sell from certain 
establishment/s in order to damage that establishment/s is prohibited. It is worth 
mentioning that not preventing such actions would lead to putting the refusing party in a 
powerful position, eliminating other competitors from the market and creating a monopoly. 
Article 5 (1)(f) prohibits the control or limitation of goods and services from or to 
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the market. Such limitation or control could be seen in the example of hiding or unlawfully 
storing products. However, the meaning of unlawful storing is not explained under the law. 
It has been indicated that the meaning is that the competitor, in order to restrict supply, 
would store only necessary products rather than excess amounts. The latter would lead to 
a monopoly position which is not the aim of this Paragraph. Moreover, this Paragraph aims 
to restrict the sudden abundance of products in the market which could lead to an increase 
in product quantity that will affect prices through a decrease in prices.  
4.3.1.2.2 Prohibitions under Article 5 (2) 
Market sharing under the UAE’s competition law is prohibited. Article 5 (2)(a) 
prohibits any agreements between undertakings that divide markets or consumers based on  
consumers’ category, geographic areas, seasons and time periods, distribution centres or 
any other basis that may affect competition. On the other hand, the EU’s competition law 
provides a similar prohibition. As has been discussed earlier in this chapter under the EU 
competition law, Cimenteries CBR SA v. Commission and the Peroxygen Products case are 
good examples. 
Moreover, Article 5 (2) (b) prohibits any restriction on the entrance of establishments 
to the market, its exit from or its joining to existing agreements or coalitions. Although this 
prohibition allows for a free market which is a condition of perfect competition theory, the 
existing commercial regulations create legal barriers to entering the UAE market. For 
example, the telecommunication regulation prevents rivals (other than Etisalat and DU) 
from entering the market, which possibly creates an oligopoly situation. Another example 
is the Nuclear Energy Law which requires a firm to obtain a licence to be able to operate 
in the commercial field. Such barriers are not mentioned in the competition law, which 
creates an ambiguity in the application of the law. 
4.3.1.2.3 Non-exhaustive list exemption 
Article 5 (3) provides an exemption from the non-exhaustive list. According to this 
Article, with the exclusion of Paragraph 1/A and Paragraph 2/A, the provisions of this 
Article do not apply to the agreements that have a weak impact on the economy in “which 
the total share of establishments party thereto fail to exceed the percentage specified by the 
Cabinet of the total transactions in the relevant market.”684 Based on a proposal presented 
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by the minister, the Cabinet may increase or decrease the percentage according to the 
economic situation requirements. 
4.3.1.2.4 Non-exhaustive list issues: 
Even though the non-exhaustive list prohibits any anti-competitive agreements 
between undertakings that aims to restrict, limit or prejudice competition, it includes many 
issues which might affect the regulation of anti-competitive agreements. 
The competition law provides that the preventions of the non-exhaustive list in 
Article 5 (1) and (2) are merely to be used as examples. Under Article 5 (1) there are six 
prohibitions and under Article 5 (2) there are two. These prohibitions, such as market 
sharing and price control, are related only to horizontal agreements. It could be noticed 
that the current law did not include any provision that prohibits vertical agreements, such 
as resale prices fixing.685 
Moreover, the non-exhaustive list provides that the practice of a firm to restrict others 
from entering, exiting from the market, or entering into an existing coalition or agreement 
is prohibited. However, there are many obstacles to entering the UAE market, which 
illustrates the conflict between the government policy and the competition law. In order to 
enforce the non-exhaustive list, the Committee, which represents the enforcement 
mechanism, must have the required authority as in its independence. Unfortunately, the 
Committee lacks that power; this will be discussed in Chapter Eight. 
Unlike other Competition systems, the UAE still lacks the implementing regulation. 
The current competition law does not provide any guidelines that could include other non-
exhaustive lists of anti-competitive practices that might affect competition. In the United 
Kingdom (UK), the Office of Free Trade (OFT) provides extra examples of anti-
competitive agreements that may harm competition. For instance, joint purchasing or 
selling, restricting advertising and exchanging price information.686 
It has been claimed that the UAE market is considered an oligopolistic market. Only 
very few undertakings exist in the market, which provide similar products. The 
telecommunication sector is one of the markets that is considered an oligopolistic market. 
Only two firms exist which provide very similar products (DU and Etisalat). Also, the civil 
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aviation sector is another sector. Such oligopolies exist because of the high legal obstacles 
to entering the market. For an oligopoly to exist it does not require the establishing of any 
agreement between the market competitors, only tacit collusion687, which is not prohibited 
under the UAE’s competition law. 
The approach that the Committee or the Ministry of Economy apply to anti-
competitive conduct is still unclear, since the implementing regulation has not been issued. 
However, since the law includes certain prohibitions, it is obvious that a per se prohibition 
approach would be applicable to anti-competitive behaviour, such as bid-rigging, predatory 
prices, price fixing and entry or exit barriers. Whether the Committee will apply the rule 
of reason prohibition will only be clear when the implementing regulation is passed, 
although it is most likely that this rule will be applied to anti-competitive agreements, such 
as market sharing. However, it has been noticed that there is no criminal offence regarding 
these anti-competitive agreements. 
However, the EU competition law does not provide any criminal offence regarding 
cartel practices; the UK has adopted a new criminal offence for cartel practice. The UK 
Enterprise Act 2002 provides, under section 188(2) of Part 6, five types of agreement: 
production limitation, supply limitation, bid-rigging, price fixing and market sharing.688 
Accordingly, all arrangements of cartel agreements are prohibited per se under the Act.  
4.3.1.3 Critical Issues 
In general terms, Article 5 prohibits the conduct of anti-competitive agreements that 
aim to restrict commerce and fair competition in the market. These prohibitions illuminate 
that the market activities must be regulated according to the supply and demand principle 
and that the aim of it is to prohibit predation prices of goods and services and prevent 
monopoly. However, Article 5 of the Competition Law shows a lack in control of anti-
competitive agreements. 
4.3.1.3.1 Associations of undertakings 
Unlike the EU’s competition law, the UAE competition law does not include any 
rule or provision regarding the association of undertakings. In the UAE, the Federation of 
UAE Chambers of Commerce and Industry has a similar function regarding trade 
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associations in general terms. The Federation aims to encourage the private sector’s players 
to invest and develop the UAE economy. The Federation consists of four bodies: the 
General Assembly, the Board of Directors, the General Secretariat and the Legal 
Administration. Moreover, the Ministry of Economy and the local departments of 
economic development have a similar role. 
On the other hand, the EU’s competition law does not define ‘associations of 
undertakings’, allowing the phrase to cover all types of associations. For example, the UK 
Office of Free Trade ‘OFT’ guidelines illustrate the application and enforcement of both 
Article 101 of the TFEU and prohibitions under Chapter I of the UK Competition Act in 
regards to trade associations. 
4.3.1.3.2 Concerted practices 
The UAE competition law does not include any provisions to regulate 
concerted practices. Unlike the situation in the UAE, the EU competition law 
regulates concerted practices, even though the term ‘concerted practices’ has not been 
defined under the TFEU or under Law no. 21/96. However, concerted practices have 
been defined by the ECJ as: a type of co-ordination between undertakings which, 
“without having reached the stage where an agreement properly so-called has been 
concluded, knowingly substitutes practical cooperation between them for the risks of 
competition.”689 
Prior to the enactment of the new UAE competition law, the country had been facing 
serious anti-competitive behaviour from the Dairy and Juice Association represented in the 
higher prices of dairy products. With the new competition law being enacted, such 
behaviour should clearly be banned. Otherwise, this type of behaviour could be repeated 
by different types of trade association.  
The OFT has followed the EU guideline in setting up its guideline regarding 
concerted practices. The OFT guideline included examples of concerted practices, such as 
intentionally entering into a practical collaboration with direct or indirect impact on the 
market.690 The OFT found in Hasbro UK Ltd, Argos Ltd and Littlewoods Ltd that those 
undertakings had concerted practice and collusion between them. The collusion and 
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concerted practices was considered to be violating the UK Competition Act.691 
4.3.1.3.3 Assessment of the prohibition rules 
Another drawback in the law is that it does not include any guideline on how the 
Competition Regulation Committee (hereafter referred to as Committee) or the Ministry 
of Economy will apply these rules on prohibited conduct. In other words, what are the 
criteria that such an enforcement authority will use to assess anti-competitive agreements? 
The EU seems to have overcome this stage with the guidelines provided. The Competition 
Commission has the authority to assess an agreement in its economic context. According 
to the EU guideline, the Commission will assess if an agreement has an anti-competitive 
objective, or potential or actual restrictive effects on competition. If the agreement is found 
not to restrict competition, then it will not be considered to affect competition.692 However, 
in case that the agreement is found to be restricting competition within the meaning of 
Article 101 (1), a second step will be initiated with the aim of determining “the pro-
competitive benefits produced by that agreement and to assess whether those pro-
competitive effects outweigh the restrictive effects on competition.”693 In case that the pro-
competitive effects are found not to outweigh the restriction on competition then the 
agreement shall be void according to Article 101 (2).  
4.3.1.3.4 Voiding of prohibited actions 
In contrast with the EU competition law, the UAE’s competition law does not 
provide any provision with regard to the prohibited practices to be void. The EU 
competition law mentions that any agreement or decision that infringes the prohibitions 
will be automatically void. However, it should be mentioned that the law is silent with 
regard to concerted practices. The General Court ruled that nullity under Article 101(2) 
TFEU is not applicable to prohibited concerted practices.694 
4.3.1.4 Exemptions 
Companies can be allowed to engage in the above activities under certain 
circumstances even though they are prohibited. Articles 7 and 8 provide the basis of such 
                     
691 Ibid. para 2.8. 
692 European Commission, Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to 
horizontal co-operation agreements. Notices from European Union Institutions, Bodies, Offices and Agencies. [Online] 2011, 
p. 7. Available from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2011:011:0001:0072:EN:PDF [Accessed: 
16 July 2013].  
693 Ibid. 
694 Artisjus v. Commission, 2008 ECR  II-270, para. 46. 
151 
 
exemptions. All that the companies need to do is apply to be exempted from the 
applications of the specific provisions of the competition law. The application should be 
made to the Minister of the Economy who has the power to reject or approve the exemption 
within 90 days, which might be extended by another 45 days. In case there is no decision 
made by the minister, the application “shall be deemed as an implicit acceptance of such 
restrictive agreements.”695 In order to be exempted, the applicant enterprise must prove 
that its business will promote economic growth, enhance competition in the long run and 
ultimately benefit the consumer.696 More detail about this category of exemptions is 
expected to be published in the implementing regulations. 
Articles 7 and 8 explain the procedure that the undertakings have to follow in order 
to request such an exemption. First, firms and establishments must apply for exemption to 
the Ministry of Economy in writing and include supporting documents, which will be 
specified in the implementing regulation. Second, the establishments must prove that their 
anti-competitive agreements would enhance economic development; or the competitive 
ability of the establishment through improving its performance; or the “development of 
production or distribution systems or achievement of certain benefits for the consumer.”697 
In case the establishment was granted an exemption and there were potential amendments 
to the anti-competitive agreements, the Ministry of Economy must be notified within 30 
days of the amendments.698 The organisational unit concerned with the implementation of 
the provision of this law is not set up yet. The implementing regulation will establish such 
a unit.699 
It is worth mentioning that the minister has many authorities under the competition 
law. For instance, he may approve the anti-competitive agreements for 30 days only until 
the final resolution is issued.700 He also has the authority to cancel an approval through 
issuing a resolution in any of the following situations:  
a) if the circumstances no longer exist, which based on it the establishment was 
granted approval; b) failure in meeting with the conditions upon which the establishments 
were granted the approval; c) if it is discovered that the information was incorrect or 
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misleading which based on it the establishment was granted approval. 701 
Critics of the exemption provisions in the UAE law argue that the powers given to 
the minister could prove problematic in the end. This is because the law gives the minister 
up to 135 days to scrutinise and decide on an exemption application. This is too much time 
wasted and businesses cannot afford it. Further, this has the potential to create a backlog 
of applications in the minister’s office. Besides, this system has previously been tried in 
the EU and it proved ineffective.702 Therefore, businesses should be advised to consult 
professional legal advisors who would direct them on how to form businesses which are 
compliant with the new law.  
The EU’s anti-cartel legislation is reasonably comprehensive. Cartels also fall under 
restrictive agreements and the EU aggressively combats cartel practices both at the union 
level (through the European Commission), and at the individual member states’ level 
(through the National Competition Authorities, NCAs).703 Article 101 of the TFEU 
provides that any clandestine pact or understanding between commercial competitors 
whose aim is to fix prices, limit production, illegally divide markets and customers 
amongst themselves or limit the sources of supply should be considered as restrictive 
agreements704, because their aim is to prevent or restrict competition in the market.705 On 
the other hand, Article 5 of the Competition Law allows the minister to exempt any kind 
of anti-competitive agreements, which includes price fixing and market sharing. Such 
agreements definitely harm competition in any given market and ought to be declared 
illegal. In fact, they are construed as constituting very grievous infringements of the EU’s 
competition rules and attract very heavy fines from the European Commission and the 
NCAs.  
Further, Article 101 permits the European Commission to cooperate with third party 
countries in dismantling cartels if their activities directly and negatively affect competition 
within the EU. This means that the Commission can go after companies that are based 
outside the EU and which have entered into restrictive agreements with EU-based firms. 
The UAE’s competition law appears a little more flexible or, as some would prefer to put 
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it, somewhat more lenient compared to the EU’s rigid rules on restrictive agreements.  
Although the anti-cartel rules contained in the UAE competition law bear a lot of 
similarities with those found in Article 101 of the TFEU, Paragraph 3 Article 5 of the UAE 
competition law provides for the exemption of so-called “weak-impact agreements”.706 
That is, restrictive agreements whose negative elements do not have much weight on the 
competition matrix in the relevant market. Therefore, it can be accurately argued that when 
it comes to dealing with cartels, the EU rules are much stricter than the UAE competition 
law. The UAE is primarily concerned with the magnitude of the restrictive agreements, 
unlike the EU which seems to generally outlaw restrictive agreements. 
4.3.2 Control of abuse of dominant position and exemptions 
4.3.2.1 Introduction 
Another important element of competition law is the control of abuse of dominant 
position. Undertakings, through dominant position, benefit from the additional power 
against other rivals in the market. However, such power maybe abused, for instance, 
through refusing to deal with other undertakings. Like any other competition regime, the 
UAE competition law prohibits any establishment from abusing its dominant position, 
which might affect competition in the market. Article 6 provides for the regulation of 
dominant position. 
4.3.2.2 Dominance Position and relevant market 
Dominance, under the UAE competition law, is defined as a position whereby an 
enterprise can, on its own or in cohort with others, control or significantly affect the 
relevant market. However, the definition does not state an amount of the controlling 
percentage. A company achieves a dominant position if its market share surpasses the 
threshold set by the UAE Cabinet.707 Article 6 of the Competition Law prohibits firms that 
hold a dominant position from engaging in acts or conduct which may be considered as an 
abuse of such a position, thereby resulting in the reduction or elimination of competition 
in the relevant market. 
As in the EU’s competition law, the relevant market has been defined under the 
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UAE’s competition law. Relevant market consists of the goods or services or the number 
of goods and services upon whose characteristics, usage and price aspects “shall be 
replaceable by others to meet a certain need of the consumer in a certain geographic 
area.”708 There are three factors of commodities or services to be interchangeable in the 
same market, which can be drawn from this definition: characteristic, intention of usage 
and price. However, the law does not define the geographic market.  
4.3.2.3 Critical Issues 
The UAE’s competition law does not prohibit having a dominant position itself. The 
law only prevents the abuse of the power of dominant position. This is the same situation 
as with the EU competition law. In addition, dominance is a wide expression that covers 
other terms, such as monopoly and oligopoly.709 
The UAE has been facing some serious monopolistic behaviour which is considered 
crucial to the fairness of competition. There are two types of monopoly: natural monopoly 
and legal monopoly. In regards to legal monopoly, it occurs when the UAE government 
monopolises, through regulations, certain sectors of the market, such as 
telecommunications, oil and petroleum and aviation. On the other hand, a natural 
monopoly occurs through the monopolisation behaviour from an undertaking over special 
products that have privileges, such as lower prices or better quality over the products of 
other rivals. 
The government policies in the UAE regarding market regulation point to serious 
issues: The Commercial Agency Law 1981 allows private monopoly. Firms are allowed to 
monopolise products (goods or services) through the creation of ‘exclusive agents.’ 
Moreover, the government policies allow them to, partially or completely, monopolise 
goods or services, which might lead to lower quality or higher prices. An example of this 
is the government monopoly of 100 per cent of Emirates Airlines (Dubai Government) and 
Etihad Airlines (Abu Dhabi Government). In addition, the government allows market 
oligopolies. For example, the telecommunications sector is oligopolised through two 
competitors, Etisalat (in which the government owns large shares), and DU (which is a 
private competitor). It should be pointed out that the UAE government has failed to prevent 
the private monopolies that occur in the market, leading them to abuse their dominance 
                     
708 Article 1, UAE Federal Law No. 4 of 2012 Concerning Regulating Competition. 
709 Korah, V. An Introductory Guile to EC Competition Law and Practice. 8th ed. Oxford: Hart Publishing. 2004.  
155 
 
position and harm the economy. 
As was pointed out above, the law does not state the percentage of market share of 
an establishment for it to be considered to have a dominant position. However, it is 
believed that the percentage should be based on the nature of the market as the market 
power is different in each market. 
4.3.2.4 Abuse of dominant position 
It is worth mentioning that the competition law does not define the abuse of dominant 
position. The conduct contemplated under Article 6 as constituting an abuse of dominance 
includes selling goods or services at lower prices than the current market level with a view 
to blocking the entry into that market of other establishments. Dominant establishments 
also use lower prices to expose competitors to losses which eventually edge them (the 
competitors) out of the market in question. Additionally, this abuse could result from 
forcing customers to cease purchasing or dealing with competitors as well as withholding 
goods in order to create an unwarranted shortage of the same (hoarding). Further, refusal 
to conclude a contract on the sale or purchase of goods and services unless the other part 
agrees to other terms which are unrelated to the contract at hand is also tantamount to an 
abuse of dominance. In addition, the refusal to conduct business with a competitor under 
the usual business terms is recognised by Article 6 as constituting abuse of dominance.710 
4.3.2.4.1 The types of abuse of a dominant position: 
Article 6 of the Competition Law specifies the kinds of practices that are deemed to 
be considered as abuse of dominant position. It is obvious that the prohibition of 
agreements for abuse of dominant position under this Article follows the same method as 
for anti-competitive agreements under Article 5, through providing examples in the form 
of a non-exhaustive list. 
Article 6 (1)(a) prevents any direct or indirect restraint on the reselling of products 
that aims to prejudice, limit or prevent competition in the market. Article 6 (1)(b) prohibits 
any unfair practices by any undertaking that is in a dominant position through abusing its 
power of dominant position in order to prevent other competitors from entering the market, 
eliminating them from the market, or causing them heavy losses so as to prevent them from 
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continuing their business711. This act is known as ‘predatory pricing’. Usually, such 
prohibited practices are conducted through lowering the prices of the undertakings that 
enjoy the dominant position below the cost. This will lead other existing rivals, who are 
usually small or new, to withdraw from the market. 
Another type of abuse of dominant position that is prohibited under the law is the 
discrimination between clients in relation to the contract conditions of selling or buying or 
product prices.712 This article prevents any undertaking that benefits from a dominant 
position from abusing its position by discrimination against its clients in similar contracts 
through imposing different prices or conditions in the contracts. Moreover, the law 
prohibits the undertaking from imposing any condition on any client not to deal with any 
other competitor713, so it would lead to that rival losing and eventually leaving the market. 
This is called ‘tie-in’, which would put the rival in a weak position. 
In addition, the law prohibits the refusal of an undertaking to deal with other 
competitors, whether that refusal was total or partial.714 This behaviour is known as ‘refusal 
of supply.’ In addition, Article 6 (f) prohibits ‘unjustified’ refusal to deal with other 
competitors “through buying or selling or limiting or hindering such dealing that may lead 
to imposing an unreal price thereof.”715 Furthermore, Article 6 (g) prevents the imposition 
of a condition of accepting dealing obligations concerning other products, which are not 
related to the original contract, in order to conclude the original agreement. 
The law goes further with the preventions as it prohibits publishing, knowingly, 
incorrect information about products or prices. This behaviour might harm other 
competitors and accordingly harm the market.716 The law prohibits the establishments that 
enjoy a dominant position from abusing their position through increasing or decreasing the 
supply of products to create an artificial scarcity or abundance of the commodity.717 
As has previously been mentioned, the competition law gives the UAE Cabinet the 
power to set the threshold for the percentage of the market share, which would constitute 
the establishment of a dominant position.718 As such, the threshold is bound to change from 
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time to time depending on the prevailing economic situation in the country and upon a 
proposition by the Minister of Economy.  
4.3.2.4.2 Exemption 
Companies can be allowed to abuse their dominant position under certain 
circumstances even though they are prohibited. Companies and investors should be advised 
that some degree of abuse of dominance can be exempted from the application of Article 
6 of the Competition Law upon application to the minister. Articles 7 and 8 are the basis 
of this exemption just like the exemptions provided to the anti-competitive agreements. 
However, the exemption will depend on whether such practice will enhance economic 
growth and competition in the long run.  
The understanding of abuse of dominance under the competition law is similar to 
that contained in Article 102 of the TFEU. This part of the treaty prohibits the abuse of a 
dominant position.719 If a practice deemed as constituting an abuse of a dominant position 
is discovered by the EU Commission, then it will be declared incompatible with the internal 
market. Unlike the UAE threshold for determining dominance, which is much more 
flexible and liable to adjustment by the UAE Cabinet, the EU Competition rules provide 
that dominance will be deemed to exist if an establishment consistently holds a 40 per cent 
market share.720 In addition, the EU competition law is much stricter than the UAE’s 
competition law. It does not provide any exemptions to the abuse of dominant position like 
in the UAE.  
4.4 Conclusion 
After everything has been given due consideration, it is possible to conclude that the 
cooperation arrangements between companies may give rise to restriction or distortion of 
the competition in the internal market. With regard to the EU Competition Law, Article 
101 determines what kinds of cooperation agreement are prohibited. Such business 
practices as price fixing, limitation of production, allocation of markets and customers, and 
resale price fixing are prohibited under Article 101 of the TFEU and relate to such 
phenomena as cartels. The conducted analysis has unfolded the types of aforementioned 
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practices that are usually conducted in the framework of cartels. Also, it has been 
ascertained that secret agreements play a crucial role in facilitating the concerted violations 
of Article 101 of the TFEU by European business entities. 
In order to fall under the prohibition, a cooperation agreement or arrangement should 
first meet at least two conditions: (1) it should have an impact on trade between the member 
states; (2) it should aim at or lead to restriction or distortion of competition. The types of 
arrangement exemplified in Article 101, thus, can be held to be illegal only if they meet 
the two conditions. Thus, price fixing is only illegal if it has an impact on the trade between 
member states and restricts or distorts the competition. The same concerns market sharing, 
resale price fixing and limitation of production. 
Also, it should be generalised that the abuses of a dominant position are prohibited 
under Article 102 of the TFEU. It has been ascertained that the TFEU provides only general 
regulation of a dominant position, while the criteria for the assessment of dominance are 
established through the case law of the European Commission and the European Court of 
Justice. 
Dominant position refers to a position in the market that allows the company to 
influence the market substantially and, to a certain extent, disregard the competitors. There 
can be an individual or a collective dominant position. The examples of dominant position 
are: limitation of production and technical progress, imposing unfair sale prices, applying 
dissimilar conditions for the equivalent transactions, making conclusions of contract 
subject to acceptance by other parties of restrictive obligations. The prohibition of abuse 
of a dominant position is strict and does not foresee any exemptions. 
With regard to the UAE’s competition law, it has been obvious that the UAE applies 
an open economic policy based on the principle of supply and demand, and the prohibition 
of anti-competitive agreements that the UAE competition law includes is to safeguard the 
market. Article 5 of the competition law provides for the prohibition of anti-competitive 
agreements that aim to distort, limit or eliminate competition in the market.  
The non-exhaustive list under Article 5 (1) and (2) is merely a collection of examples. 
It includes prohibitions on price fixing, bid-rigging, refusal of supply, limitation of 
production or unlawful storing, and applying conditions on buying, selling or performing 
of services. In addition, it includes market sharing, preventing undertakings from entering 
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or existing the market, or its entering or existing agreements or coalitions. However, this 
Article, excluding Para 1/A and 2/A, does not apply to anti-competitive agreements if the 
impact on the economy is deemed to be weak.  
One can notice that the non-exhaustive list has many issues. The prohibitions under 
Article 5 consist of the prohibition of horizontal agreements. However, the prohibition 
regarding vertical agreements was not mentioned under this Article. Another issue that can 
be noticed is that, although the law aims to prevent any restriction on market entrance or 
exiting from it, there are many barriers to entering the UAE market, such as government 
policies.   
It should be noted that the Committee should be independent in order to enforce the 
non-exhaustive list. However, the Committee lacks that authority. Moreover, the 
guidelines on how the non-exhaustive list will be applied, and whether there are other 
examples to be added in addition to the non-exhaustive list, are still unclear. This is because 
the implementing regulation has still not been issued. 
It is still unclear which approach the UAE authority will apply to anti-competitive 
conduct. However, based on the experiences from other legislation, the per se approach 
could be applied to bid-rigging, predatory prices, price fixing and entry or exit barriers, 
since it is the most appropriate approach to deal with such anti-competitive behaviour. The 
approach of the rule of reason has been applied in the EU to the market sharing concept; 
however, it is not clear whether the authorities in the UAE would follow such an approach. 
It will only become clear once the implementing regulation is out. 
One of the drawbacks in Article 5 is that it did not include any provisions regarding 
the association of undertakings, unlike the EU law. Moreover, the provision regarding the 
control of anti-competitive agreements does not include any provision regarding concerted 
practices. 
In addition, the law does not specify the method that the Committee or the Ministry 
of Economy would follow to assess anti-competitive agreement rules in practice. Also, 
unlike the EU law where the anti-competitive contracts are automatically void, the UAE 
law does not provide any similar provision. 
With regard to the exemptions, there are two conditions for undertakings to be 
granted such exemption. First, an undertaking has to apply in writing with supporting 
160 
 
documents to the Ministry of Economy. Second, the undertaking has to prove that its anti-
competitive agreement would benefit the economy, the consumers, advance the 
distribution or production system, or improve its performance and competitive ability. 
However, critics argue that the minister’s authority could be problematic in the end as was 
discussed earlier leading to create a backlog of applications in his office.  
One can notice that the prohibitions under Article 101 of the TFEU are broad to 
capture all kinds of undertakings’ arrangements that aim to limit or distort competition. In 
addition, it is apparent that the UAE’s competition law deals with anti-competitive 
agreements in a less strict way than the EU law. The EU law generally outlaws the 
restrictive agreements unlike the UAE law, which is more concerned with the extent of the 
restrictive agreements.  
On the other hand, the UAE’s competition law gives a great deal to the control of 
dominant position, specifically under Article 6. It should be noted that the law does not 
prohibit dominant position itself, but abuse of that position. Generally, abuse of dominant 
position aims to limit, prejudice or prevent competition in the market. 
It is worth mentioning that the law has provided a definition of dominant position, 
and also relevant market. However, the law does not include any definition of the abuse of 
dominant position. Also, in order that the undertaking is considered to be abusing its 
dominant position, the percentage of market share is not stated in the law. The Cabinet has 
the authority to decide such a percentage and has the right to increase or decrease based on 
the suggestion of the Minister of Economy.  
The exemptions that are provided under the law are the same exemptions that are 
applicable to the anti-competitive agreements. Articles 7 and 8 deal with such exemptions. 
It should be noted that the EU’s competition law is stricter than the UAE’s competition 
law. Unlike the UAE law, the EU law does not provide any exemptions to the abuse of 
dominant position. 
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Chapter five: Control of Mergers and State Aid 
5.1. Introduction 
Another significant element of competition law is mergers control. A firm can gain 
an advantage from a merger by achieving a position of dominance in the market. Thus, 
competition law prevents such behaviour in case the merger will result in market 
dominance that will harm fair competition.721 Merger control is a policy tool designed to 
prevent excessive concentration in markets. The rationale behind the merger control is that 
excessive concentration may result in significant restriction and distortion of competition. 
It has been claimed that a firm seeking a merger may aim to increase its market power, 
eliminate other competitors, and enable itself to increase prices through reducing 
production.722 The mission of merger control, thus, is to prevent such a situation. 
The UAE’s competition law has covered this situation through including necessary 
provisions regarding economic concentration (including mergers and acquisitions) in order 
to protect the fair competition in the market. Articles 9, 10 and 11 cover the rules of control 
of mergers and acquisitions. 
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part of this chapter aims to provide 
an in-depth discussion regarding control of mergers in the UAE competition law with a 
reference to the EU competition law. First, it will provide a history of merger control in 
the EU. Second, it will discuss the concept of control of mergers and the definition under 
the EU law. Third, it will discuss the applications of Merger Regulation in the EU. Fourth, 
this chapter will discuss and analyse the significant cases in the EU history of mergers 
control. Later, the situation of economic concentration (mergers and acquisitions) in the 
UAE will be discussed and analysed. 
The second part of this chapter will consider the concept of state aid. State aid is 
generally understood to be a benefit or advantage given by the government, through state 
institutions or entities, to certain enterprises.723 This aid is selective in nature and it is, most 
of the time, intended to give a competitive edge to the beneficiary. State aid can be in the 
                     
721 For more detailed discussion see Chapter Six ‘Anti-competitive Agreements and Abuse of Dominant Position’. 
722 Whish, R. Op. cit. p. 785. 
723 McDermott P. et al., Private Sector Pay. [Online] 2013. p. 1.  Available from: 
http://www.trowers.com/uploads/Files/Publications/2013/Bulletins/State_Aid_-_Private_sector_pays_2.pdf [Accessed: 1 June 
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form of a grant, preferential loans, overpayments for goods or services as well as the 
transfer of land interests below the market value.724 Most competition jurisdictions in the 
world, including the EU, prohibit state aid if it has the potential to distort competition in 
the relevant market. Even though the concept of state aid is not expressly discussed in the 
UAE competition law, the exemptions contemplated under Article 4 of the competition 
law prove its existence. Thus, the aim of this part is to give a deep consideration to this 
concept under the EU and the UAE competition laws to find the reasons for the similarities 
and differences. 
5.2 Control of Mergers 
5.2.1 Mergers Control in the EU 
5.2.1.1 Introduction 
In the EU, the legal foundation of the merger control is set forth in Articles 101 and 
102 of the TFEU. Indeed, merger represents an arrangement between two undertakings. 
Therefore, it is an agreement. The merger agreement may potentially give a rise to anti-
competitive conduct prohibited by Article 101 (1). Furthermore, since the merger implies 
a greater concentration, it may also give rise to abuse of dominant position prohibited by 
Article 102. Therefore, by virtue of its nature, mergers are regulated by the anti-trust 
provisions of the TFEU.  
The fact is that Article 102 of the TFEU not only provides the European Commission 
with the possibility to regulate the conduct of big enterprises which abuse their dominant 
position in the relevant market, but also grants business entities the possibility of reaching 
the position within the market structure which enables them to conduct abusive acts in the 
first place. Thus, the main objective of the current part of the study is to offer an insight 
into the merger control and acquisitions under the prescriptions of EU competition law. 
5.2.1.2 History of merger control 
Currently, the issues of mergers and acquisitions are regulated in the framework of 
the European Union merger law. The EU merger law is part of the EU competition law. 
The incentive of the European Union to regulate mergers and acquisitions by means of its 
competition law is justified with the necessity to control an enormous concentration of 
                     
724 Ibid. 
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economic strength in the hands of a negligible number of business entities.  
Although before 1990 the Treaty of Rome contained competition provisions, merger 
control is not explicitly provided. Therefore, in order to exercise merger control, additional 
legislation was necessary. The establishment of the EU merger law as a well-elaborated 
pillar of the EU competition law dates back to 1989, when the first Council Regulation 
4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings (hereinafter referred to 
as the 1989 Merger Regulation) was adopted.725 It was the previous Merger Regulation 
that created a legal framework for review of mergers, acquisitions and other 
concentrations.726 The rationale behind the enactment of the first Merger Regulation was 
the premise that, with the completion of the internal market and lowering barriers for 
international trade and investments, the corporation would attempt to reorganise so as to 
gain competitive advantage. There were concerns that the developments in the market 
would drive corporations to concentrations, which can be harmful for the internal market 
competition. Therefore, there was a need for legislation that would prevent anti-
competitive concentrations and provide for merger control. At the time of the adoption of 
the Regulation, then-Competition Commissioner Lord Brittan stated that his task was to 
detect what kind of mergers harmed competition.727 He emphasised that the mergers which 
posed no threat to competition would be upheld.728 
The 1989 Merger Regulation rested on three main principles. The first principle 
articulated that the enlargement of the EU would inevitably lead to the proliferation of 
corporate reorganisations, especially in the form of concentrations.729 The second principle 
provided that mergers and other concentrations were welcomed in light of the impositions 
of dynamic competition. The third principle was that concentration could substantially 
impede effective competition in the single market and, thus, it was incumbent on the EC 
to include in Community law prescriptions regulating concentrations. 
It is possible to discern four eras of Community Merger Control, starting from the 
                     
725 Kekelekis, M. The EC Merger Control Regulation: Rights of Defence: a Critical Analysis of DG COMP Practice and Community 
Courts’ Jurisprudence. Kluwer Law International. 2006, p. 9. 
726 Levy, N. Gottlieb Cleary. EU Merger Control: A Brief History Gottlieb, Cleary, Steen & Hamilton. [Online] 2004, p. 1. Available 
from: http://www.cgsh.com/files/Publication/39346756-bc80-4fd2-
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727 Ibid. 
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729 European Council. Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings. [Online] n.d. Available from: http://eur-
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adoption of the 1989 Merger Regulation. The first era is called the years of discovery 
(1990-1994). In this period, the European Commission was flexible in the application of 
the EC merger law. The second era is the years of consolidation (1995-1998). The main 
specificity of this period was the elimination of certain gaps of the 1989 merger Regulation 
by the European Commission. For example, the Commission removed the disparity 
between “concentrative” and “cooperative” joint ventures. The next era was the era of 
controversy (1999-2001). In this period, the European Commission prohibited a large 
number of transactions.730 Also, a wide range of anti-trust theories were employed in 
practice. Finally, the fourth era is the years of reform and reckoning. This period of time is 
characterised by the adoption of a Green Paper on the overhaul of the 1989 Merger 
Regulation and the subsequent elaboration and adoption of the 2004 Merger Regulation. 
It should be noted that the 1989 and 2004 regulations are based on the same 
principles. However, there is a substantial difference in the legality test. Under the old 
Merger Regulation a concentration was prohibited if it (1) led to a strengthening of a 
dominant position and (2) resulted in ‘significant impediment of effective competition.’731 
In a word, strengthening a dominant position alone was not enough to prohibit 
concentration. The new resolution introduces a slightly different principle: a concentration 
which significantly impedes competition in the internal market by inter alia strengthening 
the dominant position is incompatible with the internal market. Therefore, there are no two 
requirements for the illegality of the merger but only one – serious impediment of the 
internal market competition. By contrast, had these requirements met, there is no case of a 
prohibited concentration. This view is supported by the Court. Thus, in Qualcomm v 
Commission the Court held that ‘concentration which does not create or strengthen a 
dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly 
impeded in the common market or in a substantial part of it is to be declared compatible 
with the common market’.732 
5.2.1.3 Concepts and definitions 
Article 3 of the 2004 Merger Regulation provides a twofold definition of the concept 
of concentration. Thus, according to the Regulation, a concentration should be considered 
                     
730 Case No COMP/M.1672 - Volvo/Scania; COMP/M.2187 - CVC/Lenzig. 
731 Roller, L. & De La Mano, M . The impact of the new substantive test in European merger control. European Competition 
Journal. 2006. 2.1, pp. 9-28. 
732 Case T-48/04 Qualcomm Wireless Business Solutions Europe BV v Commission of the European Communities. 
165 
 
to arise if the change of control takes place either from (1) a merger of two or several 
previously independent enterprises or parts of business entities, or from (2) the acquisition, 
by one or more business entities already having control over at least one enterprise, or by 
one or several business entities, where by way of acquiring of securities or assets, by means 
of contract or by any other means, “of direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of one 
or more other undertakings”.733 
One may observe that the term ‘merger’ is narrower than the term ‘concentration’. 
The following arrangements are not considered as concentration: (1) temporary holding of 
securities by credit and financial institutions; (2) acquisition of control by an office-holder 
in insolvency proceedings, liquidation, winding up, compositions or similar proceedings 
or cessation of payments; (2) mergers and acquisitions conducted by financial holding 
companies, whose sole purpose is to acquire holdings and to turn them into profits without 
involvement in the management of companies.734 
5.2.1.4 Application of the Merger Regulation 
The Merger Regulation applies to all concentration with a Community dimension.735 
The concentration has a community dimension if: 
 “(a) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings 
concerned is more than EUR 2,500 million; (b) in each of at least three Member 
States, the combined aggregate turnover of all the undertakings concerned is 
more than EUR 100 million; (c) in each of at least three Member States included 
for the purpose of point (b), the aggregate turnover of each of at least two of 
the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 250 million; and (d) the 
aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings 
concerned is more than EUR 100 million, unless each of the undertakings 
concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide 
turnover within one and the same Member State.”736 
                     
733 European Council. Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation). Article 3. Available from: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:024:0001:0022:EN:PDF [Accessed: 9 March 2013]. 
734 Control of Concentrations, Subsidiary Legislation 379.08: Control of Concentrations Regulations. [Online] 2003, pp. 1-2 
Available from: http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid=10475&l=1 
735 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger 
Regulation) OJL  24, 29.01.2004, pp.1-22. 
736 Article 1 (3) Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 
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Thus, the Merger Regulation applies only to those concentrations that meet the 
aforementioned conditions. 
5.2.1.5 Cases (critical discussion) 
Despite the fact that the 2004 Merger Regulation, as well as its predecessor, provides 
general definitions of terms in the domain of the EU merger law, the EU statutory law does 
not accomplish the regulatory framework of concentrations. Nevertheless, the EU case law 
is conceived to both construe and extend the statutory provisions of the EU merger law. 
Thus, the case of Gencor Ltd v Commission contains the judicial definition of the term 
“merger control”. According to the case, the EU Court of First Instance holds that the main 
objective of merger control is “[…] to avoid the establishment of market structures which 
may create or augment a dominant position and not need to control directly possible abuses 
of dominant position.”737 
The aforesaid judicial legal definition of the term “merger control” helps to give an 
insight into the nature of the EU merger law in general. Thus, the Court’s conclusions 
imply that merger control is both the preliminary stage of the law enforcement of abuses 
of a dominant position and the preventive measure of an indirect treatment of such abuses. 
It should be explicated that merger control always precedes the enforcement of the EU 
competition law by the European Commission in respect of those business entities which 
conduct abuses of a dominant position. Suffice it to say that merger control is a system of 
preventive measures which are supposed to avert the emergence of an abuser of a dominant 
position. In this connection, it is possible to agree with the reasoning of the judges in 
Gencor Ltd v Commission that the greater utility lies in the creation of the market structures 
which could be involved in abuses of a dominant position in the future. 
Notwithstanding the judicial logic that prevention is better than treatment, a rational 
note should be made that some cases establish exceptions to the general principles of 
merger control. Thus, the anti-competitive conduct of a business entity may be allowed 
under the banner of “technical and economic progress”.738 Another exception to the general 
principles of the EU merger control stems from Kali und Salz AG v Commission. In this 
case, the European Court of Justice ruled that the concentration should not be ceased if the 
taking over would lead to either the failure or insolvency of the business entity and when 
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738 European Council. Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. Article 2. 
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the cease does not decrease the competitive state in the relevant market.739 
5.2.2 Economic concentration (control of mergers and acquisitions) in the 
UAE 
5.2.2.1 Introduction 
Merger operations are regulated under UAE Federal Law No. 8 of 1984 concerning 
Commercial Companies (Companies Law), and the Competition Law (2012). In addition, 
there are other regulations and rules implemented by many federal and domestic 
authorities, which are administered and enforced by the Securities and Commodities 
Authority (SCA).740 
5.2.2.2 Merger regulation under the Company Law (1984) 
Articles 276 to 280 of the Company Law deal with merger regulation. According to 
the law, a merger is defined as "the dissolution of two or more companies and the 
incorporation of a new company to which all the liabilities of the dissolved companies 
would be transferred".741 According to the definition, two merging firms cease to exist to 
be replaced by a new firm which assumes their rights and obligations. The law also defines 
an acquisition as "the dissolution of one or more companies and transferring their liabilities 
to an existing company". This mean that the company which was acquired is “deemed to 
have ceased to exist”, and its liabilities and assets are transferred to the acquirer 
company.742 It should be noted that a merger or acquisition requires the approval of the 
SCA “where they concern a publicly listed company”.743 
It is worth mentioning that a new Companies Law is being processed for the stage of 
finalisation. The draft includes certain amendments to merger and acquisition regulation 
to complement competition law. 
5.2.2.3 Merger regulation under the Competition Law. 
The UAE competition law aims to prevent any kind of economic concentration that 
may harm competition in the market. The economic concentration regulation is covered 
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through Article 9, 10 and 11 of the law. However, the law does not state any definition 
regarding economic concentration, merger or acquisition. 
5.2.2.3.1 Merger application Procedures 
Economic concentration is addressed by Article 9 of the UAE Competition Law. 
Paragraph 1 of this Article provides that firms that carry out economic concentration 
operations which are likely to create a dominant position should apply to the Ministry of 
Economy to have their operations approved.744 This application should be made within 30 
days before the completion of such a deal. Economic concentration operations include 
mergers and acquisitions. As was explained earlier, the competition law does not define 
the concept of ‘merger’. However, mergers are understood as the “acquisition of assets, 
proprietary rights, usufruct or shares that enable an enterprise to directly or indirectly 
control another entity”.745 Any merger that exceeds the percentage threshold set by the 
UAE Cabinet has to seek approval from the minister. If the minister has not responded to 
the application within the time specified by the law (90 days plus the additional 45 days), 
then the applying entity has the right to assume approval.746 However, the merging firms 
cannot start implementing the merger agreement without the minister’s consent within the 
legally provided time frame. They should wait until the expiry of that time frame so that 
they can assume the existence of consent from the minister.747 Failure to notify the ministry 
on mergers that exceed the percentage of market share set by the Cabinet will attract 
significant financial penalties.748 It should be mentioned that the conditions for applying 
for a merger or acquisition are not set out in the competition law. However, Article 9 (3) 
states that such conditions and the required documents shall be specified under the 
implementing regulation. 
5.2.2.3.2 Minister’s Authority 
Under the competition law the minister of the economy is duty-bound to treat the 
details of the merger notifications forwarded to him with utmost confidentiality. Therefore, 
companies should not be worried over the security of the documents they forward to the 
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minister. Under the merger provisions of this law, the minister can issue three types of 
decisions for any merger deal. First, he can approve the transaction if it bears no negative 
effects on competition.749 Second, if there are competition concerns, the minister can issue 
a decision approving the transaction but attach a caveat requiring the concerns to be 
remedied.750 Some of the likely remedies to be recommended by the minister include 
requiring merging firms to sell a portion (a part) of what they have acquired or license 
some of their intellectual property rights to other firms.751 This helps in meeting the 
prescribed market threshold. The third type of decision could be considered adverse. Here, 
the minister can wholly disallow the transaction, especially if it raises competition 
concerns and there are no solutions that can remedy such concerns.752 The only solution 
left to investors affected by the third type of decision is to review their deal or apply for 
exemption from the application of the competition law.753 Such an application is made to 
the same minister and its approval is dependent on whether the applicant’s deal will 
enhance economic growth in spite of the fact that it exceeds the market share percentage 
threshold approved by the UAE Cabinet. Alternatively, the applicant can seek redress from 
the UAE federal courts if he feels aggrieved by the minister’s decision to disallow the 
merger. According to Article 11 (2), the minister has the right, through issuing a resolution, 
to revoke any approval he has made within Article 11 (1), if any of the three situations in 
Article 8 (7) has occurred.754 
5.2.2.4 Critical Analysis 
Merger and acquisition conditions in the EU are, to some extent, similar to those 
spelt out by the new UAE competition law. For example, the EU merger control rules 
prohibit much the same anti-competitive practices as the UAE competition law. This 
includes mergers and acquisition deals which are aimed at the creating and strengthening 
of a dominant position and the subsequent abuse of such a position. It is obvious that the 
UAE’s competition law has just started to take its first steps and therefore its effectiveness 
cannot be fully assessed at this time. However, it would not be a mistake to judge the 
contents of this law based on international best practices, especially on mergers and 
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acquisitions. One of the negatives associated with the provisions of this law could be the 
time it takes the Minister of Economy to approve or disapprove such transactions. In the 
EU, it would take the Commission around 5 weeks to scrutinise, approve or disapprove a 
merger deal.755 The same task will take 3 to 4 months to complete in the UAE. While the 
European Commission would extend the aforementioned period of 2 weeks, the UAE 
Minister of Economy is allowed an extended period of up to 45 days (more than 4 weeks).  
While the international practices on merger provide that remedies be availed to non-
conforming mergers, the remedies provided by the UAE competition law tend to rely on 
the wisdom of the Minister of Economy and the federal courts. Through the minister, 
mergers that exceed the UAE Cabinet’s market share threshold but enhance economic 
growth can be granted the go-ahead to start operating. Through the federal courts, 
aggrieved parties can seek legal redress.  
In contrast, the EU merger control regulation provides for elaborate remedies which 
can either be structural or behavioural.756 Structural remedies involve restructuring of the 
property allocation such other parties could be allowed the access to the merging firms’ 
market turf. For example, if two merging airlines are found to exceed the set market share 
percentage, they could invite or allow other independent airlines to share in their routes. 
This would ensure that they have not locked their competitors out of the relevant market. 
Behavioural remedies could involve a requirement by the European Commission for the 
merging firms to remove some discriminatory clause in their contract. The EU merger 
control regulation also allows aggrieved parties to seek legal redress at the ECJ.757 The 
UAE competition law does not provide for such remedies. It is, however, hoped that some 
semblance of these remedies will be availed through the implementing regulations. 
In approving or disapproving a merger or acquisition, the minister must assess 
whether the merger will negatively affect competition in the relevant market. If this is the 
case then he will not approve the merger. However, the minister has the power to approve 
a merger that is likely to negatively affect competition but have a positive impact on the 
economy. The reasoning behind this is that the economic gain far outweighs the negative 
effects on competition. It thus appears that the substantive test for the assessment of 
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mergers under the UAE competition law is whether a merger will negatively affect 
competition, and if so, what positive impact that merger has on the economy.758 This could 
be interpreted as meaning that a merger that has the potential to create a dominant position 
and subsequently alter the competition rules will not necessarily be disallowed if it has a 
positive effect on the economy. 
The UAE competition law test on merger assessment differs significantly from that 
of the European merger control. The EU test on merger assessment was created by the 
current EU merger regulation (Regulation 139/2004) which came into effect on May 1, 
2004.759 Article 102 of the TFEU prohibits the formation of mergers that are aimed at 
creating and strengthening dominant positions since such mergers constitute economic 
concentration, which has the potential to significantly impede competition. The European 
merger regulation test is known as SIEC (Significant Impediment of Effective 
Competition).760 Under the old test (which was replaced by SIEC in 2004), dominance was 
the acid test of the viability of a merger under the European merger control regime. 
However, SIEC does not necessarily assess the viability of mergers based on the 
“dominance test,” though it is important. A good example would be the merger of Air 
France and KLM in 2004. Though the proposed merger was likely to lower competition in 
14 domestic and international routes, the EU Commission gave a nod to the merger because 
of the travel efficiency and consumer benefits it was expected to bring about in European 
Airlines.761 SIEC looks at the significant impediments a merger is likely to have on 
competition plus the efficiencies such a merger would have on services to consumers. The 
UAE’s competition law, on the contrary, looks at the positive economic impact a merger 
is likely to have. This impact should, however, outweigh the negative effect the merger 
might have on competition. 
It is worth pointing out that there is a significant difference in the merger 
approval/disapproval periods between the UAE competition law and the European merger 
control regime. It only takes 25 working days for the EU Commission to scrutinise and 
approve/disapprove a merger deal in Phase 1. This period can only be extended for 10 
days.762 Contrastingly, the UAE competition law allows the Minister of Economy up to 90 
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days and an extension of up to 45 days for scrutiny and approval of a merger deal in phase 
1.763 Furthermore, the market share threshold for merger and acquisitions under the EU 
merger control regime appear to be well defined. Mergers that are likely to control over 40 
percent of the relevant market could be prohibited by the Commission.764 The UAE 
competition law, on the other hand, leaves the determination of this threshold in the hands 
of the Cabinet, which would be advised by the minister on this particular matter. However, 
it is desirable to give some period and test the law and then decide the percentage based on 
the observation. 
The EU merger regulation is broader in the sense that it defines the two types of 
mergers. That is, horizontal and non-horizontal mergers. Horizontal mergers refer to 
mergers between major market competitors. In other words, this is a merger between firms 
or enterprises that make the same products and sell to the same market.765 A good example 
would be a merger between the US aircraft, Boeing, and the European aircraft production 
giant Airbus. Non-horizontal mergers involve firms or enterprises dealing with different 
fields of production and serving different market segments. The UAE competition law is 
silent on such elaborations. However, it is hoped that such elements on mergers and 
acquisitions will be captured by the yet to be written accompanying executive regulations. 
After giving a deep insight into mergers control, the next part will discuss the state aid 
element. It is very important to assess whether the UAE’s competition law prohibits the 
concept of state aid, as is the case with the EU’s law, or whether there are any exceptions 
to this concept. 
5.3 State Aid  
5.3.1 State Aid in the EU 
In simple terms, state aid can be described as ad-hoc support of national businesses. 
For instance, during the recent financial crisis some of the largest banks were saved by 
their government. This can be considered state aid. In recent years, there has been growing 
concern that state aid may significantly distort competition by giving unfair competitive 
advantages. The state aid-relevant provision were present in the Treaty of Paris and then 
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in the Treaty of Rome. However, the rules began to be actively enforced only in recent 
decades.  
The core provisions of the EU competition law prohibiting state aid originate from 
Article 107 of the TFEU. Similar to Article 101 of the TFEU, Article 107 prescribes a 
general rule that the state must not subsidise or aid private business entities to the detriment 
of free competition, but it is entitled to approve exceptions for particular projects directed 
at restoration after natural disasters or regional development. The general definition of state 
aid is provided in Article 107 (1) of the TFEU. 
According to Article 107 of the TFEU, granting state aid is prohibited ‘in any form 
whatsoever’. This broad wording is construed so as to cover all possible methods and forms 
of aid. In Belgium v Commission the Court pointed out that, by virtue of the phrase ‘in any 
form whatsoever,’ it did not matter if the aid was granted in the form of loans or in the 
form of subscription to the capital of a company.766 Also in Germany v Commission the 
Court ruled that Article 107 does not make a distinction between permanent and 
provisional measures.767 
At the same time the state aid prohibition is not absolute. Thus, state aid is banned 
only when there is any support given either by a Member State of the EU or through the 
state resources of such Member State which threatens or distorts competition by favouring 
particular business entities or the manufacturing of certain goods, infringes on the trade 
between Member States and is inconsistent with the principle of the single market.768 
The above-captioned definition of state aid is comprehensive. Article 107 (1) of the 
TFEU recognises the following salient features of state aid as a prohibited activity: a) any 
support which involves a Member State or State resources; b) the aforesaid support distorts 
or threatens to distort normal competition; c) the aforementioned support favours certain 
undertakings or manufacture of specific goods; d)  the above-mentioned support influences 
trade relationships between Member States; e) the above support is deemed inconsistent 
with the internal market. 
One may assume that if state aid does not distort or threaten to distort competition in 
the internal market, such state aid is permissible. Indeed, on many occasions the Court 
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ruled that in order to classify aid as state aid, as per Article 107 (1), all the conditions set 
out in it should be met (Belgium v Commission (Tumebeuse); Spain v Commission (Hitasa), 
France v Commission, Westdeutche Landesbank Girozentrale and Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen v Commission).769 
Despite the comprehensiveness of the TFEU’s definition of state aid, the above-
captioned definition lacks a very important characteristic of state aid – the support is 
granted to private business entities. 
The prohibition of state aid which distorts competition in the internal market allows 
certain exemptions. Thus, according to Article 107 (2) the following types of aid are 
considered to be compatible with the internal market: (1) aid of a social character granted 
to individual consumers unless there is no discrimination as to the origin of the products 
in question; (2) aid to recover damages caused by outstanding occurrences and natural 
disasters; (3) aid granted to the economies of certain parts of Germany which were affected 
by the division of the country.  
Furthermore, Article 107 (3) defines the types of aid which are also compatible with 
the internal market: (1) aid to encourage economic development in areas with unusually 
low standards of living or in regions which seriously suffer from unemployment; (2) aid to 
encourage the fulfilment of an important project which is in the common European interest 
or aid to remedy the serious economic disturbance of a Member State; (3) aid to facilitate 
the development of certain activities in certain areas provided that such aid does not impede 
the competition in the region concerned; (4) aid to promote heritage conservation and 
culture, provided that such aid does not distort competition in the Union and does not affect 
trade between Member States; (5) other categories of state aid which can be specified by 
the Council.  
5.3.2 State Aid in the UAE 
The concept of state aid is not expressly discussed under the UAE’s competition law. 
This does not, however, mean that it does not exist. It can be inferred from the exemptions 
contemplated under Article 4 of the Competition Law. The full list of the exempted sectors 
under this law is found in the appendix (Chapter IX).770 
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Apart from exempting various public sectors, Article 4 provides for the exclusion of 
private enterprises which would otherwise be construed as infringing on the market share 
threshold set by the Cabinet. Some of the state sectors exempted from the application of 
the competition law include the postal services and telecommunications, gas and 
petroleum, and the land, sea as well as air transport sector. Furthermore, there are activities 
exempted under the same provision (Article 4). These include activities that have got 
something to do with the production and distribution of electricity, cultural activities 
(written, audio and visual), and activities involving drainage, waste disposal, sanitation as 
well as other environmental support services.771 Additionally, the production and 
distribution of pharmaceuticals is also exempted. Private firms that carry out tasks assigned 
to them by both the federal government and the governments of the individual emirates are 
also exempted from the application of the competition law, and so are small and medium-
sized enterprises. 
5.3.3 Critical Analysis 
EU member states do not entirely lose their independence by signing the various 
treaties essential for their membership of the union. In fact, Article 346 (formerly Article 
295 of EC Treaty) of the TFEU clearly states that the treaties signed by the Member States 
shall not in any way be biased against the individual Member State’s legal system of 
property ownership.772 What this means is that Member States’ governments have the right 
to engage in commercial activities, for example, acquiring and maintaining shareholdings 
in private firms, creating and managing public companies or nationalising certain sectors 
of the economy.773 This part of the TFEU could be said to be the equivalent of Article 121 
of the UAE Constitution, which guarantees each emirate the power to enact their own laws 
and apply them within their territories.774 As such the individual emirates also possess the 
right to carry out commercial activities of their choice. It is worth noting that the primary 
aim of setting up the EU was for the promotion of trade by creating a common market. 
Since trade was the chief motivation for the formation of the EU, it is only reasonable that 
it is made fair, hence the enactment of the competition laws. It is these laws that prohibit 
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state aid which is likely to affect competition.  
Although state aid is not entirely prohibited under the TFEU treaty, it must not affect 
competition in the internal market.775 Article 107(1) of the TFEU gives the European 
Commission powers to declare state aid incompatible with the competition rules if the aid 
has got the potential to distort competition within the EU. It suffices to mention that, unlike 
the UAE competition law, the EU control of state aid is quite elaborate. It clearly spells 
out the activities which the state can aid, including social services, housing, social 
infrastructure, aid to small and medium-sized enterprises, and research.776 The European 
Commission also allows state aid where it is used to correct market failures. Ioannis Lianos 
points out that Article 107(3) exempts state aid provided to people or businesses situated 
in historically low potential economic areas. This includes the Member States’ overseas 
economic territories like Guadeloupe, French Guiana, the Canary Islands and parts of 
Germany affected by the division of that country among other areas.777 Other than this 
express exemption, the EU competition law hardly favours any other commercial 
undertaking by the state. However, the EU Commission is given powers to decide on block 
exemptions under the direction of the EU Council. 
The EU competition rules provide that state aid should focus on activities rather than 
the firm carrying out those activities. In fact, when assessing the compatibility of any state 
aid with the EU competition rules, the Commission looks at the effects of the aid rather 
than the intention of the provider of the aid. There is hardly any mention of state aid control 
in the UAE competition law. What is clear is the number of sectors and activities exempted 
from the application of the law. It is important to note the EU rules on state aid control 
exempt activities, rather than entire sectors, from the stringent rules on state aid. If the 
Commission establishes that a particular firm or enterprise benefited from state aid that is 
deemed incompatible with the EU anti-competition laws, then that firm is ordered to return 
the aid in addition to some interest. Such a rule is nowhere to be found within the UAE 
competition law. However, investors and other business stakeholders should remain 
hopeful since this law is still raw and it has not been tested. 
Unlike the UAE competition law, the EU competition rules are very clear on what 
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constitutes state aid to enterprises and how it should be dealt with. Article 107(1) of the 
TFEU expressly prohibits any aid given by a member state using public resources and 
which is likely to affect or distort competition by favouring the recipient of the aid over 
other enterprises. However, state aid is not entire prohibited under Article 107(1) though 
it is highly discouraged. State aid can be permitted if it meets particular conditions imposed 
by the TFEU rules. One of these conditions is the requirement for a member state intending 
to offer aid to any enterprise to notify the EU Commission which would in turn scrutinise 
and approve or disallow such aid if it has the potential to distort competition. The EU 
Commission has at times found itself at loggerheads with member states over the extent to 
which the latter can aid their health sector. Article 152 (5) of the EC Treaty requires 
member states to take charge of organising and delivering healthcare to their citizens.778 
Since the involvement of government in the health sector is likely to attract policies such 
as the provision of subsidies to the various industry players, the likelihood of 
incompatibility with the EU state aid rules is very high. This has been a major source of 
legal tussles in the European Court of Justice in the recent past. Perhaps the UAE Cabinet 
should take the European experience on board as they embark on drafting the various 
regulations that will accompany the broad provisions of the competition law. 
5.4 Conclusion 
Merger control is a relatively recent development in the EU competition law. It dates 
back to the year 1990, when the first Merger Regulation was adopted. The basic principles 
set forth by that regulation are still applicable. However, the method of distinguishing legal 
and illegal concentration has slightly changed. The merger control applies only to the 
concentrations which may potentially impede competition in the internal market, for 
instance by strengthening a dominant position. Also, the merger control is confined to 
concentration which has a Community dimension. Whether a company has a community 
dimension can be found by calculating relevant turnover amounts. 
Exceptions to the general principles of merger control should not be ignored. It is 
possible to agree with the reasoning of the Court in Kali und Salz AG v Commission that it 
is not always prudent to take over business entities even if they threaten effective 
competition. The research of the EU merger law shows that merger control is a very 
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complex practice which requires from the European Commission and the European Court 
of Justice an accurate assessment of all risks and benefits before making a decision on the 
cease of a concentration. 
On the other hand, to some extent the conditions of economic concentration in the 
UAE are similar to the EU. Both legislations aim to control the mergers and acquisitions 
deals that aim to create and strengthen their dominant position, which could lead to abuse 
of such a position. It should be noticed that the UAE law is still in its early stages and has 
not been tested yet. 
However, some critics may draw attention to the negative points concerning the 
provisions of this law regarding economic concentration. There is the very long period that 
it takes the Minister of Economy to approve or disapprove, after an examination, a merger 
or acquisition request. This procedure takes 90 days, which may be extended to another 45 
days. In contrast, it takes 5 weeks in Phase I in the EU. 
In addition, the EU competition law allows structural and behavioural remedies 
unlike the UAE competition law, which lacks such remedies. It is hoped that the coming 
implementing regulation includes such remedies. 
One can see that the assessment of merger control in the UAE differs from the EU 
method. The EU follows the ‘dominance test’. According to this test, if a merger or 
acquisition aims to create or strengthen a dominant position that has the potential to hinder 
competition in the market then the law shall prohibit the creation of such a formation. On 
the other hand, the UAE competition law does not consider the negative impact that a 
merger or acquisition may have on market competitiveness, if the formation has a positive 
impact on the economy. 
While the EU competition law defines two types of mergers, horizontal and non-
horizontal, the UAE does not mention anything regarding that. It is hoped that the elements 
on mergers and acquisitions will be included and explained in upcoming implementing 
regulation. 
Regarding state aid, in the EU it is not illegal per se. It is only illegal when it distorts 
or threatens to distort competition in the internal market. The concept of state aid is very 
broad and covers any kinds, forms and methods of state aid. At the same time, there is a 
range of exemptions. The exemptions include the types of legitimate aid such as the 
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depressed economic regions. As well as mergers, state aid is subject to a notification 
system. All aid should be notified to the Commission, which has power to review the 
legality of aid.  
On the other hand, the UAE competition law does not expressly discuss the concept 
of state aid. However, it may be inferred from the exemptions under Article 4 that the 
concept does indeed exist. The UAE constitution empowers the individual emirates to 
engage in commercial activities, which is also the case in the EU, allowing the individual 
states to do the same. 
However, EU competition law does not allow state aid, based on the fact that such 
aid might distort competition in the market leading to negative effects. However, EU 
competition law does provide exemptions in some cases when they do not hinder 
competition in the market. 
It should be mentioned that, unlike UAE competition law, the EU competition law 
is quite elaborated since it is very clear in which activities that states can aid, including 
SMEs, housing and research. Although the EU competition law hardly favours any state 
commercial activities, other than the expressed exemptions, the EU Commission is 
empowered to establish block exemptions under the EU Council’s direction. 
In addition, while the EU competition law provisions on state aid control exempt 
activities, the UAE competition law exempts certain sectors. This could be seen as a 
negative point regarding control of state aid. Excluding certain sectors from the application 
of the law may lead to the creation of anti-competitive behaviour such as dominant position 
and anti-competitive agreements that would lead to a distortion of competition and the 
economy in the end. 
If a firm that benefits from state aid in the EU is found to be incompatible with the 
EU competition law, then the state aid must be returned in addition to some interest. 
However, this is not the case in the UAE, since such rules do not exist in the current 
competition law. 
Generally, it can be said that the UAE competition law is still new compared to the 
most advanced competition regimes, such as the EU. It will be a matter of time until the 
law has been tested to prove its effectiveness. Although the law is silent on many 
competition elements or does not include sufficient explanations, the hope is that the 
180 
 
implementing regulation will clarify such matters when it comes. 
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Chapter Six: Enforcement of Competition Law 
6.1 Introduction 
It should be noted that competition law enforcement is a very critical matter in the 
competition system, since it ensures market competitiveness and protection from unfair 
practices. In order for competition law to be efficient and able to tackle anti-competitive 
behaviour, it has been claimed that the legal system should be strong enough by way of 
containing the required elements and provisions for such prohibitions. In addition, in order 
to enforce the competition law, it must contain the required sanctions and impose them 
against the violators so as to discourage such behaviour in future. This implies the 
requirement of intensive observation by the authorities on undertakings and their activities 
in the market. 
This chapter aims to study the enforcement mechanism of the UAE competition law. 
This chapter will provide a critical assessment of the enforcement system based on the 
experiences in the EU system. The findings will provide some suggestions on how to 
overcome the defects, if any, through learning from different experiences. 
The first part of this chapter will look at the EU competition law enforcement 
mechanism. It will give an overview of the current enforcement regulation, the 
Commission’s authorities and judicial review. The second part of the chapter will discuss 
competition law enforcement in the UAE. The role of the Competition Regulation 
Committee will be illustrated. Also, the roles of the Ministry of Economy and the Minister 
of Economy will be discussed. Later in this chapter, the penalties under the competition 
law will be elaborated.  
6.2 Enforcement under EU Competition Law 
6.2.1 Introduction 
Elaborating on the enforceability of Article 107 of the TFEU, it might be appropriate 
to note that it is incumbent on the European Commission, in collaboration with Member 
States, to constantly overhaul all available systems of aid in relevant Member States.779 
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It should be reiterated that the decision in Van Gend en Loos established the 
supremacy of the EC competition law over the national competition laws of Member 
States. In light of this, the decision in Van Gend en Loos spurred the European Community 
to establish a central enforcement authority responsible for ensuring the observance of EC 
competition law. The role of the central enforcement authority of EC competition law was 
assumed by the European Commission as the executive body of the European Union. Stine 
Andersen is disposed to think that the Commission exercises its enforcement obligations 
in a politically tolerable manner.780 
Since 1964, the Commission has taken an active part in the enforcement of EC 
competition law. The first competition-related case which to be settled by the Commission 
was the case of Consten & Grundig.781 Nowadays, the Commission remains the central 
player in the field of enforcement of EU competition law. Nevertheless, Regulation 1/2003 
has given rise to the decentralised enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU782 by 
way of placing the national competition authorities as well as national courts of Member 
States at the centre of law enforcement.783 
In addition to the European Commission, the functions of enforcement of the EU 
competition law are realised through the European Council. Particularly, Article 113 of the 
TFEU prescribes that the Council guarantees the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market, as well as ensuring the effectiveness and normal course of competition by 
way of special legislative procedures and indirect enforcement of the EU competition law. 
The enforcement of Article 113 of the TFEU is performed particularly through Council 
Regulation No 659/1999 which lays down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 
of the EC Treaty. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules 
for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty is an instrument implementing the state 
aid provisions. The regulation introduces the term ‘unlawful’ aid which is granted in 
violation of the treaty provisions. The regulation provides for a notification system: all aid 
should be notified to the Commission. Moreover, unless the Commission takes the 
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authorising decision regarding the aid notified, aid cannot be proceeded with.784 If the 
Commission is satisfied that the arrangement does not constitute aid or is legitimate aid, it 
will endorse the arrangement with the respective decision. However, if the Commission 
finds that arrangements may potentially distort competition, the Commission shall launch 
investigative proceedings. If the Commission finds that aid is unlawful it may invoke an 
injunction to suspend the aid. 
6.2.2 Public Enforcement Under Regulation 1/2003: the Role of the European 
Commission and National Competition Authorities 
6.2.2.1 Overview of Regulation 1/2003 
The Commission has extensive powers to investigate horizontal and vertical 
agreements that may potentially harm competition. For example, the Commission has the 
authority to enter company premises without announcement and to explore the company’s 
internal documents.785 Moreover, the Commission has the power to prosecute any 
company that fails to comply with EU competition laws and impose fines, which may reach 
up to ten percent of the company’s global turnover.786 
Regulation 1/2003 is the foundation that modernised anti-trust enforcement rules and 
procedure in the EU. It started to be applied on May 1, 2004. The 44th article of Regulation 
1/2003 holds that the Commission, by 1st May 2009 - that is, five years after application - 
shall report to the EU Parliament and the council of its functioning. Regulation 1/2003 was 
implemented after comprehensive reform of procedures and it sought to enforce Articles 
82 and 81 EC since 1962 (now 101 and 102 TFEU). There are some important 
characteristics of the regulation. First, it abolished the practice of informing of business 
agreements to the Commission. This effectively allowed the Commission to concentrate 
its resources on the crucial battle against monopolies and cartels as well as other serious 
violations of the anti-trust rules. Second, national competition authorities and courts were 
enabled to effect EC anti-trust guidelines and policies in their entirety.787 This implies that 
there are several overseers as well as a broader application of the EC anti-trust rules.  
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The system used to impose competition in the EU, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, is 
founded on a number of rules. First, Regulation 17/1962 put in place a system where an 
arrangement that occurs within Article 81(1) (now 101 (1) TFEU) would only escape 
through Article 81(3) (now 101 (3) TFEU) when it was exempted. There are two main 
methods which can be used to get exclusion. The first involves exemption as a block 
regulation while the second is exemption as an individual from the Commission, otherwise 
known as notification and exemption procedure.788 Second, Regulation 17/1962 was 
replaced by Regulation 1/2003. It renders article 101(3) directly relevant and decentralises 
the implementation of the anti-trust provisions. The network for European competition 
(ECN) was also formed by Regulation 1/2003 and it put in place procedures and 
mechanisms for the teamwork between the National Competition Authorities (NCA) and 
the Commission.  
The practice note takes into consideration the collaboration between the European 
Commission, the NCA, and each other when it comes to the implementation of Articles 
101 and 102 of TFEU under Regulation 1/2003. It covers briefly the cooperation between 
the EC and competition authorities in third countries. It also covers issues that may arise 
in case of cooperation between competition authorities later.789 
6.2.2.2 Powers of Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003 
Initiating proceedings is a formal way used by the Commission to show that it aims 
to accept a decision under Regulation 1/2003. Cseres says that Regulation 773/2004, 
Article 2 provides that: the Commission has powers of investigating before it can initiate 
the proceeding.790 The Commission can also publicise its intention of initiating 
proceedings after it appropriately informs the parties. These powers are based on Articles 
17, 18, 20 and 21 of Regulation 1/2003. Article 18 gives the Commission the powers to 
request different agents to provide it with information. Article 20 allows inspections to be 
conducted by the Commission on the premises of different undertakings. Article 21 gives 
a mandate to the Commission to do inspections on private properties and this is guaranteed 
in Article 8 of the European Convention for Human Rights in Europe (ECHR). Lastly, 
Article 17 empowers the Commission to perform general inquiries in the sector economy 
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and to ask NCAs to impose penalties and fines under Articles 23 and 24.791 
The second power involves taking statements where the Commission conducts 
interviews with the legal or natural person. According to Article 19, this power can only 
be exercised after the individual concerned has given consent and collects information 
relating to the subject matter of the investigation. Third, the Commission is capable of 
taking the last decision by ordering for the infringement termination of the competition 
rules.792 Procedural decisions can also be assumed in the course of its investigations. 
Article 7 empowers the Commission to carry out interim measures so as to evade 
irreparable damage which can occur before the final decision can be made. A decision can 
be taken that binds commitments but without finding infringement, or a positive decision 
can be taken finding Articles 101 and 102 inapplicable.  
Article 8 holds that decisions can be made by the Commission enforcing interim 
measures in cases of urgency to apply for a short period of time. The Commission may 
also renew them when it is deemed appropriate and necessary. Article 9 allows the 
Commission to render undertakings that have been given by the parties binding upon them, 
even when a final decision will not be made finding an infringement.793 In certain cases, it 
may reopen the proceedings by the Commission or upon request by the parties. Lastly, 
Article 10 allows the Commission to make a positive decision finding Articles 101 and 
102 are not applicable to certain practices or agreements.  
Fourth, the Commission has the power to impose fines as well as intermittent penalty 
payments. According to Article 23, the Commission is empowered to impose fines on both 
substantive and procedural transgressions of the rules of competition. On the other hand, 
the Commission is empowered by Article 24 to levy intermittent penalty payments so as 
to compel undertakings to act in the way required by the Commission by penalising 
defiance.794 
Lastly, there are various aspects which must be taken into deliberation before 
Regulations 1/2003 decisions that find an infringement can be undertaken. For instance, 
                     
791 Lane, R. European and National Enforcement of EU Competition Law: Sharing the Sovereignty. School of Law University of 
Edinburgh. [Online] 2009, p. 3. Available from: http://www.jean-monnet-coe.keio.ac.jp/workingpapers/robert_lane_01.pdf 
[Accessed: 27 May 2013]. 
792 Commission of the European Communities. Communication from the commission to the European Parliament and the Council: 
Report of the Functioning of the Regulation. [Online] 2009. p. 4. Available from: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0206:FIN:EN:PDF [Accessed: 27 May 2013]. 
793 Van Den Bergh, R.J. & Camesca, Op. cit. p. 126. 
794 Evans, D. & Padilla, J. Op. cit. p. 107. 
186 
 
the Commission can take provisional measures, impose fines or require periodic payments 
in accordance with Article 27. However, the undertakings concerned must be granted the 
prospect of being listened to in cases where the Commission has accepted an opposition. 
It is important to note that the right to be listened to has to be exercised in writing, but 
Regulation 773/2004, Article 12 provides the concerned parties with the right to be orally 
heard. 
6.2.2.3 Regulation 1/2003 in practice 
To effectively tackle the challenges associated with the enlargement of the EU in 
2004, the European Commission agreed to reconsider the arrangements for the application 
of Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU.795 The main aim was to ensure that competition rules 
for the EU were effectively supervised and the administration was simplified to the greatest 
extent possible. Reconsideration by the Commission facilitated the implementation of 
Regulation 1/2003, also known as the Modernisation regulation, and it was brought into 
force on May 1, 2004 (OJ 2004 L1/1). Various factors were abolished by the Modernisation 
Regulation. They include the structure for announcement of agreements, the conduct to the 
EC for a person exemption in Article 101(3) (in Article 101 cases), or for the negative 
clearance. National courts in collaboration with the national competition authorities were 
empowered to apply Articles 101 and 102 in their entirety. In the past, only the 
Commission had the power of granting individual exemptions under Article 101(3). 
Under Regulation 1/2003, authorities for national competition were selected by 
Member States to be the authorities that are responsible for applying Articles 101 and 102 
of the TFEU. The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in the UK is regarded as a NCA. The OFT 
is assisted by sector regulators which have concurrent powers that are used to enforce 
Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU, as well as Chapter 1 and II of the Competition Act.796 
There are also a number of authorities which have been designated as NCAs. 
Despite the fact that NCAs under Article 5 of the Modernisation Regulation have the 
power to use Articles 101 and 102, the ECJ said, in relation to Article 102, that they are 
not empowered to decide in cases where there are no infringements.797 When the NCA 
discovers that the conditions for applying the prohibitions have not been met, the powers 
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of the NCA will be limited to making a decision that there are no grounds for action. The 
decision by the ECJ is relevant to the submission of Article 102, but the reasoning appears 
to be equally applicable to Article 101.  
Regulation 1/2003 enforces accountabilities on the Commission, NCAs and national 
courts to ensure that Articles 101 and 102 are consistently applied by all Member States. 
The Practice note is concerned with the cooperation between the Commission and NCAs. 
Cooperation between national courts and the Commission is regarded as the practice note. 
An obligation was enforced by Art 3 para 1 of Regulation 1/2003 on NCA of all member 
states to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in line with their national competition rules.798 
This obligation implies that national requirements must comply with EU interpretations of 
Article 101 and 102 when applying them in line with their national rules. As the European 
competition law undergoes a decentralising process, the NCA and national courts 
increasingly play a major role in enforcing and implementing the EU competition rules. 
The NCA and the commission have established a number of competition authority 
networks whose obligation is to detect, examine and punish violations of Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU.  
This implies that the Commission plays a very important role when it comes to the 
application of competition law. Specifically, the role of the Commission is to advise the 
parties on how EU roles should be applied and the progress which the decentralised system 
of European competition law should follow through the steps applied by the Regulation 
1/2003.799 Regulation 1/2003 applies executive competence to NCAs and national courts. 
It creates a system for parallel application of national competition law and the EU. 
Europeanisation of competition law has been made possible by the enforcement system 
that enhances cooperation between NCA and EC. The EC rules are directly applied across 
the entire Union. Therefore, the national authorities of each country have to comply fully 
with the Commission since it is not just a requirement but mandatory. The interaction 
between the EC and NCA is required under Article 11 of Regulation 1/2003. The 
Commission and the NCAs establish a grid of public authorities whose aim is to work 
closely together. 
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6.2.2.4 The Commission’s Fines 
The Commission has the right to impose fines in case of violations of the competition 
law. The statistics suggest that the Commission makes extensive use of fines as a method 
of enforcement of anti-cartel provisions. Thus, in 2012 the Commission imposed fines for 
cartel arrangements equalling almost €1.9 billion.800 The highest fine was imposed on Saint 
Gobain for an illegal cartel in the car glass case with a total of €1.3 billion. Among well-
known companies that were fined by the Commission are Philips, LG Electronics, and 
Siemens AG.801 
In a recent case, the Commission imposed a fine on Microsoft of a total of €561 
million. The Commission’s decision was based on the fact that Microsoft has failed to 
comply with the commitments that it made to offer internet browser users the feature to 
freely choose their preferred web browser. According to the Vice President of the 
Commission, Microsoft had abused its dominant position. He asserted that there was a 
significant role for legally binding commitments in the Commission’s enforcement policy. 
This was because such commitments “allow for rapid solutions to competition 
problems”.802 However, a strict compliance is necessary with the Commission’s decisions 
and any failure to comply would be considered a very serious violation leading to strict 
sanctions.803  
6.2.2.5 Judicial review 
Within the European competition network, there are various enforcement 
mechanisms by the national competition authorities. These mechanisms are integrated in 
judicial reviews with the aim of ensuring that all agents adhere to the laws and regulations 
adopted by the European Commission. EU and national competition law (NCL) has a close 
relationship.804 National courts and NCAs are required when applying national law that 
influences trade between countries in the EU to also apply Union law. According to 
Regulation 1/2003, article 3(1) holds that, when national courts and NCAs apply the law 
for national competition, they must constitute a decision, agreement or concerted practice 
that applies Articles 101 and 102. Article 3(2) of the regulation 1/2003 is concerned with 
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the relation between national and union law and particularly with the way national 
authorities apply stricter national laws to conduct or agreement.  
Regulation 1/2003 provides expressly the fines that the Commission should impose 
on associations and undertakings that have infringed the competition rules in the EU that 
“they shall not be of a criminal law nature”.805 Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
General Court of the EU (“EGC”) has argued consistently that the fines imposed for 
infringement of competition law are not of criminal law by nature. By contrast, the ECJ 
has failed to address this question more explicitly. For instance, the judgment it held in 
Banda was that three criteria should be applied in determining the type of sanction imposed 
under Regulation 1/2003.806 The criteria coincides with the one adopted by the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Engel, which first legally classifies the offence under 
the law, second the nature of the offence, and third the nature and degree of fine severity 
the concerned individual will incur.  
The ECHR in Europe held that criminal proceedings should be respected in practice. 
However, the EFTA Court directly addressed the matter of whether imposing fines under 
competition law fell within the criminal sphere as a principle matter. In Menarini 
Diagnostics v Italy, the ECtHR went a step further by holding that a fine that has been 
imposed for violating national competition rules was of a criminal nature within the 
meaning of Article 6(1) of the ECHR.807 The type of fines for infringing competitions laws 
in the EU imply that guarantees of title VI of the Charter (Art 47 to 50) can be applied to 
competition proceedings. However, scholars say that the applicable safeguards in 
competition law are different from those governing criminal matters.  
In Jussila V Finland, the judgement by ECtHR argued that the fining procedure in 
competition cases is different from the hard-core found in criminal law. Therefore, 
guarantees of criminal-head will not have to apply in accordance to their stringency. 
However, will the principles of Jussila v Finland have to be applied to the proceedings of 
competition law? This judgement related to fiscal surcharge tax fraud that the tax 
authorities in Finland imposed. According to the applicant, the administrative court 
responsible for confirming the surcharge should have held an oral hearing, pursuant to 
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Article 6(1) ECHR808. However, the plea was dismissed by the ECtHR through reference 
to the form of the fiscal surcharge. The court reasoned that it had already established the 
link with the competition law. 
 It also held that there are certain forms of criminal cases which fail to contain a 
significant degree of stigma, implying that these are criminal charges which carry differing 
weight. Cases of criminal head have gradually broadened and they do not belong strictly 
to traditional categories of criminal law, like for instance the competition law809. The 
Commission is not a tribunal, according to the settled case-law, particularly within the 
meaning of Article 47 in the Charter. Nevertheless, this does not prevent the chance of 
locating an infringement and fines being imposed, as a whole, and being considered as 
fulfilling the requirements of that provision. An administrative body can impose fines even 
when it does comply with Article 47 of the Charter; as long as the decision is subjected to 
additional review by a judicial body that complies with these requirements.  
Applicants in competition cases argue that ECJ and EGC proceedings fail to fulfil 
the requirements under Article 47 of the Charter. EU Courts have been criticised for not 
conducting a de-novo trial and that their own judgments cannot be substituted for those of 
the Commission. Second, EU Courts have been criticised for not conducting a review of 
the legality of a decision that is contested, thus giving the Commission a percentage of 
discretion in economic issues810. However, this criticism has been dismissed by the EGC 
and ECJ. They hold that a system of judicial review on the decisions made by the 
Commission with regards to the proceedings under Article 101 and 102 TFEU provides 
the safeguards needed by Article 47 of the Charter. In conclusion, the judicial reviews 
which the treaties provide are reviewed by the EGC as a matter of both facts and law, and 
they can be reviewed further by the ECJ when there is an appeal. The EGC is empowered 
to analyse the evidence, nullify the contested evidence either in part or in whole, and 
change the amount of the fine. This implies that, when it comes to the amount of a fine, 
the EGC is allowed to substitute the decision it makes for that of the Commission.  
6.3 Enforcement under the UAE Competition Law 
In order to understand the enforcement mechanism under the UAE Competition Law, 
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the role of the Authorities, established according to the law, has to be understood. 
According to the UAE competition law, there are three authorities that are empowered by 
different roles in order to implement the law. These authorities are: the Committee, the 
Ministry of Economy, and the Minister of Economy. 
6.3.1 Enforcement Authorities and their Roles under the law 
6.3.1.1 The Role of the Competition Regulation Committee 
Article 12 of the UAE Competition Law calls for the formation of a statutory body 
which will be referred to as the Competition Regulation Committee (the Committee). This 
body will act in an advisory capacity and it shall be headed by the deputy Minister of 
Economy. The composition of the Committee and the remuneration of its members will be 
determined by the Cabinet.811 
Article 13 of the Competition Law spells out the functions of the Committee.812  One 
of its major responsibilities is to propose policy and legislation to the Minister of Economy 
aimed at safeguarding competition in the UAE.813 Further, the Committee is charged with 
the monitoring of the implementation of the Competition Law and subsequently making 
recommendations to the Minister regarding anything to do with the implementation 
process.814 The committee is responsible for proposing legislation and procedures related 
to the protection of competition, and submitting it to the minister.815 The Committee is 
further tasked with the review of appeals for reconsideration of the minister’s resolutions 
within 10 days of the date of acknowledging the Resolution816 as well as performing any 
other duty related to the protection of competition in the UAE as it may be assigned to it 
by federal or any other relevant state authorities.817 Moreover, the committee is assigned 
to submit recommendations to the minister regarding the exemption of anti-competitive 
agreements or dominant position practices.818 Additionally, the Committee is supposed to 
prepare and submit an annual report to the minister detailing its activities for the ending 
year.819 
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This Committee is similar to the (NCAs) found in each Member State of the EU. 
However, unlike the Committee which has to answer to the Minister of Economy, the 
NCAs are independent of any organ of government. The working of the EU is such that 
national laws of the individual Member States have to conform to those of the EU (Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU).820 As such, the NCAs enforce national competition laws and 
coordinates with the European Commission which enforces the EU competition law. The 
UAE competition law, on the other hand, mandates the Ministry of Economy with the 
supervision of the Committee. 
6.3.1.2 The Role of the Ministry of Economy 
Implementation of the UAE’s competition law rests with the Ministry of Economy 
(hereinafter referred to as the Ministry). Article 14 of this law enumerates the 
responsibilities of the Ministry with regards to competition in the country. They include 
cooperating with other state bodies in implementing competition policies as well as 
coordinating with the same bodies in eliminating practices that hinder competition.821 The 
Ministry is also tasked with preparing notification and application forms as well as a 
register for notifications and complaints.822 According to Article 14 paragraph 4, the 
Ministry will also be required to investigate the information and activities that violate 
competition by itself or based on a complaint and subsequently make recommendations to 
the minister for an appropriate resolution.823 It is the responsibility of the Ministry to carry 
out studies on the competition situation in the UAE market and issue reports to the public 
concerning its findings.824 The Ministry is tasked to receive applications of reconsideration 
“in relation to Resolutions issued in accordance with this law and take necessary 
procedures in this respect.”825 
Since notifications on economic concentration aspects - such as restrictive 
agreements, mergers and dominant position - are made to the Ministry, it is responsible for 
following up on these notifications, and recommending amendments where necessary.826 
The Ministry is allowed the use of external experts or consultants in order to accomplish 
any activity which lies under its responsibilities. Paragraph 9 of Article 14 mandates the 
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Ministry to coordinate with state bodies in other states with a view to serving the purposes 
of the competition law. The Ministry is also tasked with the formulation of measures for 
the promotion and enhancement of a culture of competition within the UAE.827 In addition, 
the Ministry is supposed to conduct the activities of the Committee’s Executive 
Secretariat.828 Lastly, the Ministry can perform any other task related to competition 
referred to it by the Cabinet.829 Article 15 requires the Ministry and the Committee to 
exercise utmost confidentiality as far as the information provided to them by business firms 
is concerned.830 This means they should not disclose any details they may have learned 
about the firms to any person, body or entity unless they have been authorised to do so. 
6.3.1.3 The Role of the Minister 
Article 8 grants the Minister of Economy (hereinafter referred to as the minister) 
various powers and responsibilities.831 The minister exercises the powers through the 
issuance of resolutions. The minister issues resolutions approving/disapproving mergers 
and acquisitions deals in relation to their level of conformity with the competition law (the 
approval can be issued within 90 to 135 days). It is the same minister who issues resolutions 
for exemption of merging firms whose mergers exceed the market share percentage 
approved by the Cabinet. 
 Conversely, the minister has the power to issue a resolution revoking the approval 
of merger or acquisition in three particular cases. First, he can revoke the merger upon the 
discovery of misleading information upon which the approval was issued. Second, the 
minister can revoke a merger approval if the enterprises concerned are unable to meet the 
conditions attached to the approval. Finally, the minister will revoke the merger upon the 
discovery that the circumstances under which the approval was issued no longer exist. 
Although the percentage of the market share which a merged enterprise may control is set 
by the Cabinet, the competition law gives the minister the power to recommend to the same 
Cabinet a decrease or increase of this percentage (Article 5 paragraph 3). The minister’s 
recommendation to the Cabinet for an increase or decrease of the percentage should be 
based on the country’s prevailing economic situation. 
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6.3.1.4 Block Exemptions 
Developed and developing countries that have passed competition laws are mindful 
of the effects such laws would have on certain sectors of their economies. Governments 
try to mitigate these effects by including exemption clauses in their competition legislation. 
Exemptions, in the context of competition law policy, are understood to be those industries, 
activities and sectors of the economy which are excused or freed from the obligations that 
are imposed on others.832 It follows, then, that block exemptions can be defined as freeing 
of large enterprises or group of businesses from obligations imposed by competition laws 
on other industries or sectors. Most exemption clauses in various competition laws are 
granted to state-owned or state-controlled enterprises. Certain mergers and acquisition 
agreements as well as dominant market players can be accorded exemptions if they serve 
a greater economic purpose or contribute to the enhancement of competition.833 
Exemptions in the EU competition regime are contained in Article 101 (3). There are 
several regulations passed by the EU with regard to block exemptions, especially on 
vertical exemptions.834 
Like any other competition jurisdiction, the UAE’s competition law provides for 
exemptions of certain sectors of the economy. Most of the exempted sectors are state-run 
and they include the postal services and telecommunications, gas and petroleum, land, sea 
as well as air transport sector. These could be termed block exemptions because they 
involve entire industries/sectors. Additionally, Article 4 exempts several activities, which 
include activities involved with the production and distribution of power/energy, cultural 
activities (written, audio and visual), drainage, waste disposal and sanitation.835 Production 
and distribution of pharmaceuticals are also exempted. It is noteworthy that the exempted 
sectors are regulated by other laws and regulations. SMEs are also exempted, though what 
constitutes SMEs is yet to be known.  
It could be suggested that unforeseen opening up of the market could prove 
detrimental to the indigenous players in an economy. Therefore, some might suggest that 
the exemptions are better to ensure that indigenous market players are not eliminated from 
the market by international market players. The UAE has learned from the experiences of 
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its neighbours, such as Bahrain which opened up her telecommunications sector only to 
have international giants edge out home grown telecommunications companies. As the 
official put it, “ ...Today they have Vodafone...”836 Therefore, one of the major reasons for 
the exemptions in the competition law is the protection of home grown companies. For 
example, exemption of the telecommunications sector in the UAE will allow the country’s 
communications firm, Etisalat, to grow so that it can withstand competition from global 
communications giants like Vodafone, Deutsche or Orange. Besides, government –
controlled enterprises like Etisalat and the oil companies invest in areas which are high 
risk in terms of revenue. In other words, they invest in areas which do not guarantee returns, 
therefore it is only fair that they are excluded from the application of the competition 
law.837 A good example would be the order by the government for Etisalat to provide 
mobile network coverage for the whole of the UAE notwithstanding the areas which are 
unpopulated. The unpopulated areas do not guarantee any returns for Etisalat. Private 
communications providers would be reluctant to invest in such areas and that is why they 
might not be granted exemptions. 
6.3.1.5 Penalties 
Business owners as well those who aspire to set up businesses in the UAE must 
beware of the provisions of UAE competition law and the significant penalties it proposes 
for violators of these provisions. Article 16 of this Law imposes a fine of no less than 
United Arab Emirates Dirham (AED) 500,000 and no more than AED 5,000,000 for firms 
that enter into restrictive agreements and those that abuse their dominant position (as 
provided for under Articles 5 and 6).838 
Violation of Article 9 (inappropriate entry into an economic concentration activity 
like merger and acquisition) will attract fines amounting to a minimum of 2 percent and a 
maximum of 5 percent of the firms’ annual revenue. This is provided for under Article 17 
of the Competition Law.839 Alternatively, the violators will be forced to pay a fine no less 
than AED 500,000 and not exceeding AED 5,000,000 if it proves difficult to ascertain the 
violators’ annual revenue.840 
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Article 10 Paragraph 2 prohibits enterprises from implementing deals involving any 
economic concentration activity when the same deals are awaiting a resolution by the 
minister. According to Article 18, establishments implicated in such a violation will face 
a penalty of a fine no less than AED 50,000 and not exceeding AED 500,000.841 Further, 
Article 15 provides for the information provided to the Ministry by business enterprises to 
be treated with utmost confidentiality. Failure by any person to observe the provisions of 
this Article will attract a fine of no less than AED 50,000 and no more than AED 200,000 
(Article 19).842 Pursuant to Article 20, anyone found to be in violation of the rest of the 
provisions of the competition law will be fined no less than AED 10,000 and no more than 
AED 100,000. Article 21 provides that a repeat offender in the context of the competition 
law will be fined double the recommended fine.843 Under Article 22, an enterprise may be 
ordered to close down by a court for a period of no less than 3 months and not exceeding 
6 months. On the other hand, all the laws governing competition in the EU are based on 
the provisions of Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU. The ultimate penalty that can be 
imposed on any violation of the EU competition rules is an outright nullity of the 
agreements in question.844 
6.3.1.6 Critical Analysis 
It is obvious that the Committee under UAE competition law deals with competition 
cases as an advisory body, unlike most of the committees in different countries which 
function as administrative bodies, such the EU Commission. It is the Ministry of Economy 
that is entitled to the role of administrative body. However, under this section the role of 
each authority will be critically analysed. 
It should be noted that the Committee is not a completely independent body, whereas 
the case is different in the EU as the members of the Commission are independent. The 
UAE competition law empowers the Ministry of Economy with the role of supervision 
over the Committee. For example, part of the Committee’s duties is to refer to the Minister 
of Economy regarding different matters such as the annual report of its activities.  
It should be noticed that the Committee is chaired by the Deputy Minister of 
Economy. It is doubtful that there would be no influence from the Ministry of Economy, 
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especially by the minister, on the performance of the Committee regarding its duties. Thus, 
the Ministry of Economy and the minister have a controlling influence over policy and 
enforcement of the competition law. It could be proposed that the Committee should be 
independent from the influence of any party or authority. Having a look at the UAE 
competition statute one might notice that the Committee is not independent, either 
financially or administratively. It is expected that the Committee will be located within the 
Ministry of Economy due to their overlapping duties. Thus one might suggest that it is 
desirable to grant the Committee its independence. 
These factors lead to the suggestion that the Committee should seek to attain actual 
independence. According to Dabbah, the lack of independence would obstruct the effective 
power of competition authorities in order to proceed with investigations or make decisions 
in competition cases.845 The Committee should also be empowered with the authority to 
enforce the law, which entitles it to the ability to investigate and make decisions against 
violators. In my view, not only achieving the independence, but also the Committee should 
be linked to the Cabinet like other competition committees in the region, such as the 
Egyptian Committee.846 
With regard to the Committee’s membership, according to law the Committee is 
headed by the Deputy Minister of Economy. However, the law does not state the number 
of members or the criteria for selecting such members. It is the Cabinet which is 
empowered to determine the composition of the Committee (including the number of 
members), regulation, duration of membership and the member’s reward. Some issues 
should be taken into consideration when forming the Committee. First, the members should 
be independent from any influence, whether government or private sector. The 
effectiveness of the Committee could be hindered in cases where there was any influence 
on the members. The members should be selected from different fields and sectors of the 
economy (public, private, legal, economist, etc.)  
Second, the selection of members should be in accordance with their capability to 
perform. This means that all members have to have sufficient knowledge and experience 
in the competition law field and its application in practice. Ignoring that fact could lead to 
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inefficiency in the law’s implementation, whether by the Committee (as it is suggested) or 
by the actual enforcing authority (the Ministry).  
From the above, it could be said that the Committee has no influence on competition 
law enforcement, and the authorities should reconsider its duties and responsibilities. 
Granting it independence and selecting the members in accordance with their capacity to 
perform would make its work more effective since there would be no influence on the 
members such as there is now.  
According to the law, the Ministry shall undertake the enforcement of this law with 
the relevant authorities in the country. It is obvious that the Ministry has been entrusted 
with greater authority than the Committee has. According to Article 14 (11), the Ministry 
is entitled to act as the Executive Secretariat of the Committee. This clearly shows that the 
Committee is not an independent authority and shows a lack in the structural and 
enforcement mechanism. 
The law does not state the responsibilities, criteria or the procedures that the Ministry 
would follow when acting as Committees Executive Secretariat. It might be best to 
establish a General Secretariat under the authority of the Committee after granting it its 
independence. This would make the Committee’s work easier and more effective, not 
answering to any other authority, which might hinder its abilities to perform its duties. 
Although the Ministry is tasked to enforce the law, the competition law does not 
mention anything in regards to the enforcement mechanism, nor are there any guidelines 
issued to clarify this matter. It is hoped that the implementing regulation will include clear 
guidelines for an effective enforcement mechanism. The absence of such guidelines would 
lead to biased and unreliable judgments. Such guidelines should include the rules of 
enforcing the law that comprise all types of prohibition in competition law, such as 
enforcement, mergers, abuse of dominant position and anti-competitive agreements. 
One more issue that could be noticed is the Committee’s and Ministry’s assessment 
roles. The law does not state what authority is responsible for assessing Committees’ work. 
However, the Committee has to prepare annual reports on its activities and submit it to the 
Minister. Also, the Ministry has the role of supervising the Committee. Thus, it is assumed 
that the Ministry and, consequently, the minister has the role of assessing the Committee. 
This is another negative point and, as a suggestion, the Committee should be independent 
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from the Ministry of Economy. Since the Committee is headed by the Deputy Minister of 
Economy, there are great possibilities that their work will be influenced by the Ministry of 
Economy and the minister. In addition, the law does not state who would assess the 
enforcer’s (represented in the Ministry) work. However, it is assumed that the Cabinet is 
entitled such a task, since the Ministry reports to the Cabinet. 
Another issue which could be found with the enforcement system is the way that the 
minister functions under the law. First, there is the very long period (of up to 135 days) to 
scrutinise, approve or disapprove an application of anti-competitive agreement, or merger 
or acquisition deal. It normally takes 90 days, which could be extended to another 45 days. 
As was discussed earlier, this is too much time wasted and undertakings and businesses 
cannot afford it. It might lead to negative effects on their performance, which might 
negatively affect the economy. In addition, it is possible that this may lead to the creation 
of a backlog of applications in the minister’s office. Such a mechanism has been tested 
earlier in the EU, where it did not succeed and proved inefficient.847 
With regard to block exemptions, it would be desirable not to exclude certain sectors 
from the application of this law. Instead of exempting sectors, the UAE should learn from 
the advanced competition systems, such as that of the EU, and follow its method of 
exemption of certain activities. It could be suggested that anticompetitive behaviours such 
as monopoly, oligopoly, and abuse of dominant position could legally exist in case of 
excluding many sector, which will have a harmful effect on the economy. Instead of 
fighting anti-competitive behaviour, the law would be protecting it. 
With regard to penalties, the law only states one type of penalty, which is a financial 
penalty. The law does not include any imprisonment sanctions. Big corporations aim to 
dominate the market and eliminate the SMEs so that they can gain the most profit. 
Adopting harsher sanctions will ensure fair competition and enhance the market.  
In addition, it could be desirable to include imprisonment sanctions in the 
competition law for some cases, such as the violation of Article 15. The violation of Article 
15 might lead to serious damage to the commercial interests of business institutions or 
owners or might be incompatible with public interest. It should be noted that any person 
who discloses such information might aim to get benefit from that behaviour, thus 
                     
847 Bryceland M. & Singh. M. Op. cit. 
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implementing harsher sanctions would deter them from such conduct. 
Some remarks can be made on looking at the penalty system. First, the Ministry has 
competence in the cases that concern the violation of competition law only and does not 
apply any criminal sanctions. Second, the penalty system does not include punishments for 
violating the law, such as cartel arrangements and criminal offences. 
It should be noted that private enforcement is stated in the competition law. Article 
23 (2) grants any party who has suffered any damaged due to a violation of any provision 
of this law to seek compensation from the court. This is what is known as ‘private 
enforcement’. In the UAE’s legal system, compensations by persons may be claimed 
before the Civil Court, and by any company before the Commercial Court. 
Although private enforcement is an important element in competition law, some 
issues may arise. Firstly, the law does not mention any details regarding the level or type 
of compensation. Second, the law does not state whether it is mandatory to acquire any 
evidence from the Ministry (competition law enforcer) before seeking for compensation 
before the court. 
Such issues have been criticised by Dabbah as he states that: such a provision 
provides for a small window for the actions of private enforcement “to be brought before 
the courts” seeking compensation in circumstances where a person suffers from damage 
because of law violation.848 
6.4 Conclusion 
Competition law enforcement is a critical matter. It ensures the protection from anti-
competitive practices in the market, not only by having a strong legal system, but also by 
ensuring that the concerned law includes the necessary provisions and rules for such 
prohibitions. 
The UAE competition law aims to enforce competition rules in the commercial 
market in order to prevent anti-competitive agreements and establish a competitive market. 
The Competition Regulation Council was created in order to perform some duties, aiming 
to fulfil the main object of enforcement. However, the main responsibility of enforcing the 
law is not entrusted to the Committee but to the Ministry of Economy. The role of the 
                     
848 Dabbah, M. Competition Law and Policy in the Middle East. Op. cit. p. 205. 
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Committee is more one of advising the Minister of Economy on the cases of anti-
competitive practices and proposing policies and legislation aimed at safeguarding 
competition in the country.  
Moreover, the law states that the Cabinet shall issue a resolution on the formation of 
the Committee specifying its duration of membership, regulation and members’ awards. 
The Cabinet has not issued any resolution yet although the law states that it must be issued 
within 6 months of the application of the law.849 The criteria of members’ selection should 
be clear. It is suggested that the members should be selected according to their capacity to 
perform. This means that they should have adequate knowledge and experience regarding 
commercial and legal fields. Also, they should be independent from any influence, whether 
from the public or private sectors, ensuring the effectiveness of performing their duties. 
On the other hand, the Ministry is tasked to enforce the competition law. It should 
be noted that the Ministry acts as an Executive Secretariat of the Committee. It is the 
Ministry’s responsibility to launch an investigation and seek information regarding any 
anti-competitive practices, whether by itself or upon a complaint and confront such 
practices with the authorities. Also, the law grants the minister many powers, such as the 
approval or disapproval of merger and the acquisition or anti-competitive contracts. One 
can notice that the Committee has no independence from the Ministry, which might affect 
its performance. It is believed that the lack of independence may lead to hindering the 
power of the competition law enforcer’s authority to make decisions on anti-competitive 
cases or proceed with investigations. 
The guidelines on enforcing the competition law are not indicated in the law. 
However, the Implementing Regulation should include such guidelines specifying the 
power and responsibilities that the Ministry is entitled, such as investigations and evidence 
collection, whether when initiating or post investigation. Also, the criteria, responsibilities 
and procedures the Ministry shall follow acting as the Executive Secretariat of the 
Committee are not stated in the law. Maybe it is better that this role is transferred to the 
Committee, after granting it the required independence, through establishing a General 
Secretariat under its authority. 
It should be noted that the law does not mention what authority would assess the role 
                     
849 Article 32, UAE Federal Law No. 4 of 2012 Concerning Regulating Competition. 
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of the Committee or the Ministry. However, from the responsibilities of the Committee, it 
could be the Ministry of Economy which would assess the Committee’s work, since the 
Committee has to submit an annual report to the minister, and one of the Ministry’s 
responsibilities is supervision over the Committee. In addition, since the Ministry reports 
to the Cabinet, it is expected that the Cabinet is entrusted with that responsibility. 
The time that the minister takes to review and investigate the applications of mergers 
and restrictive agreements is too long compared to a similar mechanism in the EU. It might 
negatively affect the performance of the businesses waiting for the decision, and might 
create a backlog in the minister’s office. The Government should learn from the experience 
of the EU Commission, as it has tested such a method and it proved inefficient. 
With regard to the block exemptions, it is preferable that the Government also learn 
from the EU competition system through reconsidering the block exemptions. Instead of 
exempting certain sectors, the UAE Government should exempt certain activities, just as 
the EU does. 
With regard to penalties, there is only one type of punishment available in the 
competition law. The law states financial penalties and disregards criminal sanctions. 
Including criminal sanctions in some cases would give effectiveness to the enforcement 
mechanism. In addition, the law is silent regarding the punishments for violations of a 
criminal nature.  
It is suggested that the UAE should adopt a ‘leniency programme’ which aims at 
encouraging the violators of the law to submit information to the authorities in regard to 
their violation. A leniency programme is a method which grants the violators of 
competition law immunity from imposing fines on them or reducing the amount of fines if 
they report their anti-competitive practices to the authorities. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion and 
Recommendations 
7.1 Conclusion 
This chapter summarises the findings and conclusions shown in the preceding 
chapters. This chapter concludes with the findings of this research outlining the major 
contributions of the study and attempts to suggest some implications for reforming 
competition legislation and enhancing the enforcement mechanisms in the UAE. 
Competition law has become a major instrument to regulate competition and prevent 
anti-competitive practices in the market. The many schools of thought and theories are 
aimed at establishing a strong method in order to enhance competitive practices. However, 
different competition regimes with different concepts exist due to the different factors in 
each country, such as economic factors. Nonetheless, most competition laws address the 
same issues, such as mergers control, abuse of dominant position and restrictive 
agreements. 
Despite the arguments against the adoption of competition law, many benefits can 
be achieved through the proper implementation of competition law. Sustainable economic 
growth can be accomplished through the right implementation of competition law ensuring 
fairness in competition between undertakings and preventing monopolies and cartels. 
Enhancing competitiveness in the market through eliminating the harmful practices of 
international cartels is what competition aims for. 
However, to achieve such goals, effective implementation of competition law is 
necessary, which depends on the capacity of jurisdiction to handle the implementation. The 
benefits of competition could be drawn from the effective enforcement of competition law, 
which implies the need for an independent judiciary system.  
Since the independence of the UAE, different fields and sectors have witnessed 
several developments, especially the economic and legal sectors. Such developments 
require that laws should be adequate and suitable for the whole environment. 
The country was facing many challenges from anti-competitive practices in the 
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economic sector before the adoption of competition law. Even though some legislation 
included some articles to tackle anti-competitive behaviour, it was inadequate and there 
was an inadequate enforcement mechanism.  
The UAE has adopted its first competition law represented in Federal Law No. 4 of 
2012 Concerning Regulation of Competition to be enforced from 23rd February 2013. 
However, the law allows the concerning parties in the market a period of up to six months 
to adjust their operations accordingly. The law seems to be fresh and has not been tested 
yet.  
One can notice that Shari’ah principles have influenced the legal system in the UAE 
but, still, the core law codes are civil ones. However, there was no influence on the 
implementation of the competition law. Noticeably, Shari’ah principles deal with 
regulation of competition in the market by prohibiting anti-competitive practices such as 
monopolies, price fixing, exclusive agreements, and harming other individuals. The 
ignorance of Shari’ah principles in the process of developing a modern competition law 
led to legal monopolies by undertakings that abuse their market rights.  
On the other hand, regarding the EU’s competition law, it is evident that the 
Ordoliberal approach has deep roots in the origins of the law. However, it is debatable to 
what extent this approach has influenced the enactment of the law. There is no obligation 
on the European Courts or the Commission to follow this approach. Besides, the 
Commission has adopted a more-economic approach not linked to the Ordoliberal 
approach. 
With regard to the scope of the competition law, both the UAE and EU competition 
laws deal with anti-competitive practices. There are some similarities as both laws cover 
all commercial entities in and outside their territories. However, there are some differences 
in the scope. The scope of the EU law is quite a lot broader than the UAE’s scope. The 
UAE law regarding restrictive agreements is very specific. The UAE competition law 
grants larger exemption than the EU law. Whereas only certain activities are exempted 
under the EU law, many major sectors and activities are exempted under the UAE law. 
The UAE law does not grant the authority to issue block exemptions for some types of 
agreements like the EU law does. Mergers control is regulated differently in the UAE. The 
merger parties have to submit a merger application before the merger, whereas the case is 
different in the EU. Where the EU law prohibits state aid, the UAE does not prohibit state 
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aid since many undertakings are state-owned or run by federal or local authorities. 
After examining the UAE competition law and comparing it to the EU law, several 
issues have been revealed which are divided into the following categories. 
Anti-competitive Agreements and Abuse of Dominant Position 
Several issues have been revealed in Chapter Six concerning anti-competitive 
agreements and dominant position, as follows: 
A. The UAE’s competition law does not regulate the associations of undertakings, 
whereas the situation is the opposite in the EU. The associations of undertakings are 
regulated under the rules of the UAE Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry. 
The competition law does not extend its rules for agreements under the rule of the 
Federation of Chambers. 
B. It has been agreed that concerted practices are likely to cause damage to an 
economy and thus should be banned. While the EU regulates concerted practices under the 
EU’s competition law, such practices are not regulated under the UAE’s competition law. 
C. While the EU competition law includes guidelines for the criteria of assessing anti-
competitive agreements or abuse of dominant position, such guidelines are not provided 
under the UAE competition law. The absence of such an approach and guidelines 
underlines the insufficiency and inefficiency in the enforcement policy. 
D. Unlike the EU competition law, which stresses the voiding of anti-competitive 
agreements, the UAE competition law does not include similar rules. This indicates a 
defect in the law where the undertakings might still benefit from the results of their unfair 
practices and arrangements. 
E. The method that the UAE competition law provides to scrutinise an application of 
exempting an anti-competitive agreement or abuse of a dominant position has been proven 
inefficient in other jurisdictions. The period that the minister takes to investigate and decide 
on an application for exempting an anti-competitive agreement or abuse of dominant 
position from the application of the law is too long. It is a waste of time and might harm 
businesses, and create a blockage of applications in his office. 
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F. The authority of the Ministry to exempt any anti-competitive agreement or abuse 
of dominant position from the application of the law could lead to a problem. The Ministry 
could exempt any anti-competitive agreement even if it was expected to eliminate 
competition in the market. 
G. The UAE competition law provides exemptions for “weak-impact agreement” 
which is not as strong as the EU competition law. 
H. Price fixing by cartel arrangement is one of the most harmful violations in the UAE 
market. However, there is no criminal offence provided under the UAE competition law 
regarding cartel arrangements. 
I. While other jurisdictions follow the per se and rule of reason approaches, it is 
unclear which approach the UAE enforcement authorities will adopt to apply on bid-
rigging, predatory prices, price fixing or market sharing. 
J. While dominant position is not prohibited per se under the UAE’s competition law, 
the abuse of such a position is prohibited. However, the law does not define the meaning 
of abuse of dominant position. 
K. The law provides that the Cabinet is to decide the percentage of market share for 
an undertaking to be considered abusing its dominant position; however, there are no 
criteria or guidelines for this. 
L. Abuse of dominant position is prohibited under the EU law and it does not grant 
any exemptions. However, such an anti-competitive practice can be exempted under the 
UAE competition law. The problem that may arise is that there is no justification provided 
for such abuse of dominance. 
Control of Mergers 
Chapter Seven revealed several issues concerning control of mergers and 
acquisitions, as follows: 
A. It takes too long to examine and evaluate the applications of mergers and 
acquisitions. While the EU Commission takes 5 weeks (could be extended for another 2 
weeks), the process takes 3-4 months (might be extended for another 45 days). 
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B. Unlike the EU competition law, the UAE competition law does not provide any 
guidelines for remedies (structural or behavioural) granted to non-confirming mergers or 
acquisitions. It is left solely up to the wisdom of the Minister of Economy. 
 
C. The competition law does allow mergers or acquisitions that would enhance the 
economy even if they are likely to harm competition. However, the criteria or assessment 
has not been provided in the law. It only looks at the positive impact on the economy. 
Allowing such mergers or acquisitions would create a dominant position that is likely to 
eliminate competition in the market. 
D. The EU competition law provides definitions for horizontal and non-horizontal 
mergers. On the other hand, neither types are covered under the UAE competition law. 
Elaborating such a type will determine what will be prohibited under the law and thus make 
the enforcement system more efficient. 
State Aid 
The following are the issues that were revealed from Chapter Seven regarding state 
aid. 
A. State aid is prohibited under the EU law; however, some exclusions are provided 
under certain guidelines. On the other hand, the UAE competition law does not prohibit 
state aid. 
B. EU competition law allows for state aid if the reason is to correct market failures. 
This is not taken into consideration by the UAE competition law since the act itself is not 
prohibited. 
C. The UAE competition law does not provide any rules on what constitutes state aid 
to undertakings nor the criteria of dealing with such state aid. 
Enforcement: 
Chapter Eight has elaborated some major issues related to the enforcement system: 
A. The Committee does not deal with competition cases as an administrative but as an 
advisory body. Besides, the Committee is not completely an independent body as the 
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Ministry of Economy has the power to supervise the Committee. In addition, the 
Committee is chaired by the Deputy Minister. There might be a negative influence on the 
performance of the Committee. 
B. While the Cabinet is authorised to set up the Committee, the law does not provide 
the number of Committee members nor criteria for their selection. 
C. According to the law, the Ministry should act as the Executive Secretariat of the 
Committee. The criteria, responsibilities and procedures of such authority are not provided 
under the law. 
D. The criteria and guidelines for the enforcement mechanism are ambiguous and not 
included under the law, which could lead to unfair and inconsistent judgments. 
E. The exemptions that are provided under the law are far too general. It is preferable 
that the UAE follow the EU model and applies the exemptions to certain activities instead 
of excluding major sectors. 
F. The UAE competition law provides financial punishments for violating the law. 
However, criminal punishments are not included. Including such punishments would 
insure that markets are working in fair conditions. 
G. Unlike the EU competition law, the UAE law does not provide any leniency 
programme. 
One of the issues that faces the enforcement of competition law is the lack of 
competition culture among the different market parties, such as firms and consumers. This 
is one of the issues that faces the enforcement system in the UAE. Normally, firms will 
tend to avoid taking any legal action against larger corporations, which are mainly owned 
by the government, or in which the government has a majority share. In addition, 
consumers assume that the government ought to take action against violators. 
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7.2 Recommendations 
Based on the observations from this research, this research concludes with some 
recommendations for reform of the UAE competition law. The recommendations are based 
on a critical examination and evaluation of the UAE competition law and a comparison 
with the EU competition law. Some of the recommendations have been proposed and 
discussed in the previous chapters, and are collected and summarised here for convenience. 
The recommendations are divided into the following categories: 
Recommendations regarding the general competition policy: 
A. The government should open its market and reduce the entry barriers to a certain 
extent that would enhance competition. Ignoring this would allow the existing monopolies 
to continue in the market, which would harm competition and lead to a rise in prices. 
B. The competition policy should include the exempted sectors to be regulated under 
the competition law and instead allow exemptions for certain activities (such as block 
exemptions in the EU competition law). This will lead to fair competition in the market 
through opening up the exempted sectors, which will lead to eliminating anti-competitive 
behaviour. 
C. The federal and locally owned undertakings should be regulated under the 
competition law. Such exemption should be repealed. Doing that would allow fair 
competition as all commercial entities would be responsible before the law.   
Anti-competitive Agreements and Abuse of Dominant Position 
A. The UAE’s competition law should regulate the practices of associations of 
undertakings. It is known that associations of undertakings are official trade bodies in 
which undertakings meet and make agreements. Such agreements, such as price fixing, 
might harm competition. Thus, regulating such practices will ensure that competition is 
not hampered in the market. 
B. The law should include provisions to regulate concerted practices since they are 
considered as one of the types of anti-competitive practice. This is a gap in the current law 
which should be avoided to include provisions and prohibit all anti-competitive practices. 
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C. The guidelines for assessing anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominant 
position are not provided under the competition law. However, this could be managed 
through including such guidelines in the implementing regulations that are expected to be 
issued late in 2013, which will enhance the enforcement mechanism. 
D. The competition law should follow the advanced competition models (such as the 
EU) in the voiding of anti-competitive agreements that violate the law. It should clearly 
state that any anti-competitive agreement that violates Article 5 shall be void. This means 
that the law will ban the entities from benefiting from the outcomes of their anti-
competitive practices or agreements. 
E. The competition law should learn from the experiences of the advanced 
competition policies, such as the EU model. The period that the minister takes to scrutinise 
applications for anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominant position exemptions 
are far too long. Following more advanced models will enhance the competition policy and 
its enforcement mechanism. 
F. Cartels are a very serious violation under the category of anti-competitive 
agreements. Allowing cartels will allow anti-competitive practices such as price fixing to 
exist in the market which will harm competition. Imposing criminal offences will deter 
such violations, which will be a significant enhancement in the law. 
G. The law or the upcoming implementing regulations should provide a definition of 
abuse of dominant position. In addition, the criteria for determining the percentage of 
market share for an undertaking to be considered abusing its dominant position should be 
included. Such definition and criteria will enhance the law and its enforcement system. 
H. The UAE Government should learn from the experience of other jurisdictions, such 
as the EU, and not allow any exemptions for abuse of dominant position from the 
application of competition law provided under Article 6.  
Control of Mergers  
A. The period of approving or disapproving a merger or acquisition application should 
be less. The UAE can learn from the EU system for example and follow a similar method 
in Phase 1. This will accelerate the process and will prevent any backlog in the minister’s 
office.  
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B. The law allows for mergers and acquisitions that have a positive impact on the 
economy even if they lessen competition. However, the law does not state the assessment 
criteria for a positive impact on the economy. The law should spell out the guidelines for 
assessing this positive impact. 
C. The law provides that mergers or acquisitions are not illegal if they have negative 
effects on the competition process but at the same time enhance the economy. This could 
be interpreted as allowing for the creation of a dominant position and abuse of that position, 
which will definitely have a negative impact on competition, in case it leads to improving 
the economy. This must be modified so that mergers are not allowed to abuse their 
dominant position, and their operations should be prohibited if they cause significant 
lessening of competition. 
D. The law does not provide any guidelines for remedial actions. The law or its 
implementing regulations should include such guidelines. For example, the law should 
state that, in case of refusing an application, the merger should be void and must return to 
the previous situation. Not explicating this might create an issue as the merging 
undertakings would take an advantage from the results of their illegal merger. 
E. The law should include provisions for horizontal and non-horizontal mergers and 
provide definitions for both of them. This will allow for determining what type of merger 
is prohibited under law and at the same time will enhance the enforcement system. 
State Aid 
A. The law should provide rules on what constitutes state aid to undertakings and 
provide guidelines for whom and the way that state aid is provided. 
B. Commercial state-owned entities should not benefit from state aid. This might have 
a negative effect on competition through favouring one party over another, which in the 
end will eliminate the other party. State aid should be regulated and strict to a limit that it 
does not have negative effects on competition and has a positive impact on the economy. 
C. State aid should be allowed in case of correcting market failure. This will have a 
positive impact on the economy. 
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Enforcement 
A. The Committee should be granted its independence and work as an administrative 
body and enforce the competition law. It should be authorised to deal with competition 
cases and take decisions against violators. The Committee should be referred to the Cabinet 
instead of the Ministry of Economy. This will ensure the effectiveness of the enforcement 
mechanism and eliminate any negative influence from any entity or individual. 
B. The law or its implementing regulation should include the criteria and guidelines 
for establishing the Committee. For example, the number of members, the period of 
membership, and the criteria of selecting members. The members should be experts and 
have qualifications in the field of competition law. 
C. Instead of granting the Ministry of Economy the powers of Executive Secretariat, 
this authority should be transferred to the Committee after granting it its independence. It 
is best to learn from the experiences of developed competition systems and establish a 
General Secretariat under the authority of the Committee. This will lead to a faster and 
more effective enforcement system. 
D. The law or its implementing regulations should include clear guidelines for the 
enforcement mechanism to avoid any unfair and inconsistent judgments. 
E. The law should be applicable to all sectors and not exempt any of them. Only 
certain activities should be excluded through providing clear criteria of exemptions. 
F. The penalties mechanism should be modified to include criminal offences for the 
formation and operation of cartels, such as imprisonment. 
G. The law should adopt a leniency programme that will encourage the violators of 
the law to report their violations to the authorities in order to reduce the fine or exempt 
them from it. 
7.3 Further Research 
This research is the first of its kind to address competition law in the UAE. The 
findings of this research and the lack of research into competition law in the UAE raise 
many potential avenues for future research. This research has investigated all aspects of 
the UAE Competition Law and policy: control of anti-competitive agreements, control of 
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abuse of dominant position, control of mergers and acquisitions, state aid, and 
enforcement. It is suggested that each aspect can be a subject for further study and be 
separately examined in depth. 
The law is very new and has not been tested yet. Furthermore, there are no cases that 
deal with violations of competition law. This is one of the limitations of this research. Once 
the law is implemented, examining cases under the competition law in the future will be 
another area for further study. Such examination will result in suggestions for 
strengthening and enhancing the enforcement system.  
The implementing regulations have not come out yet. This is another area for further 
research. Examining the effectiveness and clarity of the guidelines of implementing 
regulations, once out, would result in further suggestions for the enhancement of the law 
and its enforcement mechanism. 
The comparison of the UAE’s competition law with other competition laws is 
another area for further study. This study has compared the UAE competition law with the 
EU competition law. However, further research can compare each aspect separately with 
the EU competition law or other laws. The comparison criteria could be of the laws of 
similar context such as the competition law of Saudi Arabia, or the laws of different context 
such as the US anti-trust laws. 
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Appendices 
 
Federal Law No. (4 ) of 2012 Concerning Regulating Competition 
 
We, Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the United Arab Emirates, 
After reviewing the Constitution; 
Federal Law No. 1 of 1972 concerning the responsibilities of Ministries and the powers of Ministers, as 
amended; 
Federal Law No. 5 of 1975 concerning the Commercial Register; 
Federal Law No. 4 of 1979 concerning the Suppression of Fraud and Deceit in Commercial Transactions; 
Federal Law No. 10 of 1980 concerning the Central Bank, Monetary System and the Organisation of Banking 
Profession, as amended; 
Federal Law No. 18 of 1981 concerning the Organisation of Commercial Agencies, as amended; 
Federal Law No. 8 of 1984 concerning Commercial Companies, as amended; 
Federal Law No. 9 of 1984 concerning Insurance Companies and Agents, as amended; 
Civil Transactions Law promulgated by the Federal Law No. 5 of 1985, as amended; 
Federal Law No. 6 of 1985 concerning Banks, Financial Institutions and Islamic Investment Companies, as 
amended; 
Penal Code promulgated by Federal Law No. 3 of 1987, as amended; 
Law of Evidence in Civil and Commercial Transactions promulgated by federal Law No. 10 of 1992, as 
amended; 
Civil Procedures Law promulgated by Federal Law No. 11 of 1992, as amended; 
Criminal Procedures Law promulgated by Federal Law No. 35 of 1992, as amended; 
Federal Law No. 37 of 1992 concerning Commercial Trademarks, as amended; 
Federal Law No. 9 of 1993 concerning control over trafficking of precious stones and metals and hallmarking 
them 
Commercial Transactions Law promulgated by Federal Law No. 18 of 1993, as amended; 
Federal Law No. 1 of the Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority, as amended; 
Federal Law No. 28 of 2001 on the Establishment of the Emirates Authority for Standardisation and 
Metrology; 
Federal Law No. 7 of 2002 concerning Author's Copyrights and Neighbouring Rights, as amended; 
Federal Law No. 17 of 2002 concerning the Organisation and Protection of the Industrial Ownership of 
Patents and Industrial Drawings and Designs, as amended; 
Federal Decree by Law No. 3 of 2003 concerning the Organisation of the Communication Sector, as 
amended; 
Federal Law No. 8 of 2004 concerning the Financial Free Zones; 
Federal Law No. 1 of 2006 concerning Electronic Transactions and Commerce; 
Federal Law No. 24 of 2006 concerning the Consumer Protection; and 
Federal Law No. 6 of 2007 concerning the Establishment of the Insurance Authority and the Organisation of 
Activities thereof; and 
Upon the proposal made by the Minister of Economy; 
The approval of the Cabinet and the Federal National Council; and 
The ratification by the Federal Supreme Council, 
Have issued the following Law: 
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Chapter I 
Article 1: Definitions 
 
In the application of the provisions of this Law, the following words and expressions shall have the meanings 
set out opposite to each of them, unless the context requires otherwise: 
State: United Arab Emirates. 
Ministry: Ministry of Economy. 
Minister: Minister of Economy. 
Concerned Authority: Competent local authority. 
Sectoral Regulatory Bodies: The federal or local authorities authorised under the regulation thereof to 
organise, control or supervise a certain economic sector in the State. 
Establishment: Any legal or natural person undertaking an economic activity, any related person or any 
consortium of such persons regardless of the legal form thereof. 
Relevant market: The commodity or service or the number of commodities or services upon whose price, 
characteristics and usage aspects shall be replaceable by others to meet a certain need of the consumer in a 
certain geographic area. 
Agreements: Agreements, contracts, arrangements, coalitions or practices between two establishments or 
more or any cooperation among establishments or resolutions issued by establishment consortiums whether 
they are written or oral, explicit or implicit or public or confidential. 
Dominant Position: The position that enables any establishment, by itself or in participation with some other 
establishments, from dominating or affecting the relevant market. 
Economic Concentration: Any behavior from which a total or partial alienation (merger or acquisition) of a 
property or usufruct of the properties, rights, stocks, shares or liabilities of an establishment to another 
establishment shall result and that may enable one establishment or a consortium of establishments from 
controlling, directly or indirectly, another establishment or a consortium of other establishments. 
Committee: Competition Regulation Committee formed in accordance with the provisions of this Law. 
 
 
Chapter II: Law Objectives 
Article 2 
 
This Law aims at the protection and enhancement of competition and the combat of monopoly practices 
through the following: 
1. Providing a stimulating environment for establishments in order to enhance efficiency, competitiveness 
and the interest of consumers and to achieve sustainable development in the State. 
2. Keeping a competitive market governed by the market mechanisms in accordance with the economic 
freedom principle through banning restrictive agreements, banning the business and actions that lead to the 
abuse of a dominant position, controlling the operations of economic concentration and avoiding all that may 
prejudice, limit or prevent competition. 
 
 
Chapter III: Law Enforcement 
Article 3 
 
The provisions of this Law shall be enforced on all establishments in relation to the economic activities 
thereof in the State and on the exploitation of the intellectual property rights in the State and abroad and such 
provisions shall also be enforced on the economic activities that are practised outside the State and that shall 
affect competition in the State. 
Chapter III: Law Enforcement 
Article 4 
 
The following shall be excluded from the execution of the provisions of this Law: 
1. Sectors and activities specified in the appendix attached to this Law and the Cabinet may delete or 
add any sectors or activities to such exclusions. 
2. Actions carried out by the Federal Government or any of the Emirates' Governments and actions 
initiated by establishments upon a Resolution or authorisation of the Federal Government or any of 
the Emirates' Governments or under the supervision of any thereof, including the actions of the 
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establishments owned or controlled by the Federal Government or any of the Emirates' 
Governments as per the guidelines specified by the cabinet.  
3. Small and medium establishments in accordance with the controls specified by the Cabinet. 
 
Chapter IV: Anti-competitive Practices 
Article 5: Restrictive Agreements 
 
1. Restrictive agreements between establishments with the subject or objective that shall prejudice, limit or 
prevent competition shall be prohibited, especially those targeting the following: 
a) Specifying the prices for buying or selling commodities and services, directly or indirectly, by 
creating the increase, decrease or stabilisation that may affect the competition negatively. 
 
b) Specifying the conditions of buying, selling or performing of services and the like. 
 
c) Colluding in tenders or offers in bids, tenders, practices and all supplying offers. 
 
d) Phasing out of the operations of production, development, distribution or marketing and all other 
aspects of investment or limiting them. 
 
e) Colluding to refuse  to buy from certain establishment or establishments or to sell to or supply 
certain establishment or establishments and to halt it or impede it from the practice of its activity.  
 
f) Limiting the freedom of commodities and services flow to the relevant market or withdrawing 
them from such market, which may include the concealment or storage thereof unlawfully, 
abstaining from dealing with such commodities or services or creating a sudden abundance 
thereof that may lead into the trade with such commodities and services with unreal prices. 
 
2. Subject to the provisions of the foregoing Federal Law No. 18 of 1981, restrictive agreements between 
establishments that may prejudice, limit or prevent competition shall be banned, especially those targeting 
the following: 
a) Dividing markets or assigning clients based on geographic areas, distribution centres, quality of 
clients, seasons and time periods or any other basis that may negatively affect competition. 
 
b) Taking procedures to hinder the entrance of establishments to the market, to exclude such 
establishment from the market or to hinder joining existing agreements or coalitions. 
 
3. In exception of paragraph 1/A and paragraph 2/A, the provisions of this Article shall not be enforced on 
weak-impact agreements in which the total share of establishments party thereto fail to exceed the percentage 
specified by the Cabinet of the total transactions in the relevant market. The Cabinet may, upon a proposal 
made by the Minister, increase or decrease such percentage in accordance with the requirements of the 
economic situation. 
 
Chapter IV: Anti-competitive Practices 
Article 6: Abuse of Dominant Position 
 
1. Any establishment of a dominant position in the relevant market or in a main and effective part 
thereof shall be prohibited from performing any actions that lead into the abuse of such position in 
order to prejudice, limit or prevent competition, especially such actions of the following subjects or 
objectives: 
a) Imposing the prices or conditions of reselling of commodities or services directly or 
indirectly. 
b) Selling a commodity or performing a service with a price less than the actual cost thereof 
with the aim of hindering competitive establishments from entering the relevant market, 
excluding them from such market or causing them losses that prevent them from 
continuing the activities thereof. 
c) Discriminating with no justification among clients in identical contracts in relation to the 
prices of commodities and services or the conditions of buying and selling contracts. 
d) Obliging a client not to deal with a competitive establishment. 
e) The total or partial rejection to deal in accordance with the usual commercial conditions. 
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f) Unjustified abstinence from dealing in commodities and services through buying or selling 
or limiting or hindering such dealing that may lead into imposing an unreal price thereof. 
g) Suspending the concluding of a buying or selling contract or agreement of commodities or 
services by the condition of accepting dealing obligations concerning other commodities 
or services that shall be, by nature or by commercial use, unrelated to the original location 
of dealing or to the agreement. 
h) Purposively publish incorrect information about the commodities or its prices. 
i) Decrease or increase the available supply of the commodity so as to create an artificial 
scarcity or abundance of the commodity. 
2. Dominant position, referred to in item (1) of this article when the total share of an establishment exceeds 
the percentage specified by the Cabinet of the total transactions in the relevant market. The Cabinet may, 
upon a proposal made by the Minister, increase or decrease such percentage in accordance with the 
requirements of the economic situation. 
 
 
 
Chapter IV: Anti-competitive Practices 
Article 7 
 
1. Restrictive agreements or practices related to a dominant position may be excluded from the application 
of the provisions of Articles 5 and 6 by a resolution of the Minister, issued upon the recommendation of the 
Committee, providing that: 
a) The concerned establishments shall notify the Ministry in advance by the ad hoc form and attaching 
the documents specified by the Executive Regulation of this Law. 
 
b) The concerned establishments shall prove that such restrictive agreements or practices related to a 
dominant position will lead to the enhancement of economic development, the improvement of the 
performance of the establishments and the competitive ability thereof, development of production 
or distribution systems or achievement of certain benefits for the consumer. 
 
c) The Ministry shall be notified of any potential amendments to the restrictive agreements or practices 
related to a dominant position, already exempted, before no less than 30 days of the execution of 
such amendments. 
 
2. The Executive Regulation of this Law shall specify the controls of notifications and the documents to be 
attached to the exception application. 
3. The Executive Regulation of this Law shall specify the organisational unit concerned with the execution 
of the provisions of this Law. 
 
Chapter IV: Anti-competitive Practices 
Article 8: Minister Resolutions 
 
1. The Minister shall issue the Resolution thereof referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 7 of this Law within 
90 days. Such period may be extended for other 45 days of the date of receiving the notification satisfying 
the required conditions. Failure to issue a Resolution of the Minister within such period shall be deemed as 
an implicit acceptance of such restrictive agreements or practices related to a dominant position. 
2. The Minister may approve temporarily and for a period of no more than 30 days to apply the restrictive 
agreements or practices related to a dominant position until the final Resolution thereof shall be issued 
concerning them. 
3. Upon finalising the formal examination of the application and the supporting documents thereof, the 
Ministry shall issue a notification of completing the formal requirements of the application. 
4. The Ministry shall examine the application form the evaluation the extent of satisfying the conditions 
stipulated by paragraphs 1/A-B of Article 7 of this Law by the establishments or agreements. 
5. The Minister may specify a period for the exemption issued by this Article or may subject it to periodic 
revision. 
6. The Minister may take a justified Resolution concerning the notifications submitted in accordance with 
the provisions of Article 7 of this Law as follows: 
a) Approval or rejection of  the continuation of enforcing restrictive agreements or practices related 
to a dominant position and the amendments thereof 
247 
 
 
b) Approving on the continuation of enforcing restrictive agreements or practices related to a 
dominant position and the amendments thereof, providing that the concerned establishments 
shall undertake to execute the conditions and obligations specified by the Minister for this 
purpose. 
 
7. The Minister may issue a Resolution on the revocation of the approval in any of the following cases: 
a) If it becomes apparent that the circumstances, under which the approval has been issued, no 
longer exist. 
 
b) If the concerned establishments failed in satisfying the conditions and requirements upon which 
they were granted the approval. 
 
c) If it becomes apparent that the information, under which the approval has been issued, were 
misleading or incorrect. 
 
 
Chapter V: Economic Concentration 
Article 9 
 
1. The accomplishment of the economic concentration operations wherein the total share of the 
establishments parties thereto exceeds the percentage specified by the Cabinet of the total 
transactions which may affect the level of competition in the relevant market, especially the creation 
or enhancement of a dominant position shall be conditioned by the submission of an application to 
the Ministry by the relevant establishments before 30 days at least of the accomplishment of such 
operations according to the ad hoc form and attachment of required documents. 
2. The Cabinet, upon a proposal made by the Minister, may increase or decrease the percentage of 
concentration stipulated by paragraph 1 of this Article in accordance with the requirements of the 
economic situation. 
3. The Executive Regulation of this Law shall specify the controls of applying for economic 
concentration and the documents to be attached to the application. 
 
 
Chapter V: Economic Concentration 
Article 10 
 
1. The Ministry shall verify the economic concentration operations referred to in Article 9 of this Law 
in accordance with the procedures specified by the Executive Regulation of this Law. 
2. The Minister shall issue the Resolution thereof referred to in Article 9 of this Law within 90 days 
that may be extended for other 45 days of the date of receiving the application satisfying all the 
required conditions. Relevant establishments should not perform, within such period, any actions 
or procedures for the accomplishment of the economic concentration. The failure to issue the 
Minister Resolution within such a period shall be deemed as an implicit acceptance of the economic 
concentration operations. 
3. The Ministry may require additional information in relation to the operation of economic 
concentration. 
 
 
Chapter V: Economic Concentration 
Article 11 
 
1. The Minister may take a justified Resolution concerning the applications submitted in accordance with the 
provisions of Articles 9 and 10 of this Law as follows: 
a) The approval of the economic concentration operation if it shall not affect competition 
negatively or if it shall have positive economic impact that exceed any negative impact on 
competition. 
 
b) The approval of the economic concentration operation, providing that the relevant 
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establishments shall undertake to execute the conditions and obligations specified by the 
Minister for such purpose. 
 
2. The Minister shall issue a Resolution on the revocation of the approval referred to in paragraph 1 of this 
Article in case of the realisation of any of the cases referred to in paragraph 7 of Article 8 of this Law. 
 
 
Chapter VI: Competition Regulation Committee 
Article 12 
A committee called “Competition Regulation Committee” shall be established in accordance with this Law. 
The Committee shall be chaired by the Deputy Minister of Economy. A Cabinet Resolution shall be issued 
forming the Committee and specifying its regulations, duration of membership therein and the member’s 
rewards. 
 
 
Chapter VI: Competition Regulation Committee 
Article 13 
 
The responsibilities of the Competition Regulation Committee shall be the following: 
1. The proposal of the general policy for the protection of competition in the State. 
2. The study of issues related to the execution of the provisions of this Law and the submission of 
recommendations in this respect to the Minister. 
3. The proposal of the legislations and procedures related to the protection of competition and the 
submission thereof to the Minister. 
4. The study of reconsideration applications for Resolutions issued by the Minister and submitted 
thereto within a period of no more than 10 days of the date of acknowledging the Resolution. 
5. The submission of recommendations to the Minister concerning the exception of restrictive 
agreements or practices related to a dominant position. 
6. Prepare an annual report on the Committee’s activities to be presented to the Minister. 
7. Any other issues related to competition protection referred thereto by the Federal Authorities or 
relevant authorities of the State. 
 
 
Chapter VII: The Responsibilities of the Ministry in the Domain of Competition 
Article 14 
 
The Ministry shall undertake the following responsibilities related to the competition affairs: 
1. The execution of competition policy in cooperation with the relevant authorities in the State. 
2. The coordination with the relevant authorities in the State to confront any form of activities or 
practices in violation of the provisions of this Law. 
3. The preparation of forms and applications related to the practice thereof of the tasks thereof and the 
assignment of a register for notifications and complaints. 
4. The investigation of information and such practices which breach competition upon a complaint or 
by itself and the confrontation of such practices in cooperation with the competent authorities and 
the submission of recommendations to the Minister concerning the Resolutions to be taken in this 
regard so that the Minister shall take suitable procedures in this respect. 
5. The receipt of reconsideration applications in relation to Resolutions issued in accordance with this 
law and take necessary procedures in this respect. 
6. The conduct of studies related to competition in the markets and the issuance of reports and 
provision of information to the public. 
7. The receipt and following-up of the notifications of restrictive agreements or practices related to a 
dominant position, the amendments thereof and economic concentration applications. 
8. The use of experts and consultants from outside of the Ministry for the achievement of any of the 
activities falling under the responsibilities thereof. 
9. The enhancement of the information exchange with the competition relevant authorities in other 
states with the aim of serving the purposes of this Law and the execution thereof. 
10. Take actions and measures to promote competition culture and free market principles 
11. The conduct of the activities of the Executive Secretariat of the Competition Regulation Committee. 
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12. Any other tasks related to competition referred thereto by the Minister. 
 
 
Chapter VII: The Responsibilities of the Ministry in the Domain of Competition 
Article 15 
 
1. The Ministry shall be committed in undertaking the tasks thereof to the following: 
a) Take sufficient procedures to ensure the confidentiality of information reviewed by the 
Ministry or provided thereto by the business institutions which the disclosure thereof may 
cause serious damage to the commercial interests of such business institutions or owners 
thereof or such information that contradicts with the public interest. 
b)  Not to disclose any information reviewed by the Ministry unless to the persons concerned 
or upon the request of the relevant authorities. 
2. The Committee shall adhere to the Ministry’s tasks indicated in this article. 
 
 
Chapter VIII: Penalties 
Article 16 
 
Whoever violates the provisions of Articles 5 and 6 of this Law shall be penalised by a fine of no less than 
AED 500,000 (five hundred thousand) and no more than AED 5,000,000 (five million) 
 
 
Chapter VIII: Penalties 
Article 17 
 
Whoever violates the provisions of Article 9 of this Law shall be penalised by a fine of no less than 2% and 
no more than 5% of the annual total sales of commodities or revenues of services, subject of the violation, 
realised by the violating establishment in the State within the last lapsed financial year or by a fine of no less 
than AED 500,000 (five hundred thousand) and no more than AED 5,000,000 (five million) if it shall be 
impossible to specify the total sales or revenues subject of the violation. 
 
 
Chapter VIII: Penalties 
Article 18 
 
Whoever violates the provisions of paragraphs 2  of Article 10 of this Law shall be penalised by a fine of no 
less than AED 50,000 (fifty thousand) and no more than AED 500,000 (five hundred thousand). 
 
 
Chapter VIII: Penalties 
Article 19 
 
Whoever violates the provisions of Article 15 of this Law shall be penalised by a fine of no less than AED 
50,000 (fifty thousand) and no more than AED 200,000 (two hundred thousand). 
 
 
Chapter VIII: Penalties 
Article 20 
 
Whoever violates any other provision of this Law and the Executive Regulation thereof shall be penalised 
by a fine of no more than AED 10,000 (ten thousand) and no more than AED 100,000 (one hundred 
thousand). 
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Chapter VIII: Penalties 
Article 21 
 
The penalties prescribed for the crimes stipulated in this Law shall be doubled in case of repetition. 
 
 
Chapter VIII: Penalties 
Article 22 
 
The court may, upon the judgment of conviction, order the closing down of the establishment for a period of 
no less than 3 months and no more than 6 months and the court may rule to publish the verdict thereof once 
or more in two local newspapers at least at the cost of the violator. 
 
 
 
Chapter VIII: Penalties 
Article 23 
 
1. The infliction of the penalties stipulated by this Law shall not prejudice any other stricter penalties 
stipulated by another Law. 
2. The infliction of the penalties stipulated by this Law shall not prejudice the right of the aggrieved to seek 
the court for claiming a compensation for the damage resulting from the violation of any of the provisions of 
this Law. 
 
 
Chapter VIII: Penalties 
Article 24 
 
Competition lawsuits shall have urgency capacity and the competent court may issue decisions for the 
suspension of prevention of any action until the issuance of a final judgment. 
 
 
Chapter IX: General and Concluding Provisions 
Article 25 
 
Any concerned person may submit a complaint to the Ministry concerning any violation of the provisions of 
this Law in accordance with the controls specified by the Executive Regulation of this Law and the 
Resolutions issued in execution thereof. 
 
Chapter IX: General and Concluding Provisions 
Article 26 
Except for what is specified in article 19 of this, criminal proceeding for the crimes specified in this law shall 
not commence except by written request of the minister or whomever he may commission. 
The minister or the commissioned party may reconcile any of these actions before the criminal case is filed 
in return for an amount equivalent to no less than the minimum amount of the fine. 
The Executive Regulation shall specify the guidelines for reconciliation.  
 
Chapter IX: General and Concluding Provisions 
Article 27 
 
Resolutions issued by the Minister may be appealed based on the provisions of this Law before the competent 
court within 60 days of the date of notifying the persons concerned thereof. 
 
Chapter IX: General and Concluding Provisions 
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Article 28 
 
Employees determined by a Resolution of the Minister of Justice in agreement with the Minister and the 
concerned authority shall have the capacity of judicial officers in proving the violations of the provisions of 
this Law and the executive regulations and Resolutions thereof within the scope of competency of each one 
of them. 
 
Chapter IX: General and Concluding Provisions 
Article 29 
 
The Ministry shall coordinate with the competent authorities and the Sectoral regulatory bodies for the 
execution of the provisions of this Law. 
 
Chapter IX: General and Concluding Provisions 
Article 30 
 
Existing establishments upon the time of enforcing the provisions of this Law should reconcile the statuses 
thereof in accordance with the provisions of this Law within a period of no more than 6 months of the date 
of enforcement thereof. 
 
Chapter IX: General and Concluding Provisions 
Article 31 
 
Any provision in conflict or contradiction with the provisions of this Law shall be revoked. 
 
Chapter IX: General and Concluding Provisions 
Article 32 
 
The cabinet shall issue the Executive Regulation of this Law and the Resolutions necessary for the execution 
of the provisions thereof. 
 
Chapter IX: General and Concluding Provisions 
Article 33 
 
This Law shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall come into force after four months of the date 
of publishing thereof. 
 
Chapter IX: General and Concluding Provisions 
[Signed] 
 
Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan 
President of the United Arab Emirates 
Issued by us in the Presidential Palace in Abu Dhabi, 
On 24/Du Al Keada /1433 Hijri 
Corresponding to 10/October /2012 
 
 
Chapter IX: General and Closing Provisions 
Appendix of the Sectors and Activities Exempted from the Application of the 
Provisions of Federal Law No (4) of 2012 concerning Regulating Competition 
 
Any agreement, practice or business related to a certain commodity or service of which another Law or 
regulation shall granted the responsibility of organising the competition rules thereof to sectoral regulatory 
bodies shall be exempted from the application of the provisions of this Law, unless such sectoral regulator 
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bodies shall request in writing from the Ministry to undertake such issue in whole or in part and if the Ministry 
approves such request. Such exemptions shall include the following sectors, activities and services: 
a) Telecommunication sector. 
 
b) Financial sector. 
 
c) Cultural activities (written, audio, visual). 
 
d) Gas and petrol sector. 
 
e) The production and distribution of pharmaceutical products. 
 
f) Postal services, including express mail services. 
 
g) Activities related to the production, distribution and transport of electricity and water. 
 
h) Activities of drainage, garbage disposal, sanitation and similar activities in addition to the 
supporting environmental services. 
 
i) Land, sea and air transport sectors and transport by railways and related services. 
 
 
